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The global One Health movement has become firmly entrenched in both political and 
scientific discourse pertaining to emerging infectious diseases in the past decade. 
Since the discovery of the H5N1 strain of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in 
Hong Kong in 1997, the promotion of more holistic programmes for the control of 
emerging infectious disease has garnered “unprecedented support” in terms of donor 
funding and political mobilisation (Scoones 2010).   Advocates of One Health argue 
that intersectoral approaches promoting better communication between the 
veterinary, medical and environmental disciplines at all levels of governance make 
not only sound economic sense, they are fundamental to the “new approach” required 
to address the growing disease threats of the 21
st
 century. However, despite 
international endorsement of the One Health rhetoric, there is growing pressure to 
now “turn the rhetoric into reality” (Okello et al 2011). Using a multiple, embedded 
case study methodology, this thesis seeks to examine questions surrounding the 
practical implementation of One Health interventions, particularly in developing 
countries which experience limited resources and competing health priorities. 
Through examining the livestock and public health policy processes at both local and 
national levels in Uganda and Nigeria, I attempt to identify whether policy spaces 
exist for the formal inclusion of One Health approaches in future policy decisions. 
Furthermore, by scrutinising the current internationally dominant One Health 
narratives in light of global health governance perspectives and the emerging One 
Health Global Network, I question whether One Health can be better “packaged” to 
include endemic diseases and a more focussed sustainable livelihoods approach; 
arguably inciting greater motivation for developing countries to truly participate. 
Data from my three empirical chapters are presented in the context of three 
overriding “One Health propositions” for consideration; by questioning “whose 
world, whose health
1
”, I aim to delve further into the issues of not whether, but how 
this “new health paradigm” can be operationalised, and how to address the potential 
gaps which may ultimately prevent One Health from becoming a truly global 
phenomenon.           
                                                          
1
 As depicted in Scoones (2010:13) 
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INTRODUCTION TO ONE HEALTH – “A CONCEPT THAT 
BECAME AN APPROACH AND THEN A MOVEMENT”2 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the modern world, bacteria and viruses travel almost as fast as money. With 
globalization, a single microbial sea washes over all humankind. There are no health 
sanctuaries. 
 




Since 1900, the earth’s population has increased from one billion people, to over six 
billion at the beginning of the 21
st
 century (Gibbs 2005). It is estimated that by 2025, 
the human population will stand at over eight billion, largely in developing countries 
where the majority of the world’s poor live (FAO 2008). This incessant rise in the 
planet’s population is placing significant strain on natural resources, with concerns 
that the “world’s latest generation could be the first in history to experience a 
reduction in life expectancy and health in general” (AVMA 2008).  A comprehensive 
study has revealed that approximately 868 (61%) of the 1416 infectious diseases 
known to affect humans are of animal origin, with zoonotic diseases overall twice as 
likely to be associated with emerging infectious diseases compared with non-
zoonotic disease (Taylor et al 2001).  Echoing this, it has been stipulated that up to 
                                                          
2
 Background meeting documents, One Health Global Network, Atlanta November 2011 
3
 Former Norwegian Prime Minister and Director of the WHO; speech at the United Nations 




75% of the emerging infectious diseases seen in human populations over the last 30 
years are of animal origin (Osburn et al 2009, AMVA 2008).  
 
Many hypotheses have been proposed to explain the reasons for this recent “spike” in 
the emergence of zoonotic diseases worldwide. One of the most fundamental factors 
is thought to be the increasing dependence on animal protein for food, which 
inadvertently places natural resources under pressure (Delgado et al 1999). For 
example, the “slash and burn” clearing of forests to expand agricultural land was 
implicated in the emergence of Malaysia’s Nipah virus in 1998 (Kaw 2003). 
Increased human contact with wildlife through poaching, bush meat consumption 
and expanded livestock grazing areas increases the probability of zoonotic disease 
spill over from wildlife reservoirs, such as that seen with Ebola and HIV.  Climate 
change has been implicated in changing disease patterns of vector transmitted 
diseases such as Rift Valley Fever, Human African Trypanosomiasis and West Nile 
Virus. Intensification of farming systems, particularly in developing countries, places 
further pressure on already strained biosecurity measures, increasing the threat of 
emerging diseases and viral amplification (FAO 2008).  Globalisation and tourism 
can facilitate disease spread in less time than the pathogen’s incubation period; for 
example the devastating entry of SARS into Canada in 2004 was traced back to a 
passenger who was healthy at the time of boarding a flight from China (Gibbs 2005). 
Unsafe trading of animals has also been implicated in the introduction of disease on a 
number of occasions, including Monkey pox brought into America in 2003 through a 
shipment of rodents from West Africa.  It has been estimated that “tens of millions” 
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of animals are moved from Asia to other parts of the world for use in traditional 
medicine and food (Gibbs 2005). 
 
1.2 Evolution of One Health  
“Questions of the animal origins of human disease lie behind the broadest pattern of 
human history, and behind some of the most important issues of human health 
today” 
Diamond, Guns Germs and Steel (2007) 
Notwithstanding the interest surrounding emerging zoonoses in the 21
st
 century, the 
intimate connectivity between animals, humans and the environment, and our inter-
dependence upon each other for survival, has been observed for centuries; 
“The relation of animal disease to human disease was observed in the ancient 
civilisations of Babylon, the Nile Valley, and China. Later, they were 
described by Leviticus in the Old testament, by Hippocrates in Greece, and 
by Virgil and Galen in Rome” (Steele 1964).   
 
In the Middle Ages, the plague that killed millions of people was spread by rats, and 
Rinderpest outbreaks across Europe in the 18
th
 century created such serious 
devastation to social and economic structures that Pope Clement XI instructed his 
personal physician to investigate the epidemic when it arrived in Italy in 1713 (Steele 
1964). Some suggest zoonotic disease emergence is linked to two major events in 
history; the agricultural revolution, where livestock domestication around 10 000 
years ago led to the “likely appearance of new zoonotic diseases”, and 
industrialisation, where the shift of focus from infectious disease to “the chronic 
diseases of modern society” has been blamed for weakening public health structures 
over the 20
th
 century (King et al 2004).    
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Furthermore, the association of zoonotic disease with human tragedy such as war and 
famine have been commonly seen throughout history. One of the most famous 
documented events was the 1861-1866 glanders epizootic in North America, as a 
result of the crowding of thousands of mules and horses together for military 
purposes during the American Civil War (Sharrer 1995). The end of the First World 
War saw “the worst infectious pandemic in history”; the 1918-1919 “Spanish flu” 
epidemic which killed an estimated 50 million people worldwide (Reid et al 1999). 
Recent analyses of H1 sequences suggest close linkages to influenza strains naturally 
circulating in avian and swine populations to be the cause (Taubenberger et al 2005).  
More recently, Ugandan districts recovering from decades of civil war have 
experienced unprecedented outbreaks of Human African Trypanosomiasis as a result 
of careless cattle restocking programmes
4
 (Okello et al 2011, Picozzi et al 2005). 
 
1.2.1 Defining One Health  
The term “One Health” has evolved in recent decades to acknowledge this close 
relationship between humans, animals and the natural, political and socioeconomic 
environments in which they co-exist. One Health advocates maintain that 
intersectoral collaboration between the veterinary, medical and environmental sectors 
results in added benefit to each individual sector
5
 (Zinsstag et al 2009, Zinsstag et al 
2005).  Synonymous with One Health are the terms “One Medicine”, “One World, 
One Health™”
6
 and “One World, One Health, One Medicine”
7
. Although no single 
definition is universally accepted, the AMVA defines One Health as the 
                                                          
4
 See Chapter Five of this thesis for a more detailed explanation 
5
 See Figure 1  
6
 A trademark of the Wildlife Conservation Society 
7
 As used by the World Veterinary Congress 
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“collaborative effort of multiple disciplines-working locally, nationally, and globally 
to attain optimal health for people, animals and our environment” (AVMA 2008). 
The External Action Arm of the European Union has a more expansive definition 
which aligns with the approach adopted by the FAO as “the improvement of health 
and well-being through (i) the prevention of risks and the mitigation of effects of 
crises that originate at the interface between humans, animals and their various 
environments and (ii) promoting a cross-sectoral, collaborative, ‘“whole of society’” 
approach to health hazards (Okello et al, 2011). In contrast, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH/OIE) 
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1.2.2 Veterinary and Medical Co-operation to Address Zoonoses 
There remains indecision surrounding whether the veterinary or medical sectors 
should take the lead role in driving forwards One Health and zoonoses control, 
particularly in developing countries where a high burden of endemic disease exists. 
Health Ministries expect the Ministries of Agriculture to address the problem due to 
the origin of zoonoses within animal reservoirs; however the agriculture sector 
argues that as the greatest burden of zoonoses such as rabies is within the human 
population, Health Ministries should share the responsibilities for control. This has 
ultimately led to “control of NZDs falling into the gap between veterinary 
responsibilities and medical needs” (WHO 2009).  
 
Given the evidence surrounding the threat of disease from animal reservoirs, 
particularly in the area of emerging disease, it would seem that closer collaboration 
between veterinary and medical disciplines for the diagnosis, surveillance and 
control of zoonotic infections would be a priority. This is especially true in countries 
with poor internal infrastructure, given the potential cost savings of “doubling up” 
human and veterinary interventions such as vaccination programmes
8
. However, 
some experts feel the veterinary and medical communities are moving further apart 
as we move into the 21
st
 century; “the longstanding omission of fully utilizing 
veterinary medicine’s unique and talented biomedical and comparative medicine 
research potential has been unaccountably short sighted” (Kaplan 2006). Through 
examining various political and economic disease control narratives arising from the 
exceptional international response to HPAI, a major aim of this thesis is to explore 
                                                          
8
 Jakob Zinsstag and colleagues have written extensively on their research experiences surrounding 
joint delivery of health and veterinary services in Arica, see Zinsstag et al (2005), Zinsstag et al 
(2009)   
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some of the institutional requirements needed if greater inter-disciplinary 
collaboration will develop as a long term strategy to address zoonotic disease in 
developing countries. 
 
1.3 Situating the research: The International Response to 
Avian Influenza in the 21st century   
 
The huge media and international response to the emergence of H5N1 Avian 
Influenza, first characterised in the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak where eighteen people 
were infected and six died, is arguably the defining point in revival of One Health 
dialogue in the 21
st
 century. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (HPAI) is 
caused by a subtype of the Influenza A virus (H5N1); the threat of viral mutation to 
become transmissible between humans is high, and there are fears a global pandemic 
would be devastating. To put things in perspective, the 1918 “Spanish flu” pandemic 
had an average mortality rate of just 2 percent, compared to the current strain of 
H5N1 which has a mortality rate of 50 percent (Gibbs 2005).  
 
Since 2003, 283 people have reportedly died from H5N1 worldwide, with frequent 
outbreaks in poultry populations across Asia and Europe possibly contributing to its 
endemicity in bird populations in countries such as Egypt, Indonesia and China 
(Scoones 2010).   HPAI is now endemic in the rice growing areas of Southeast Asia, 
with the estimated economic losses at over $20 billion USD to date (FAO 2008, 
Gibbs 2005). Continued spread of HPAI into Europe via migratory birds has the 
ongoing potential to damage both local and commercialised poultry operations; a fact 
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often overlooked by the media’s focus on the likely impacts of the human disease 
arriving in Europe via a “pandemic that arrives with an infected international human 
traveller on a commercial flight from Asia” (Gibbs 2005).  The “bird flu” epidemic 
preceded a stream of international emerging zoonotic disease scares in recent years 
including SARS, Nipah virus and West Nile Virus, and has prompted calls for closer 
collaboration between the medical and veterinary disciplines for their control. The 
renewed attention on HPAI around 2005 was buoyed in part by a dire warning from 
the head of the United Nations System Coordinator for Avian and Human Influenza 
(UNSIC) David Nabarro, who warned that up to 150 million people could die of bird 
flu; “It's like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than 
it's running at the moment"
9
. The increased political and media focus around 2005 
ultimately led to are-framing of the policy debate “from a problem of chicken 
farmers and hygienically inadequate markets in East and Southeast Asia to one that 
could affect everyone” (Scoones and Forster 2007).  
 
To date, there have been a number of high profile collaborations
10
 between multi-
national partners and donors such as the WHO, FAO and OIE to discuss and 
establish funding and policy platforms which could be utilised to address the issue of 
HPAI and emerging zoonoses in general. Despite these well intentioned initiatives, 
recent epidemiological, economic and political responses to HPAI has raised concern 
by some that the “big politics” of stamping out intermittent disease outbreaks has 
dominated the approach, to the neglect of a “livelihoods approach” arguably more 
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See Appendix I  
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pertinent to developing economies or endemic situations (Scoones 2010). One author 
cites the “firm action” taken by Chinese officials during the 2008 recurrence of HPAI 
in Hong Kong; the looming Beijing Olympics and potential economic consequences 
of an outbreak  are thought to have pushed through the approval of a USD $128 
million market restructuring programme, despite concerns it could send small scale 
poultry farmers out of business (Scoones 2010).  Such a scenario demonstrates the 
“competing policy formulae and diverse, sometimes conflicting, intervention 
responses”
11
 which have accompanied the One Health debate since its inception, and 
a major focus throughout this thesis.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure: Three Propositions for One Health 
 
Using a multi-case study approach, this thesis is structured around three empirical 
chapters, each of which discusses One Health in the context of one of three “levels” 
of health policy: international, national and local. The empirical evidence for each 
chapter is organised around a One Health proposition, inspired by Mosse (2005)
12
.  
In keeping with Stoker (1998), these three propositions aim to present a number of 
features of One Health for consideration, rather than list “a sequence of statements 
that can be proven as true or false” (Stoker 1998). Chapter three (Proposition One) 
has an international focus, which underlies the context for the remaining two 
chapters within the African setting. Chapter four (Proposition Two) is set in Uganda 
with a focus on One Health at the national level. In contrast, chapter five 
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 Discussed in Scoones (2010)   
12
 In Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice Mosse (2005) uses five 
propositions to explore the relationship between policy and practice in the context of an international 
development project in India 
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(Proposition Three) looks at some of the locally relevant issues to One Health 
through a case study in Nigeria.  
 
Africa is deemed a relevant continent for examination of One Health approaches to 
the control of infectious endemic zoonoses. It is the setting for the first major 
collaborative research attempt to look at the impact of endemic zoonotic disease, the 
Integrated Control of Neglected Zoonoses (ICONZ) project
13
, through which my 
research was conducted. Although the recent HPAI situation in Asia has allowed that 
region to receive the lion’s share of zoonoses funding and profile of late, Africa has 
historically been home to some of the most striking examples of disease spill over 
from animals, including HIV and Ebola. Additionally, it is estimated one third of 
agricultural GDP in Africa is obtained through livestock production; therefore 
interventions to improve the zoonotic disease burden should in many cases improve 
livestock outputs, resulting in economic gain to the country and improved human 
welfare (Jones et al 2011).  Although many have been advocating for increased 
prioritisation of the African livestock sector, it still remains a relatively neglected 
sector in terms of macroeconomic policy and funding in many countries, as set out in 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
14
 (Blench et al 2003).  Lack of veterinary 
sector progress is evident at the ground level across Africa
15
, with farmers’ limited 
resources often inadequate to support private veterinary service provision, 
particularly in rural areas.  In contrast, human health justifies continual state support; 
the recognition that animal health is linked to human welfare in the context of 
                                                          
13
 Funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework programme 
14
 Developed by Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIDP) in conjunction with development partners to 
drive macroeconomic policy in countries receiving concessional lending from the World Bank 
15
 A myriad of literature supports my own veterinary experiences in over eight African countries since 
2005   
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zoonotic diseases “needs continual reinforcement” (Butcher 2009). The case for 
improved management of animal diseases in Africa therefore provides a relevant 
setting within which to undertake my PhD research. An overview of the three 
empirical chapters is as follows: 
 
1.4.1 Chapter Three: “Global Health Governance – Where Does 
One Health Fit?” 
- International Policy Context        
 
This chapter investigates the first proposition that “One Health occupies a precarious 
position within the complex dynamics of Global Health Governance in the 21
st
 
Century”. By looking at the multifaceted and changing historical perspectives of 
international health governance since the 19
th
 century, this chapter serves as a 
foundation with which to discuss the complex governance picture of the 21
st
 century 
which unfolds throughout the remainder of the thesis. Secondly, through unpacking 
the Global Public Goods perspective in which One Health is currently framed, this 
chapter considers whether this definition will adequately promote the desired 
characteristics of the approach. Moreover, the chapter explores whether the “One 
Health as a Global Public Good” narrative will allow for equal participation of all 
countries in international One Health initiatives, given that not all diseases occur in 
all countries.  
 
1.4.2 Chapter Four: “One Health by Accident” Control of Human African 
Trypanosomiasis in Uganda” 
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- National Policy Context  
 
This chapter investigates the second proposition that “Politically endorsed national 
One Health structures could help ensure successful, sustained functioning of less 
formal collaborations”.  Through exploring Uganda’s long-standing “One Health” 
approach to zoonotic Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT), this chapter explores 
the approach in the national-level policy context. By examining the formation of the 
Co-ordinating Office for the Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU), a 
permanent interministerial platform set up in the 1990’s for HAT control, I question 
whether its remit could be expanded to a wider One Health focus given the current 
disease climate of Uganda
16
. In the case of both the endemic and the “dramatic” 
disease outbreaks, it is proposed that a formally mandated institutional arrangement 
such as COCTU may allow for better transparency of funding and co-ordination to 
zoonotic disease control, whilst at the same time clarify roles and responsibilities of 
the various sectors. This is particularly important in the absence of policy 
enforcement, such as is the case with most zoonoses in Uganda (and indeed Africa); 
bodies such as COCTU could function as a politically endorsed “glue” to ensure 
sustainability of a One Health approach to disease control  and preservation of 
natural resources. In this way, networks could be co-ordinated both horizontally 
between sectors, and also vertically between the local, national and international 
levels of society to garner advocacy and political leverage for addressing “alternative 
One Health narratives”
17
. Ultimately this chapter serves to highlight the long term 
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 A number of recent high profile, and subsequently well donor-funded, short term taskforces to 
control, outbreaks of anthrax, Marburg virus and Ebola have recently occurred in the country 
17
 Alternative narratives as depicted by Scoones (2010) amongst others include development or 
livelihoods approaches that reinforce the connections between animal health and human welfare.   
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vision required if One Health is to become institutionalised within current 
government policy agendas, particularly in developing countries where competing 
priorities are many. 
 
1.4.3 Chapter Five: “After the Crisis: Sustaining “One Health” 
Momentum in Post-HPAI Nigeria  
- Local Policy Context 
 
This chapter investigates the third proposition that “The evolution of One Health 
from the ‘emergency to the everyday’ necessitates integration of local perspectives”.  
A high profile One Health response existed in Nigeria after the 2006 HPAI outbreak, 
however sustaining its momentum “now the donors have left” is proving difficult. 
Adopting a One Health approach could be beneficial, particularly in addressing a 
potentially large reservoir of Nigeria’s zoonotic diseases at source: livestock of the 
pastoralist Fulani in remote rural parts of the country which supply over 80% of 
Nigeria’s meat and milk. This chapter provides the remaining “local” One Health 
focus through analysis of empirical data from my time on a Fulani grazing reserve in 
the north of the country. Exploration of the Fulani governance systems, with a focus 
on animal health, has provided valuable insight into how disease control occurs in 
the absence of significant government or policy influence. By triangulating the 
Nigerian government’s current approach to zoonotic disease control with views of 
the pastoralist Fulani livestock keepers, I aim to describe the two different views and 
determine ways in which meaningful partnerships between pastoralists and other 
public or private actors involved in animal disease control can be built in future, 
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particularly given the potentially large stake the Fulani have in Nigeria’s public 
health status. Additionally, through attempting to understand the conflict between 
“official” government policy for disease control, and the realities of their on-ground 
implementation through the eyes of the Fulani herders, this chapter contributes 
evidence for the argument that community-driven, rather than donor-driven 
interventions are preferable if One Health is to be promoted as an “everyday” 




It is widely accepted that One Health is becoming the new “21
st
 century exhortation”; 
arising from the international response to HPAI as a means to collectively address 
the health challenges in today’s globalised world (Okello et al 2011).  The 
international political reaction to HPAI has been described by some as an “outbreak 
narrative”, dominated by public fear and an “us versus them” attitude (Scoones 
2010). Although evidence suggests that One Health dialogue has progressed from 
this
18
, the approach is nevertheless still widely discussed in the context of related 
issues such as securitisation and global public good perspective, maintaining a strong 
focus on emerging infectious diseases in the context of a global pandemic.    
 
As with all evolving approaches, it is pertinent to periodically stop and evaluate its 
progress, particularly as One Health advocates come under increasing pressure by 
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policy makers and donors to translate the approach “from ideas into action”
19
. Using 
an abductive case study approach to explore the relationships emerging between One 
Health policy dialogue and its practical implementation, particularly in the African 
context, the crux of this thesis aims to contribute to the growing discussion 
surrounding not whether but how this “new health paradigm” could be 
operationalised. Without concrete examples of how One Health could or should work 
in practice, it risks becoming seen as nothing more than a “desperate attempt to grab 
funds on the tail-end of the avian influenza bonanza” (Scoones 2010). 
 
In conclusion, by presenting a critical analysis
20
 of One Health questioning “Whose 
World, Whose Health”
21
, this thesis aims to contribute evidence towards the 
broadening of One Health narratives outside the context of securitisation and 
emerging infectious diseases which have largely dominated dialogue to date. By 
gaining an understanding of the challenges affecting the often fractured human and 
animal health services in Africa, it is hoped the global appeal of One Health can be 
broadened; at present what is considered “important” to the global community may 
not be important to individual countries faced with large burdens of endemic disease. 
The evidence from the three empirical chapters goes some way to addressing 
Scoones’ “ten challenges”
22
 for the way forward for One Health, not just in terms of 
the human developmental sphere of “poor versus rich”, but also ensuring that animal 
and ecosystem health are not forgotten in the “whose health matters” debate, given 
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 The title theme of the high profile “Winnipeg meeting” held in Canada 2009 (see Appendix I) 
20
 As opposed to a normative view 
21
 Pertinently discussed in Scoones (2010), also touched upon by others for example Okello et al 
(2011)    
22
 As outlined in Scoones (2010:207) Chapter seven: Towards a One World, One Health approach  
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the “severe bias currently towards human health at the expense of the other two” 






















CHAPTER TWO:  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction: Hypothesis and Research Objectives  
 
The drive by One Health advocates to promote, amongst other institutional 
innovations, the creation of inter-ministerial platforms for zoonoses control is well 
founded, buoyed by calls within the global health governance community to move 
away from vertical disease control initiatives towards multi-disease programmes
23
. 
However, whilst theoretically and (arguably) economically attractive, significant 
political commitment is required for this to be practically realised; particularly in 
developing countries where health priorities compete for attention and programmatic 
funding.  
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 As discussed in chapter three: “Global Health Governance – Where does One Health fit?” 
 
The practical realisation of One Health as a framework for global health is 
inherently more complicated than implied in current international dialogue, 
given its dependence on the mutual agreement and co-operation of a wide 





Given the escalation of One Health “talk” in recent years, I felt it prudent to try and 
understand how some of the recommendations ensuing from the “high profile” 
international meetings
24
 could be practically realised on a continent as diverse and 
challenging as Africa. This chapter therefore serves to outline the methodological 
approach taken towards the research, whilst at the same time explore and explain the 
underlying theoretical framework and background information central to my data 
collection and analysis.  
 
The bulk of the empirical data was collected through a series of field trips to both 
Uganda and Nigeria as part of my involvement with the five year Integrated Control 
for Neglected Zoonoses (ICONZ) project, funded by the European Commission. The 
project has a broad overall objective to gather prevalence data and subsequently raise 
the profile of neglected zoonotic diseases
25
 in Africa.  Besides the strong 
epidemiological component, further outputs surrounding socioeconomic, gender and 
political questions are also anticipated. In this way, the thesis structure is set out as a 
series of three empirical chapters, each looking at the international, national and local 
context of One Health in turn.    
 
I started with a generic desire to greater understand “this One Health concept” which 
had suddenly exploded onto the international agenda. Despite understanding the 
appeal of the fundamental objectives of such an approach, I was interested how it 
would work in practice, perhaps given my previous experience of both African and 
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 Outlined in Appendix 1 
25
 For example brucellosis, rabies, bovine tuberculosis, Leptospirosis, anthrax and porcine 
cysticercosis (WHO 2009) 
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South Asian veterinary systems. A preliminary literature review uncovered that 
despite seemingly endless publications promoting One Health as “the new 
professional imperative”
26
, the reality was that few examples of the successful 
adoption of One Health practices existed, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa
27
. It was 
upon this basis that I wished to understand more about how One Health could be 
practically realised on the ground, in locally relevant ways. Looking more outwardly, 
I was interested in injecting a “dose of reality”
28
 into prospective One Health 
policies, felt by some to be lacking in most agricultural policy in Africa (Omamo 
2003).   
 
As a starting point, I felt effort should be made to address the following four broad 
objectives within the thesis: 
 
1. Identify the current process by which animal and human disease control 
policies are developed; that is the how of policy, rather than the what.  
2. Attempt to understand the requirements for the realisation of One Health in 
high risk rural communities, particularly pertaining to advocacy and control 
of endemic zoonotic diseases in areas with limited animal and human health 
resources 
3. Examine the motivation for developing countries to contribute to the 
growing international drive for One Health; particularly given its focus on 
emerging infectious diseases
29
 and their potentially limited relevance to 
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 Title of the AVMA’s One Health Initiative Task Force final report, July 2008 (AVMA 2008) 
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 Notable published exceptions include work done in Chad (Zinsstag and Tanner 2008) 
28
 From Omamo (2003) 
29
 In particular HPAI 
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Africa’s extensive rural systems where the majority of health funding is 
required.  
4. Examine the types of evidence and advocacy necessary for the adoption of 





Using a comparative case study methodology, I wanted to examine these aspects in a 
similar light to that used by Keeley and Scoones, amongst others, within the large 
body of work surrounding environmental policy at Sussex University’s Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS); that is, question how ‘global’ debates play out in ‘local’ 
policy contexts, and vice versa, how local views are incorporated into the global 
network (IDS 2006).  More specifically, I was interested in how the international 
One Health momentum was being perceived or adopted within the national ministries 
of health and agriculture in two African countries, and, at the global level, how the 
One Health Global Network (OHGN)
30
 plans to achieve a truly “global” 
membership. At the same time, I was keen to obtain a greater insight into the more 
general issues I have seen in the African agricultural sector for some years: why is 
the African livestock sector in such disarray, why are so many livestock disease 
control policies unimplementable and seemingly irrelevant, and why the lack of 
consultation with livestock producers in the development of biosecurity models?  
 
Through breaking down the policy processes and trying to understand how current 
disease control policies are developed, funded and implemented in both the 
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 Discussed in Chapter Three 
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Ministries of Health and Livestock, and how – or where – the two may combine their 
approach, I wanted to identify where One Health could be considered in the future. 
There is an undisputable need to understand the policy process in this instance, 
particularly when advocating for a particular approach, or trying to instil a global 
“best practice” for snowballing movements, such as that seen with One Health in 
recent years.  In essence, I wanted to understand the underlying “political economy” 
of policy making concerning livestock and public health policy in Nigeria and 
Uganda; “who gains, who loses and who calls the shots” (Scoones 2010). Through 
understanding the processes involved, I could then begin to comprehend the 
questions which had puzzled me for a number of years working in the African 
livestock sector; not so much the “who” is missed out in the process, but the “why” 
(Scoones 2010).  
 
2.2 Global Health Policy Narratives: The “Big Three31” versus 
the Other Diseases of the Sixth Millennium Development Goal  
 
In 2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit agreed upon the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) developed to provide a “basis upon which a policy 
framework for interventions and advocacy for increased emphasis on improved 
health is based” (Molyneux, 2008). The sixth goal “to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and other diseases” has led to large scale financial interventions aimed to address the 
issues of infectious disease and their contribution to poverty. However, concerns 
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 HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis 
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have been raised that these other diseases, known as the Neglected Tropical Diseases 
(NTDs), have been “conspicuously ignored”, leading to the view that “if the planet 
was viewed by aliens (HIV/AIDs, malaria and tuberculosis) would be seen as the 
only diseases that existed” (Molyneux 2008).  The group of thirteen, often co-
existing NTDs include schistosomiasis, Human African Trypanosomiasis, 
onchocerciasis and trachoma. Despite estimations they account for more than half a 
million human deaths every year, it is their clear linkages to poverty
32
 which makes 
their neglect “difficult to rationalize” (Hotez 2009, Maudlin et al 2009).   
 
In 2005, the UK Commission for Africa recommended the NTDs receive specific 
funding as a group, however the recommendations have been “slow to take effect”, 
with the “big three” still receiving the majority of the world’s attention (Molyneux 
2008). Integrated interventions for the control of NTDs have been described as the 
‘low hanging fruit’ of the disease world, and should be considered as “investments in 
human capital” (Molyneux 2008, Canning 2006). Experts agree that cost 
effectiveness should drive policy recommendations for health budget expenditure in 
developing countries, rather than the financial and political prioritisation of diseases 
according to their “global burden” as calculated using tools such as the Disability 
Adjusted Life Year (DALY)
33
 (Maudlin et al 2009, Canning 2006).  Some have 
argued that the DALY calculation is not an applicable tool for many diseases found 
throughout the developing world; as “hidden” morbidities such as anaemia, 
diarrhoea, loss of work and education opportunities can mask true estimates of 
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 Hotez (2009) estimates that “almost everyone in the bottom billion” suffers from at least one NTD 
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 DALY – The number of years lost to a human life from a particular disease due to disability, 
morbidity or early death. Used to measure “burden of disease”  
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burden (Canning 2006).   Poor estimation of disease burdens are compounded by the 
vast under-reporting which occurs for many of the NTDs, attributed in part to 
inadequate health services and poor diagnostics, particularly in poor rural areas 
where the majority of these diseases are clustered (WHO 2006). As one expert states, 
“many zoonotic diseases are notoriously difficult to diagnose....there may simply be 
no reliable and cheap diagnostic test available” (Maudlin et al 2009). Ultimately, the 
under-estimation of neglected disease has resulted in “serious consequences in terms 
of funding for both research and control initiatives” (Maudlin et al 2009).  The 
system of prioritisation for investment into disease control adopted under the MDGs 
and other significant funding bodies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
has, despite its logic, seen by some as “not universally accepted as being either fair 
or sensible” and could be an explanation as to why NZDs are largely forgotten in 
major Research and Development programmes (Maudlin et al 2009).  
 
Despite the challenges, there have been recent indications that the advocacy of a 
number of NTD “champions” is paying off; in January 2012 the UK’s Minister for 
International Development announced a $785 million four year “landmark 
commitment”
34
 to address Neglected Tropical Diseases in Africa.  Some however are 
concerned that advocacy efforts have been based on “remarkable claims” 
surrounding the number of people affected with NTDs
35
 rather than any real 
evidence; noting that the “other diseases” of the Millennium Development Goals was 
“a label that quickly became the focus of intense lobbying”, given the “huge surge of 
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funding” which would ultimately come its way (Allen and Parker 2011).  There has 
also been some criticism about the efficacy of the Mass Drug Administration 
promoted by NTD networks; notwithstanding the potential issues surrounding drug 
resistance, empirical evidence from evaluations of MDA programmes in Tanzania 
and Uganda show a number of sociological issues with the approach (Allen and 
Parker 2011).  This “push and pull” debate about who should do what appears to be a 
common feature of global health governance in the 21
st
 century (discussed in chapter 
three), and provides an interesting example of the “squabble” for resources by 
networks of health actors.   In conclusion, type(s) of integration applicable to the 
local context should be considered in the development of zoonotic disease control 
programmes, particularly in resource-poor regions.  Whilst the need for increased 
implementation of integrated activities to address NTDs is appreciated, the need for 
them to “be evaluated in a systematic manner” is highlighted (Grépin and Reich 
2008).   
 
2.2.1 Neglected Zoonotic Diseases 
In 2008, efforts to raise the profile of NTDs resulted in the publication of WHO’s 
eight year “Global Plan to combat Neglected Tropical Diseases”, in which the link 
between neglected diseases, poverty and the Millennium Development Goals was 
acknowledged (WHO 2007). Within this plan lies a sub-group of diseases formally 
recognised by the WHO as “Neglected Zoonotic Diseases” (NZDs): Anthrax, Bovine 
Tuberculosis, Brucellosis, Cysticerosis/Neurocysticercosis, Cystic echinococcus, 
Rabies and Human African Trypanosimiasis (HAT) (WHO 2009). Endemic zoonotic 
diseases are common throughout the world, especially in developing countries where 
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poverty, reliance on livestock for income or food, and the close proximity of people 
and their animals favour transmission. Additionally, livestock productivity losses or 
death as a result of zoonotic disease places an even greater strain upon those whose 
livelihoods depend upon them. In her keynote speech at WHO’s landmark 2007 
meeting on Neglected Zoonotic Diseases in Nairobi, Esther Schelling cited 
“dispersed smallholder livestock systems, predominance of informal markets and 
limited capacity and resources to deliver services” as challenges to their control 
(WHO 2007). The need for a One Health approach for the surveillance and control of 
zoonotic disease in developing countries was reiterated, encouraging participants to 
envisage the future research agenda as “interdisciplinary, participatory and integrated 
with prevention and control needs” (WHO 2007).  
 
Institutional support for the control of neglected zoonoses is growing; several 
publications have identified the growing widespread support for their control; “by 
simultaneously saving lives and securing livelihoods, the control of neglected 
zoonotic diseases offers a real and highly cost-effective opportunity for alleviating 
poverty, especially in remote rural communities and marginalized periurban 
communities” (WHO 2009). A sequence of high profile meetings
36
 since 2005 have 
gone some way to increasing the profile of neglected zoonotic diseases within the 
donor community, helping to secure funding for the five year Integrated Control of 
Neglected Zoonoses in Africa (ICONZ) project which began in 2009. This 21 partner 
collaboration funded by the European Commission endeavours to fill vital 
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knowledge “gaps” which currently exist on the burden of NZDs in Africa, hoping to 
provide a strong support basis for One Health advocacy and policy activities within 
these countries.  
 
2.2.2 Current Political and Institutional Challenges of Zoonosis 
Control in Developing Countries 
Major constraints in many developing countries to zoonotic disease control include 
human resources, finances, and discrepancies within government structures such as 
decentralisation.  As a result, national or regional surveillance and control 
programmes are often difficult to undertake on the ground (Okello pers. observation, 
FAO 2008). Government and research institutions, along with animal and human 
health systems (including those in the private sector) all require strengthening if 
disease control under a One Health approach is to occur without long term subsidies 
from the international community. Additionally, advocacy and public sensitisation 
towards the risk factors for zoonoses are important to ensure that community 
behaviour change occurs for the long term prevention and control.  An additional 
challenge for implementation of One Health and functioning biosecurity and animal 
health systems in developing countries is the smallholder farming system which 
dominates the majority of rural settings, particularly in Africa (FAO 2008). 
Enhancement of biosecurity and surveillance mechanisms is necessary for the long 
term sustainable control of infectious disease in poor communities. However, cost, 
tradition, lack of income diversity and lack of alternatives to current practices are 
often cited as reasons why surveillance does not occur. Additionally, there may exist 
a lack of incentive for the smallholder farmer to participate in biosecurity measures, 
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compared to farmers with commercial establishments where uniform disease control 
measures may be financially beneficial (FAO 2008). 
 
Despite the perceived challenges of implicating a One Health approach in developing 
countries, there are positives. This was recognised over a decade ago, with the 1999 
Terramo FAO/OIE/WHO Veterinary Public Health conference focused particularly 
on Countries in Transmission (CIT)
37
 and Developing Countries
38
 in order to reach a 
wider audience. There was acknowledgement that despite the greater limitations to 
Veterinary Public Health services in developing countries, the “opportunities for the 
collaboration of veterinary and human health activities are recognised as existing 
across all countries, and are not confined to specific regions, nor do they respect 
international borders, and they may extend across ethnic and political divides” (FAO 
2003).  
 
2.3 Background to the Methodology: Policy Process Theory 
 
As previously described, the methodological approach taken for this research seeks 
to answer some of the questions surrounding policy processes; that is, aims to 
evaluate the how of policy, rather than the what. In order to undertake and analyse 
the research, I have been guided heavily by the work of Keeley and Scoones (1999) 
amongst others
39
. Their work on environmental policy processes in sub-Saharan 
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Africa appears to be some of the most comprehensive on this subject (Keeley and 
Scoones 1999, Young 2005).  To this end, there is acknowledgement within the 
literature that the majority of policy process studies – particularly those concerning 
research policy linkages - have focussed on Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries
40
, with little attention to those developing 
countries in the “south” (Keeley and Scoones 1999, Young 2005).   This serves as 
part justification for my research; that policy processes in most developing countries 
– particularly in the public health sector - remain poorly understood, and as such this 
thesis aims to contribute some discussion to this. 
 
2.3.1 Policy as a Rational, Linear Process 
In order to “prise open the black box of policy”, there needs to be some 
understanding of what policy is, and how it is made (Keeley and Scoones 1999).  
Despite the plethora of references to policies and policy dialogue in societies across 
the world, the term policy itself is deemed “notoriously difficult to define”; “rather 
like the elephant; you know it when you see it but you cannot easily define it” 
(Cunningham 1963, cited in Keeley and Scoones 1999 amongst others). A fairly 
simplified and explanatory definition of policy is “a purposive course of action 
followed by an actor or set of actors” (Wolmer and Scoones 2005). Some have 
proposed a more traditional policy perspective as "whatever governments choose to 
do or not to do” (Dye 1984, cited in Wolmer and Scoones 2005).  Whilst this may 
apply to some extent, the rising influence of non-state actors in the international 
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health sector (discussed in chapter three) means a number of policy decisions may be 
shaped largely outside of government, particularly in the context of One Health. 
Mosse (2005) distinguishes between policy as an “instrumental view” of rational 
problem solving, and the “critical view” of policy as a means to shape, justify or 
rationalise existing practice; implying the “true political intent of development is 
hidden behind a cloak of rational planning” (Mosse 2005). Regardless of whether a 
technical or critical view is taken, the vast differences in the interpretation of “what 
policy is”, and the analysis of its content, serves to underline the complex and 
contested health policy sphere of the 21
st
 century.   
 
Rather than trying to explain what policy is, or analyse existing policies within the 
case study countries, the bulk of the empirical research undertaken for the purposes 
of this thesis assumes a “critical view” concerned with understanding the how of 
policy making; an approach termed policy process analysis. There exists a widely 
upheld view that policy making is an objective, linear process, whereby policy 
decisions are based on sound scientific evidence, then implemented accordingly (for 
example Keeley and Scoones 1999, Sutton 1999). Critics of this model maintain that 
it is an “inadequate reflection of reality”
41
; depicting a separation between the 
“beauracratic” policy development process and the “technical procedure” of its 
implementation (IDS 2006). In this way, the “blame” for policy failure is easily laid 
upon the political or managerial failure surrounding the implementation aspect, 
rather than the policy itself (Juma and Clarke 1995, cited in Sutton 1999). Expanding 
this, Foucault’s description of political technology, whereby a political issue is 
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 As quoted by Keeley and Scoones (1999) 
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“removed from the realm of political discourse and recast in the neutral language of 
science” is also relevant (Sutton 1999). The promotion of policy development as a 
“neutral and value free” process based on good science, essentially acts to “create a 
mechanism whereby policy makers are absolved from responsibility for the 
outcomes of a policy decision” (Sutton 1999). Over time, the end result of the 
application of political technology results in distancing of policy makers from the 
end-users of their policies, which in a developing country context, could lead to 
greater marginalisation of already poor people, and in the context of neglected 
diseases, maintain their neglected status. Exploring policy processes seeks to 
challenge this rational, linear view of policy, and as such contribute to the body of 
evidence maintaining that “(t)he whole life of policy is a chaos of purposes and 
accidents....not at all a matter of the rational implementation of the so-called 
decisions through selected strategies’ (Clay and Schaffer 1984: 192, cited in Wolmer 
and Scoones 2005).  Although the reality may fall somewhere in between, it is 
nevertheless important to understand that policy decisions are often as much about 
the politics as the science, and that blame for policy failure may just as easily lie 
within the bureaucracy of its development, rather than its implementation (IDS 
2006).  As reinforced by Scoones, “(b)y exploring the political dynamics of policy-
making, the different options and alternatives – sometimes obscured or blocked or 
hidden – are revealed and the diverse pathways to disease response are highlighted” 
(Scoones 2010:12).   
 
Another perspective by which it is helpful to understand the policy process is that it 
relates, although differs in emphasis, to the policy-research nexus.  Ultimately 
49 
 
through gaining an understanding of what constitutes “evidence” for policy, there is 
the potential to help improve research design in the livestock and/or public health 
sectors, resulting in greater utilisation of research efforts in this area.  Many have 
complained of the “wastage” of research efforts, particularly in Africa, stating “most 
policy research on African agriculture is irrelevant”
42
, whilst others acknowledge the 
need for greater understanding of the policy process in order to better communicate 
research findings (Aberman et al 2009). 
 
2.3.2 The Policy Process Framework 
A series of workshops
43
 led by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the first 
part of last decade resulted in the identification of four key areas where the policy 
process in developing countries could potentially be heavily influenced: the political 
context, problems of research supply and communication, “exaggerated” donor 
influence and civil society organisations (Young 2005). My empirical data collection 
therefore aimed to further explore these key areas in light of the growing One Health 
movement.  The literature
44
 alludes to three “broad approaches”
45
 which can be used 
to understand the policy process: 
i) Narratives: Shifting discourses as a result of history or “practice” 
ii) Actor-Networks: Capacity of individual actors to “make a difference” 
iii) Politics and Interests: The interaction between state and civil society 
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The work of Keeley and Scoones attempts to somewhat integrate these three 
perspectives, highlighting the ways in which actors develop certain policy narratives 
within a political context which at the same time constrains them; a necessary 
understanding considered to be at the “heart of the policy process” (IDS 2006). This 
framework therefore served as the lens through which I attempted to understand the 
context of zoonotic disease policies in Nigeria and Uganda, and the possible 
progression of One Health policy within these countries through understanding: 
 
i) The dominant narratives or “stories” concerning zoonotic disease policies in 
Nigeria and Uganda. In particular, given the hugely technical subject of disease 
control, I was interested whether “strong science” was the dominant force behind 
policy development and implementation strategies, and if not, what other narratives 
were playing out and why. 
 
ii) Actor-Networks; who is involved in the policy making process in Nigeria and 
Uganda, and how are they connected? 
 
iii) Politics and Interests; Keeping in mind Scoones “all policy narratives must be 
understood in context.....tussles over the way forward are as much about politics as 
they are science” (Scoones 2010: 12), I aimed to identify the political environment in 
which zoonotic disease control policies are currently developed in Uganda and 
Nigeria, and whose interests currently dominated the process, particularly in light of 




Through looking at these three approaches, I hoped to gain some insight into how the 
“evidence” for policy is interpreted within the various governance networks which 
contribute to livestock and public health policy development in these two countries. 
In this way, I hoped to increase my understanding of why certain decisions have been 
made, whilst others, often despite the scientific evidence to the contrary, have been 
excluded.  
 
2.3.3 Policy Spaces 
Understanding that critical intersection between narratives, actors and the political 
environment can lead to the identification of what is termed policy spaces; loosely 
defined as the extent to which policy makers are restricted in their decision making 
by other influential actors or narratives (Wolmer and Scoones 2005). It is argued that 
understanding the policy process can help identify “weaknesses” within these 
networks or narratives that can be utilised to advance an alternative view, thus 
potentially lead to policy change (IDS 2006). In the case of One Health, I was 
interested to identify whether spaces existed to promote more holistic approaches to 
human and animal health policy in Africa; and whether greater interaction between 
the local, national and international levels for changing and influencing policy was 
feasible.   I suspected that currently, policy spaces for One Health did exist, however 
was interested in the extent to which these would further open up – or potentially 
close down – given the growing movement in One Health globally, for example if 




Whilst arguably a no-brainer – “who doesn’t want One Health”
46
 – the reality of 
instilling change of practice in often traditional ministries, largely represented by a 
generation of older, more conventional medics and veterinarians,  may not be easy.  
Through examining the various policy processes by which human and animal disease 
control policies are prioritised, developed and implemented in Uganda and Nigeria, I 
hoped to gain an insight into how actors and networks involved in policy making in 
these countries could better liaise in the area of zoonotic disease, to achieve a more 
holistic One Health approach, and thus better link in to what is happening at the 
international level. I wanted to understand whether greater participation of 
marginalised communities affected by livestock and health policy could be 
accommodated, and if policy change is possible, how to go about it?  
 
2.4 Research Design: Comparative Case Study Approach  
The research methodology undertaken within this thesis subscribes to the general 
approach to applied sociological research, as set out in Blaikie (2010:42). Within this 
broad framework, I felt a Case Study 
47
 methodology - defined as “in-depth 
investigations of a single instance of a phenomenon in its real life context”
48
 - would 
enable the most logical presentation of the empirical data,. I was however reassured 
by James Coleman’s famed declaration “There is no body of methods; no 
comprehensive methodology for the study of the impact of public policy as an aid to 
future policy” (Coleman 1972, cited in Rist 1994). A multiple case-study approach 
was used to collect the empirical data in two contrasting African settings; one in a 
                                                          
46
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 Yin (1994) 
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settled mixed-farming area of eastern Uganda, the second in a pastoralist cattle-
keeping community of central Nigeria. Both these countries are relevant to the One 
Health debate, given their higher than average burdens of zoonotic diseases (Map 1), 
however the pastoralist Fulani of Nigeria exhibit profound differences in culture and 
attitude compared to the mixed farming communities which were the research focus 
in Uganda, thus serving as an acceptable base for comparison between the two.  
 
The case studies were broadly framed around two sets of “field level” data collection 
involving focus group discussions in Uganda and Nigeria, plus the “national level” 
data collection which occurred through the use of key informant interviews in 
various ministries and institutions in the respective countries (see 2.5). This gave rise 
to the multi-level presentation of the general arguments in the two empirical 
chapters; however the nature of the propositions meant the discussion fell naturally 
towards the “national” perspective in Uganda, and the “local” perspective in Nigeria. 
Aspects of Burawoy’s extended case study methodology can be felt quite strongly 
throughout the research approach.  Burawoy describes the extended case study as a 
reflexive approach to ethnography whereby the researcher is closely engaged with 
the subjects. In this way, the methodology denounces the positivist
49
 approach in 
order “to extract the general from the unique, to move from the “micro” to the 
“macro” and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future” 
(Burawoy 1998). The extended case study methodology therefore paints a picture of 
several “layers” of dialogue; between the researcher and participants at the first level, 
interpreted and embedded in a second dialogue describing forces and processes 
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outside of this first level, ultimately analysed within a third layer of theory (Burawoy 
1998).   
 















Case studies are defined as “in-depth investigations of a single instance of a 
phenomenon in its real life context” (Yin 1994). A multiple, embedded case-study 
methodology has been used to collect the empirical data in two contrasting African 
settings; one in a settled mixed-farming area of eastern Uganda, the second in a 
pastoralist cattle-keeping community of central Nigeria. Both these countries have 
reported higher than average burdens of zoonotic diseases (Map 1).  I felt the contrast 
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between these two socioeconomic settings would be an interesting base with which 
to undertake a comparative study under the wider “international” umbrella of the first 
proposition. Despite the overlying social, economic and animal health similarities in 
these two sub-Saharan African countries (Table1), the pastoralist Fulani of Nigeria 
exhibit profound differences in culture and attitude compared to the mixed farming 
communities which were the research focus in Uganda.  
 
Table 1: Comparative Country Statistics (2010) at a Glance51 
 Nigeria Uganda 




Human Population (millions)  158.4 33.4 
Economy GDP (PPP)  $377.146bn (rank 30) 
Agriculture 40% GDP 
$42.215bn (rank 90) 
Agriculture 15.4% GDP 
Poverty Indicators HDI rank 156 
84.5 % below $2 
(PPP)/day 
HDI rank 161 
64.7% below $2 
(PPP)/day 
Life Expectancy at Birth 51.4 54 
Infant mortality/1000 births 88.4 63 
Total adult Literacy rate (%)  61 73 
Ethnic groups 250 >13 
Religion Muslim 50%, Christian 
40%,Other10% 
Muslim 12%, Christian 
85%, Other 3% other 
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These varying approaches to livestock keeping in vastly different environments and 
cultures provide a basis for which to capture the potential multiple “faces” of One 
Health, whilst at the same time despite the individualities, explore the more general 
comparisons which can be made to help drive forwards the approach and increase its 
appeal to a wide variety of situations and audiences. Moreover, within the overlaying 
context of the dominant international One Health narratives, I wanted to triangulate 
the various “local level” perceptions of current livestock and public health plans with 
that of individuals in the “driving seat” of national agricultural and health policy 
development in these two countries.  My aims to understand and communicate this 
“insider” view of the development and effects of policy were consistent with an 
abductive research strategy, whereby the researcher “aims to discover why people do 
what they do” (Blaikie 2010:89). Taking this a step further, I was then interested to 
evaluate the relevance of One Health events unfolding at the global level to those at 
the national level of government in these two very different social, political and 
environmental settings in Africa.   
 
2.4.1 Generalisability 
Use of the case study in the field of agricultural policy research has been criticised by 
some, largely due to its potential for specificity to a local situation or area (Omamo 
and Farrington 2004). Blaikie, however, argues that the same issues surrounding 
generalisability could occur with any study of a single experiment or population 
(Blaikie 2010: 192). He expands on this by also questioning whether one wants to 
generalise, and if so, suggests it can be done either through researching “typical” 
cases, or, as has been attempted in this thesis, to select a number of cases across 
57 
 
similar sites (Blaikie 2010: 193). Overcoming issues of generalisability through the 
use of a multiple case study methodology has also raised concern that establishing 
“comparability” is extremely difficult; however it is possible that “interpreted 
carefully, (multiple case studies) can often be seen as local manifestations of a much 
more general set of problems, and so can illuminate these” (Omamo and Farrington 
2004).  Although very different in terms of livestock practices, culture and 
environment, it could be argued that – should I want to generalise – the frameworks 
around which my empirical research was gathered in Uganda and Nigeria are in fact 
quite similar. Both frameworks concern sub-Saharan African countries which, 
despite obvious differences in ethnicity and populations, are faced with similar issues 
of poverty
52
 and potentially valuable, yet neglected, livestock sectors. Moreover in 
terms of policy, the state of the health and veterinary sectors in both countries 
epitomise the weaknesses common to these systems across much of sub-Saharan 
Africa, and as such will face similar institutional challenges should a One Health 
approach be promoted in future. For the purposes of this study, I strongly feel that 
the evidence gained in terms of how policy is made and who the major actors and 
influences are, could in fact be applicable to any number of sub-Saharan African 
countries, and as such, generalisations could still be made. Yin (2003) supports this 
through his notion of analytic generalisation, whereby plausible links between 
multiple case studies can arguably be demonstrated if they both correspond to and 
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2.4.2 Reflexivity and my stance within the research 
Blaikie (2010) describes six possible stances a social researcher can adopt, 
elaborated from his previously described three basic positions; outside expert, inside 
learner and reflective partner (Blaikie 2010: 50).  Within these stances, the one I felt 
most adequately reflected my approach to much of the empirical data collection was 
that of reflective partner. In keeping with this position, I have tried to “produce a 
polyphony of voices rather than a single voice”, in order to reduce “authorial bias” 
and misrepresentation within the thesis narratives (Fontana 1994, cited in Blaikie 
2010: 52). Particularly applicable to my approach towards the focus group 
discussions, I aimed to combine my understanding of the situation with the 
“everyday lay concepts and meanings” as experienced by the variety of actors I 
spoke with on a number of open-ended discussions (Blaikie 2010:84).  In this way, 
my epistemological assumptions aligned with that of constructionism, which loosely 
argues that as “knowledge” is the result of ordinary people making sense of the 
world around them, there are “no permanent criteria for establishing whether 
knowledge can be regarded as true” (Blaikie 2010: 95). In essence, I wanted to 
capture the everyday knowledge, attitudes and practices of people involved in these 
systems in Africa, and elaborate it in the context of that which others had described, 
and what I myself had witnessed from living on the continent for the last five years.  
 
Despite being a “mzungu
53
” and therefore, through its very definition an outsider, I 
certainly felt to be more involved with my research subjects than that of detached, or 
even empathetic, observer.  Possibly this was due to the fact that I was hearing 
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remarkably similar accounts of the issues surrounding the sub-Saharan livestock 
sector from the Ugandans and Nigerians that I had heard in previous years working 
in Mali, Ethiopia and Kenya to name a few. Perhaps a certain level of respect – and 
thus a potentially deeper engagement - was earned through my profession; it is rare 
that farmers anywhere get the chance to sit down and discuss their livestock health 
issues with a veterinarian, particularly without payment.  And I cannot ignore the fact 
that my Kenyan surname comes from a large ethnic group which also inhabits the 
area of Uganda where that part of the research was carried out, and whose roots are 
in Nigeria. Given the strong familial connections in Africa, I was afforded a unique 
place in the research; one could even say a certain level of automated trust by 
government officials and villagers alike, which does not come easily to most first 
time visitors to an area. Finally, I always allowed time within the interviews for 
participants to ask me questions also; more often than not personal questions were 
keenly asked, and this helped develop a good rapport with the informants; allowing 
the process to feel less extractive.  Although I wouldn’t go so far as to say I was a 
dialogic facilitator
54
, I did make some effort to interact with the communities and 
subjects of my research more intimately than purely from an observer’s standpoint. 
In this respect, I was comforted by the notion of active reflexivity being an 
“essential” feature of qualitative research (Mason 2002, cited in Blaikie 2010:53):  
“a researcher cannot be neutral, or objective, or detached from the 
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2.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Primary empirical data for the two national level case studies in Uganda and Nigeria 
was obtained through a series of qualitative data collection methods, including focus 
group discussions and semi-structured key informant interviews. In the Nigerian case 
study, a small proportion of secondary data was also analysed
55
. In order to examine 
the ways in which national and global activities are reflected (or not) at the local 
level, I wanted to consider how the views and attitudes of government decision 
makers compared and contrasted to that of the communities they are supposed to 
represent. For this contrasting approach to be realised, I required access to 
participants within the rural communities, along with officials from the ministries of 
health, agriculture and any other sector which presented itself with the opportunity, 
for example academia. As such, a combination data collection technique was used, 
whereby focus group discussions within a natural social setting was the unit of study 
at the local level, compared to key informant interviews within the semi-natural 
settings of the Ministries of Health and Agriculture at the national level. Verbal 
consent was obtained prior to each interview, and all data gathered was treated 
according to the protocol for collection and storage methods outlined in the ACT 
Consortium Manual for Qualitative Data Analysis (Chandler 2009). Direct 
quotations from the empirical evidence is shown throughout this thesis in italics 
within double quotation marks, whereas quotations from secondary sources of 
information such as books, documents, questionnaires or journal publications appear 
within double quotation marks, however are non-italicised.    
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In terms of data analysis, the same methodology was used for data collected both via 
focus group discussions and key informant interviews. All interviews were taped
56
, 
then the complete transcripts written out from the tape recordings. As the key 
informant interviews were all conducted in English, this posed no problem for the 
transcripts. The FGDs were however conducted in local language with an English 
translator, therefore the transcripts consisted of the English only in these recordings. 
This was not ideal; I would have preferred these recordings to be transcribed directly 
from the participants’ comments using a local translator, however the resources 
required for the many weeks’ work this would have taken (almost 30 sessions 
involving around 270 participants and over 50 hours of recordings) could not be 
justified within the financial scope of my research, so had to settle for transcripts of 
the translations. Where possible I checked and cross-checked the information at the 
time of interview to ensure what the participants were saying was accurately 
translated.  
 
Once the transcripts were completed, I attempted the use of NVivo© software for 
analysis, however felt that my efforts to analyse the various classifications within the 
rigid software programme were taking away from the true understanding and context 
of the content. After several attempts at the software I opted instead to print out all 
the transcripts double-spaced, and manually group statements according to subject 
(and often context), similar to the use of nodes and sub-nodes in the software. In 
terms of the analysis of the actual content of the quotations and materials, I remained 
aware of the possible limitations to understanding and teasing out the underlying 
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discourse, in as much as any analysis of individual human thought and motivation is 
limited. The reality in this type of work, particularly as an “outsider”, is that people 
may not always divulge their true opinions or feelings; hence it is within this 
limitation that my analysis and subsequent presentation of the empirical data lies. 
 
2.5.1 “Global” Level Data Collection (Open-ended 
Questionnaires, Document Analysis)  
The empirical evidence of the One Health “global perspective” discussed in chapter 
three is largely a result of a analysis of secondary data. Attendance at a large number 
of One Health meetings, conferences and plenary sessions has given me a good 
insight into the currently evolving thinking surrounding One Health, and the major 
debates playing out at the international level. Secondary data was largely obtained 
through my experiences with the development of the One Health Global Network 
(OHGN); one of six working groups to come out of the 2010 Stone Mountain 
Meeting. Attempts to gain individual reaction to formalising this array of existing 
networks through the One Health Global “network of networks” was initiated via a 
semi-structured questionnaire, sent around by Dr. Alain Vandersmissen
57
 to a 
number of professionals within the human health, veterinary, policy and government 
sectors. The questionnaire aimed to seek individual views on the possible functions 
of a One Health Global Network, and within this, participants were able to expand on 
their ideas as to what actually means, thus presenting some insight into the evolving 
international perceptions.  My role within this was to provide an objective synthesis 
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 which was subsequently circulated to a large number of individuals 
within the international One Health community and referred to in the public domain 
(for example Normandeau, 2011).   
 
My role in the One Health Global Network, of which I also participated as an 
observer, was largely due to my corresponding employment with ICONZ. I assisted 
Dr. Alain Vandersmissen with general co-ordination of meetings and materials, and 
as such was able to attend the inaugural “Expert Meeting on One Health Governance 
and Global Network” in Atlanta 2011
59
 as a University of Edinburgh representative. 
In terms of separating my stance as a researcher with that of a One Health 
“stakeholder”, I feel my status as observer allowed me to keep a more critical 
distance than if I had been participating as a member of the tripartite (WHO-OIE-
FAO) or other actor with a greater historical, financial or political stake in One 
Health
60
. Ultimately at the global level, I wanted to understand the unfolding 
dialogue within a number of epistemic communities surrounding global 
“governance” of One Health, and its relevance to the majority of nation-states. I felt 
including some of this secondary and observational data gave weight to the thesis in 
terms of my critical analysis behind the wide range of interpretations as to what One 
Health actually means, who is invited to participate in the dialogue, and what 
different actors (including nation-states) want out of the process. 
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2.5.2 “National” Level Data Collection (Semi-Structured 
Interviews) 
Empirical data at the national ministerial level was collected largely through a 
snowball sampling technique (see Blaikie 2010:179). Given the relatively “closed” 
doors, suspicion (especially of foreigners) and lack of time common to most 
government officials in African ministries, snowball sampling was deemed the most 
sensible – and in many instances the only available - technique to ensure that I 
actually secured the interviews. In both Uganda and Nigeria, I started with one or 
two initial contacts and as I spoke to more people, the numbers of “who I should talk 
to” escalated from there. Although meetings were difficult to set up in advance, I 
found that once I arrived in the country things progressed relatively smoothly; people 
I had already interviewed were overwhelmingly supportive of me making further 
contacts within the ministries, often passing on phone numbers and in two cases 
personally calling their peers to arrange another interview for me.  
 
Interviews were largely conducted within ministerial offices once verbal consent to 
interview and tape the interviews had been obtained.  In order to establish rapport 
with the government representatives and relax them initially, I emphasised 
confidentiality of the interview content; some of the key informants who were high 
officials of the MoH or international organizations preferred not to be identified.  
Since assuring informants the interviewee would remain anonymous, I have only 
referred to quotations throughout this thesis as simply the date, and the ministry from 
which the informant is based. After initial apprehension from some informants
61
, I 
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found interviews to be extremely positive once they were in progress, with only one 
instance where the informant did not consent to their interview being recorded.   
 











The primary objective of the key informant interviews was to understand the process 
by which livestock and zoonotic disease control policies were developed, and obtain 
a greater understanding of the policy processes and level of inter-ministerial 
collaboration which currently occurs for zoonotic disease control. Taking this 
further, I wanted to establish where, if anywhere, the potential existed for policy 
spaces to “open up” to include formally endorsed and funded One Health 
approaches, for example inter-ministerial platforms for disease control.  The 
 
THEMES DISCUSSED IN KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
  
 Awareness and/or Interpretation of One Health and its relevance to the 
ministry 
 Current processes by which policy narratives are developed and 
implemented within the ministry/institution  
 Perceived impact of health and livestock policy on rural communities  
 Current level of intersectoral collaboration for zoonotic disease 
surveillance and control, and any available or potential platforms 
 Role of government and other actors in zoonotic disease control  
 Opinions/ideas surrounding policy recommendations and 
implementation for “One Health”  
66 
 
checklist of general themes I wanted to discuss with key informants is listed in Box 1 
(page 65). Ultimately, in addition to understanding the processes by which policy 
was made in their respective ministries, I wanted to ascertain the priority informants 
placed on One Health (and public health in general given the overwhelming pressure 
to address HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB in these countries), and the likelihood of 
formal interministerial agreements on health becoming a reality outside of donor 
funding.  Particularly given the decreased focus and funding towards avian influenza 
by the international community, I was interested to gauge the perceived medium term 
impact of the numerous One Health trainings and resources.  Finally, given most 
neglected zoonoses affect poor rural communities I wanted to ascertain how 
“connected” my ministerial informants – particularly at the national level – were 
with the on-ground realities of promoting and achieving “good community health” in 
their countries, and the impact of health decisions particularly at the central level.   
Despite these seemingly set checklist of priorities, the key informant interviews 
ended up being quite unstructured in many cases. I usually allowed the interview to 
follow its natural path, particularly where informants were willing to elaborate on 
certain topics; informants all had a specific role or expertise within their ministries or 
institutions, and more often than not could offer detailed information in one area over 
another. I felt that by sticking too rigidly to a set of interview questions I would lose 
the interest of the informant, and also potentially miss out on valuable information if 
we both felt constricted by the questions.   
 
2.5.2.1 Uganda National Perspective: Key Informant Interviews 
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A total of 13 key informant interviews were held with officials from the ministries of 
health and agriculture (MAAIF), plus individuals from academia and the private 
sector. Generally it was easier to secure interviews in Uganda compared to Nigeria, 
due to the close working relationships with the University of Edinburgh which gave 
me a starting point from which I could snowball. I was well received in Uganda; the 
only frustration being the amount of time spent waiting in government ministries for 
people to show. 
Table 2: List of Key Informant Interviews Uganda (names withheld) 
Informant Institution Sector Position 
 
A Central Ministry of Health Neglected Tropical 
Diseases 
Commissioner 








C Central Ministry of Health Veterinary Public 
Health 
Veterinary Officer 






E Central Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAAIF) 




F Central Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAAIF) 
COCTU Deputy Director 
G Central Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAAIF) 




H Academia Veterinary Associate 
Professor 
I District Ministry of 
Agriculture 




J Sub-county Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Livestock Health and 
Disease Control 
Veterinary Officer 
K Local Government 
Authority 
Health Nurse 
L N/A Livestock Private 
veterinarian 
M Local Government 
Authority  





2.5.2.2 Nigeria National Perspective: Key Informant Interviews  
Data from a total of twelve interviews (seven primary sources, five secondary 
sources) were used to gather policy perspectives from members of the Nigerian 
Ministries of Health and Agriculture, at both the state and federal levels of 
government. Informed verbal consent was obtained prior to the commencement of 
each interview, and informants were guaranteed anonymitiy should they so wish.  
Table 3: List of Key Informant Interviews Nigeria62  
Informant
63
 Institution Sector Position 






Public Health and 
Special Projects 
B State Ministry of 
Health/World Health 
Organisation 
Epidemiology Desk Officer 
















F State Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Veterinary Public 
Health Division  
Desk Officer 











I Private Sector Health Medical Doctor  
J* Private Sector Veterinary Veterinarian 
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 An asterisk (*) depicts where secondary data was used, previously gathered by my research 
counterpart Dr. Ayodele Majekodunmi  
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Whilst interviews at the state level of government were relatively easy to secure 
given my association with both the ICONZ and Combating Infectious Diseases in 
Livestock for International Development (CIDLID)
64
 projects, I did not have any 
contacts at the federal level when I first started. However, a lucky break came in the 
form of a conference in Ghana a few days before I was to return to Abuja; over 
coffee I was talking to a Nigerian veterinarian and joked whether he knew anyone 
within the Ministry of Agriculture there, as I was interested in conducting some 
policy research through CIDLID and ICONZ Work Package nine. Within minutes I 
was speaking on the phone to the Assistant Director of Nigeria’s Federal Department 
of Livestock, and arranged to meet him in Nigeria two days later. From this meeting, 
I was able to secure other interviews within the Ministries of Heath and Agriculture 
through snowballing; a testimony to the co-operation and openness of Nigerian 
government officials which I found existed beyond my stay in the country. 
 
 
2.5.3 “Local” Level Data Collection (Focus Group Discussions) 
Focus Group Discussions are qualitative interview techniques where a homogenous 
group of participants (usually around 6-12) discuss selected topics assisted by a 
moderator (Tynan and Drayton 1988).  Focus groups are used in a variety of sectors, 
both public and private, and are especially popular in the health sector to help assess 
public understanding of illness and health education messages, and experience of 
health services (Kitzinger 1995).  At this level, I was particularly interested in the 
level of knowledge within rural communities about how policy was made at the 
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various levels of government, and the levels of individual participation which 
occurred within these processes. I also wanted to know about any current livestock 
policies, particularly concerning veterinary treatment and quarantine that were 
enforced within these communities, and how it affected them. Finally, I wanted to 
understand community knowledge and perception on zoonotic diseases and their 
control, along with their attitudes towards the proposed interventions in that 
particular study area
65
.  Box 2 (page 70) depicts the original focus group checklist I 
developed before going to the field, included here as it outlines the original key 




Focus Group Discussions were conducted through a facilitator/translator in both 
Uganda and Nigeria. Although fluent in the local language, the facilitators in both 
cases were not from the area specifically. The two different facilitators used in 
Uganda (corresponding to the two groups of fieldwork in Serere and Soroti districts) 
both had a veterinary background, whilst the one in Nigeria did not. Prior to the 
beginning of the FGDs, the facilitators explained the research and reason for 
gathering of the people, and verbal consent was obtained for participation and 
recording of the session. No written consent was obtained, as I feel this may have 
formalised proceedings to the extent of possible bias given the quite politicised 
settings in both countries
67
.  
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In terms of conduction of the FGDs, I have been formally trained in facilitation and 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques and have good experience in the use 
of these approaches in similar settings
68
. I tried as much as possible to ensure all 
participants were able to contribute, despite the presence of dominant individuals as 
is the norm in most participatory activities. There were of course times when local 
culture needed to be respected; particularly in the case of Nigeria it was the cultural 
norm for group elders to “speak for the rest of the group” as the younger members 
listened.  As is expected, the use of translators meant that I couldn’t engage with 
participants as fully as would be possible had I spoken the same language, however 
despite this I attempted to engage as fully as possible through active listening and 
maintaining humility.    
 
2.5.3.1 Perception of Risk 
Another critical body of information I hoped to contribute to with this research is the 
notion of community “risk perception”; “the judgements people make when they are 
asked to characterise and evaluate hazardous activities” (Slovic 1987). The 
importance of understanding why people behave the way they do, in this case in 
terms of their response to zoonotic disease, cannot be underestimated. There is much 
emphasis in current public health programmes on the risk factors; for example, do 
people realise drinking raw milk is a risk factor for brucellosis, or that eating 
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undercooked pork is a risk factor for cysticercosis?  In terms of policy development 
however, communicating the risk factors to the public is of little value if cultural 
norms do not portray them as a risk; as such I felt triangulation of risk factors within 
the context of risk perception is necessary to promote beneficial disease control 
policies.    















The international response to HPAI is a good example of how risk factors, such as 
poor hand washing and kitchen hygiene, could easily be communicated, and in many 
instances improved, within affected communities. However it was noted that “no 
systematic studies to our knowledge, have really delved into the understandings of 
 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION CHECKLIST 
 Current understanding of zoonotic diseases (symptoms, treatment, control, risk 
factors/perception, willingness to pay for control) 
 Sources of information on animal and human diseases 
 Motivations to utilise preventative vis-a-vis curative therapy in animals 
 Availability, Acceptability, Affordability, Accessibility and Quality of both animal 
and human health services in the area 
 Evidence of co-operation between human and veterinary services 
 If none, would this be something that makes sense? 
 Aspects of cattle movement, trade and market practices 




people’s risk perceptions and how cultural practices might affect their responses” 
(Scoones 2010:33).   Examples were given of how cultural practices such as the 
drinking of duck’s blood was “looked upon by some with horror”, rather than 
attempted to be understood in its cultural context (Scoones 2010:33). It appears that 
particularly in developing countries, project objectives surrounding communication 
and advocacy strategies for “risk factors” often overlook the notion of risk 
perception. In many cases there is an inherent assumption that once the risk is 
understood, people will stop engaging in “risky” behaviour, as this excerpt 
illustrates; “the people were seen as backward and in need of modernisation, and 
their fatalism about death and disease something that could be overcome through 
education and propaganda” (Scoones 2010:33).  
 
In conclusion, I wanted to utilise the focus group discussions to obtain more detailed 
knowledge about how people perceive and respond to the threat of disease. Through 
understanding the communities’ Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices with respect to 
zoonoses, I felt it would contribute to the body of evidence for how One Health 
could work in practice, given the current challenges with health and veterinary 
systems, local knowledge and culture, and isolation in sub-Saharan Africa. For the 
remainder of the thesis, direct quotations from focus group and interview participants 
are depicted in italics, as opposed to quotations from tertiary data sources.  
 
2.5.3.2 Uganda Local Perspective: Conduction of Focus Group 
Discussions 
The fieldwork for the Ugandan Case Study was undertaken in selected villages in the 
Soroti and Serere districts of eastern Uganda. Access to these villages was gained 
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through a series of field visits in 2010 and 2011, as part of my involvement with the 
Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness (SOS) campaign (see chapter five).  Soroti and Serere 
are the two districts which received targeted interventions against Human African 
Trypanosomiasis (HAT) in phase two of the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness 
programme. Both visits occurred in the dry season; the first being in July-August in 
2010, at the time of baseline sample bleeding, with the second visit in June 2011, 
around seven months after the restricted application spray and trypanocide 
intervention had taken place in November 2010
69
.  This gave a unique opportunity to 
discuss with local communities both pre and post-intervention, and ascertain their 
response in terms of HAT risk perception, particularly with their understanding of 
the role of cattle.  The villages were randomly chosen as a subset of the original 
sample frame used to obtain the August 2010 serological baseline for Stamp Out 
Sleeping Sickness Phase Two. Participants were randomly invited to attend the focus 
groups; and verbal consent was obtained prior to the start of every discussion. The 
sessions were done in the local language of Ateso, however in one area we had a 
second translator as the language was a version of Luo which my translator did not 
speak.  Participants were given no incentives to participate, however a token sum 
was paid to individuals in some cases who helped with the translation in areas where 
my facilitator was not proficient in the dialect. Some individuals within the groups 
also spoke English. There was no homogeny of participants in terms of gender and 
age as for the Nigerian case study, partly because social norms in this area did not 
dictate it, and also because the social unit I was interested was cattle keepers who 
lived in an HAT endemic area with experience of the SOS programme, regardless of 
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age or gender.   Discussions lasted on average around two hours, and, pending 
participants’ permission, were voice recorded in addition to taking handwritten notes. 
Transcriptions of the taped recordings were done at the end of every day. I did not 
take names of participants in the Ugandan case as I felt this to be too invasive given 
my limited time spent with the groups, however if certain individuals, particularly 
those with status such as the Local Councillor (LC1), introduced themselves I made a 
note of it. 
Table 4: Focus Group Discussions Soroti and Serere Districts 
Village Parish Subcounty District Participant 
Number (n) 
Mugarama B Aarapoo Pingire Serere 9 
Tuburu Achuna Tubur Soroti 11 
Omoce Aparisa Tubur Soroti 16 
Gweri Awaliwal Gweri Soroti 12 
Agirigiroi B Dakabela Arapai Soroti 13 
Awoja Dokolo Gwere Soroti 15 
Akwangalet Kagwara Kadungulu Serere 10 
Owole Kamuda Bugondo Serere 8 
Okolonga Kidetok Pigire Serere 7 
Umulotok Kidetok Pigire Serere 8 
Lale Lale Kamuda Soroti 9 
Chele Lale Kamuda Soroti 6 
Obure Obule Asuret Soroti 6 
Idupa Oburin Olio Serere 7 
Anyalai Olwelai Katine Soroti 15 
Adoku 
(Kaduka) 
Osuguru Olio Serere 10 




Discussions with local participants focussed upon the general checklisted questions 
as set out in Box 2 (page 70) however in many cases there was an added emphasis on 
the community response to the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness intervention.  This was 
done to ascertain whether this high profile zoonotic disease intervention resulted in 
increased understanding and perception of disease risk amongst the communities, 
and if not, why not. 
 
2.5.3.3 Nigeria Local Perspective: Conduction of Focus Group 
Discussions 
 
Over the three week period on Kachia Grazing Reserve in March 2011, a total of 
thirteen focus group discussions (n=95) were conducted in Hausa and Fulfulde, 
translated into English through an interpreter. Although individual participants for 
each focus group were chosen at random, the groups themselves were homogenous 
according to age and gender. This was in part due to the very gender-specific 
research focus of my counterpart, but also because of the strict social make-up of 
Fulani society. Having heterogeneous groups of participants, particularly in terms of 
gender, would at best exclude women from participating in conversation where men 
were present, and at worst, generate a cultural faux pas by bringing unrelated or 
unmarried members of male and female communities together in a public space, 
potentially resulting in severe problems within the community.  Verbal consent was 
obtained prior to the start of every discussion, with participant names and ages 
recorded. Discussions lasted around ninety minutes on average, and, pending 
participants’ permission, were voice recorded in addition to taking handwritten notes. 
Transcriptions of the taped recordings were done together with the translator at the 
end of every day, which also gave us a chance to discuss findings and make 
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clarifications on the content, particularly where questions surrounding translation of 
a particular concept arose. 
The schedule of focus groups was developed as follows: 
 Males 10-24 years 
 Males 25-64 years 
 Males 65+ years 
 Females 10-24 years 
 Females 25-64 years 
 Females 65+ years 
 Heads of Blocks 1-6 
 Co-operative Society Leaders (males) 
 Co-operative Society Leaders (females) 
 School teachers (both males and females in the same group) 
 
Overall, the conduction of FGDs within the KGR was largely successful. Participants 
were given no incentive to take part in these, although the provision of biscuits and 
kola nuts was appreciated. Initially, progress was slow, and we detected quite a high 
level of suspicion from villagers as to why we were conducting these “discussions” 
without the village heads present. Particularly for the womens’ groups, we had to 
spend quite a lot of time explaining why we needed to speak to the women without 
the men present; a concept which was foreign to both the men and women.  Early on 
in the research we encountered quite a large barrier; no-one was turning up to our 
focus group discussions despite the lengthy negotiations and agreements on their 
conduction which had occurred with the Heads of Blocks. Upon further investigation 
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we discovered one particularly powerful individual was telling the community not to 
speak to the “strangers”.   It was not until the Imam later announced through the 
mosque that villagers were permitted to speak to us that people would arrive when 
discussions were held. It appears the challenges we faced interacting with the Fulani 
were not unique to our situation; references to “suspicion and reluctant co-
operation”
70
 appeared in subsequent ICONZ project documents describing the 
serological work carried out on livestock on the reserve, and accounts in the 
literature also refer widely to Fulani suspicion of “outsiders”
71
.   
   
Table 5: Focus Group Discussions Kachia Grazing Reserve 
Gender Age   Block  Participant Number 
Male >65 1 6 
Male 25-64 1 14 
Male 25-64 5 10 
Male  25-64 6 5 
Male 10-24 4 7 
Male – Co-op Leaders N/A N/A 7 
Female >65 1 5 
Female 25-64 3 7 
Female 10-24 2 9 
Female 10-24 6 4 
Female – Co-op 
Leaders 
N/A N/A 11 
Mixed – Teachers N/A N/A 7 
Heads of Blocks N/A 2, 4, 5 3 
Total participants   N = 95 (41F, 54M)  
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Despite the challenges, there were successes with the Kachia focus group 
discussions; particularly the unique position we, as two female researchers, enjoyed 
being able to speak to the women unchaperoned.  In this respect we were indebted to 
our Fulani translator, who despite being male and an “outsider”, appeared to earn a 
high level of respect in a short amount of time from the opinion leaders. I feel certain 
that without his negotiating skills and mobilisation techniques, we would not have 
gained permission to speak to the women without the men being present. The fact 
that we were able to hold women-only meetings meant that we could gain unique 
perspectives of the female social units, an aspect of Fulani society known to have 
received “little attention” to date in the literature (de Bruijn 1997)  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
The empirical data for this thesis was collected using a multiple embedded case study 
approach; two “national” case studies in Uganda and Nigeria, and an “international” 
case examining currently dominant policy narratives and the challenges of One 
Health governance. Combination qualitative methodologies were used at both the 
local and national levels to triangulate the various perceptions on policy development 
and implementation, with a particular focus on zoonotic diseases. It was felt that this 
approach acknowledges the “broad brush thinking across all levels of policy” 
required to address health issues in developing countries, particularly zoonoses given 




Data collection occurred keeping in mind the previously discussed requirement to 
understand the “underlying politics of policy processes”
72
; that is, the influence of 
individuals, networks, and the wider political context on policy development. 
Through understanding these three elements, particularly where they intersect, I 
wanted to identify potential policy “spaces” that could elevate One Health into the 
mainstream of national –and potentially international - policy dialogue. Guided by 
Scoones (2010:13), questions posed to participants aimed at generating knowledge 
around the following issues:  
 Who are the actors involved in policy development, and what are the major 
influences on their decisions? 
 What “policy spaces” could potentially open up (or close down) within this 
policy environment? 
 What are the potential impacts of current health and livestock policies on 
livelihoods? 
 What are the motivations for communities to adhere to policies and enforce 
them within their local areas, especially those pertaining to zoonotic diseases? 
 
Overall, It is proposed that the results from these case studies will promote a greater 
understanding of the factors which motivate farmers and associated stakeholders to 
partake in sustainable zoonoses control in a variety of African settings; in short, 
contribute to discussion surrounding national-level operationalisation of One Health. 
Additionally, by attaining primary information from a number of ministerial and 
other institutional stakeholders through key informant interviews, the case studies 
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attempt to strengthen existing knowledge on the feasibility of intersectoral 
collaboration between relevant government departments, research institutes and the 
private sector, for the development of sustainable national zoonotic disease control 




















GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: WHERE DOES ONE 
HEALTH FIT? 
 
One Health occupies a precarious position within the complex 





A detailed look at Global Health Governance in the “Global Health Decade”
73
 
acknowledges the rising stake of non-traditional health actors
74
 in a sphere that has 
been largely dominated to date by the WHO, national health ministries and a small 
number of state research institutes. Globalisation, emerging disease threats and 
international pressure resulting from the Millennium Development Goals are all 
proposed as reasons for the increased funding, visibility and subsequent explosion of 
global health issues onto the political scene in recent years. It is into this convoluted 
network of Global Health Actors (GHAs) that One Health has landed; this chapter 
therefore aims to explore One Health’s raison d'être in the various contexts and 
complexes surrounding Global Health Governance as we enter the second decade of 
the 21
st
 century. Through examining the literature in conjunction with empirical 
evidence gained from my involvement with the One Health Global Network 
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, this chapter aims to investigate the first proposition of this 
thesis: that “One Health occupies a precarious position within the complex dynamics 
of Global Health Governance in the 21st century”.  
 
This chapter begins with an historical account of International Health Diplomacy 
dating back from the 19
th
 century, from which several comparisons to the 21
st
 
century situation can be drawn. Following this, the evolution of international health 
governance into the 20
th
 century is discussed, focussing in particular on the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) which, since its inception in 1948, has had to majorly 
adapt to the changing patterns of global health governance during its sixty years of 
existence. Looking at the WHO’s history in light of its “global political legitimacy”
76
 
gives a good foundation with which to understand the various interconnections, 
alliances and priorities which have formed within and between the major health 
actors over time; a context within which One Health must now fit.  The rise of 
Global Public Goods (GPGs) as a means to “solve” the world’s health problems is 
discussed, and, through examining the theory behind the GPG perspective, questions 
around the “broad consensus”
77
 that One Health is a Global Public Good are raised.  
 
Looking at some of the interactions occurring at the international level also helps 
frame the subsequent empirical chapters, particularly given the strong influence of 
international policy narratives on health programmes of developing countries, such 
as those discussed in the Ugandan and Nigerian case studies.  Control of the wide 
scope of public health issues of potentially international concern, either emerging or 
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endemic, are not necessarily priorities in developing countries with little access to 
trade and where international pressure to address the “big three” usually overwhelm 
health budgets and policy decision-making.  By examining current global health 
governance discourse, this chapter aims to explore options to motivate and encourage 
developing countries to invest in alternative One Health approaches, and how 
international movements such as the development of the One Health Global Network 
may encourage or prevent participation.   
 
3.1.1 What is Globalisation?  
Globalisation is the process of increasing social, economic and political inter-
dependence; recognising that events in one part of the world have an ever-growing 
effect on people and places in another (Fidler, 2001). Globalisation continues to 
evolve as people, goods, concepts, capital, ideas and values diffuse across national 
borders; such integration continues to have “critical implications for public health 
and global public health governance”, largely affecting the sustainability of health 
systems worldwide (Taylor 2002).     
 
Similar for many sectors, the advent of globalisation is a double-edged sword for 
health, with the continuing cross-border flows of people, goods and services meaning 
that health determinants, status and outcomes cannot be assured by the actions of 
national governments alone. There is a recognised need for collective action
78
, which 
goes beyond government sectors to include the private and third party sectors - such 
as the international development agencies - to better manage the health risks 
associated with globalisation. Some commentators argue that the effects of 
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globalisation go so far as to undermine state control, leading to changes in traditional 
governance that force nation states to co-operate with each other and build 
partnerships with non-state actors to ensure the health of their own country (Ng and 
Ruger 2011).  There is also widespread acknowledgement that human health 
determinants are increasingly influenced by factors outside the health sector such as 
trade, crime, communication technologies and environmental factors. Calls to 
“broaden the horizon of public health” are increasing in frequency, recognising that 
human health should be “further up” the policy agenda (McMichael and Beaglehole 
2000).  
 
3.1.2 Theoretical Framework: A Note about Governance 
Anglo-American political theory uses the term government to refer to the “formal 
institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive power” (Stoker 
1998). Characterised by its ability to make and enforce decisions; government thus 
refers to the “formal processes at the state level which maintain civil order and 
facilitate collective action” (Stoker 1998).  In contrast, the term governance reflects 
the “shifting patterns of styles of governing” which have largely emerged in recent 
decades (Stoker 1998).  Dictionary definitions have traditionally alluded to 
governance as a synonym for government; however the growing amount of research 
into governance theory has broadened the definition as “referring to a new process of 
governing, a changed condition of ordered rule” (Rhodes 1996, quoted in Stoker 
1998).  Despite the comparable end-points, the major difference between government 
and governance is largely found within the means by which each is achieved;  
“Governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered 
rule and collective action. The outputs of governance are not therefore 
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different from those of government.  It is rather a matter of difference in 
processes” (Stoker 1998). 
 
 










Some authors use the term governance to indicate governing styles by which the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors have become blurred, aiming to 
capture the “shift in thinking” which has developed in recent years, particularly in 
the international development sector. It is thought that governance is a more 
appropriate terminology to reflect the growing interdependence of the public, private 
and donor bodies in the policy arena of developing countries, particularly in the 
health sector (Ng and Ruger 2011). As will be evident in this thesis, the notions of 
“contracting-out” to the private sector and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are 
now part of the reality of decision-making in many countries.  More recently, the 
“governance perspective” has been developed as an organising framework to help 
understand the changing processes of governing, leading to “fresh perspectives 
which may not have been identified through other frameworks” (Stoker 1998). Box 3 
The “Five Propositions of Governance” (from Stoker 1998): 
1. Refers to a series of institutions or actors drawn from - but also beyond - 
government 
2. Identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and 
economic issues 
3. Identifies the power dependence between institutions involved in collective 
action 
4. Autonomous, self-governing networks of actors 
5. Recognises the capacity to “get things done” that does not rest on the power of 




(page 84) shows five propositions of governance which have been developed to 
present these various aspects for consideration; it is within these propositions that 
aspects of One Health governance in the context of my involvement with the One 
Health Global Network (OHGN) can be explored. 
 
3.2 The first 100 years of International Health Governance:  
1851-1951  
 
The effects of globalisation and the stake of non-state actors and sectors in health 
governance are not new; international regimes for public health diplomacy have been 
in place largely since the 19
th
 century. Important lessons can be learnt from looking 
at the history of public health governance, which should be used to guide 21
st
 century 
decisions (Fidler 2001).  Although quarantine practices in Europe can be traced back 
to the 14
th
 century (Bell et al 2010), international co-operation on the control of 
global risks to human health did not begin until the mid 19
th
 century. It was around 
this time that the original shift from national to global governance occurred in 
response to the threat of public health risks including infectious diseases, opium, 
alcohol, transboundary pollution and occupational hazards.  
 
The first International Sanitary Conference occurred in 1851, when European states 
gathered to discuss cholera, yellow fever and plague. At the time, the efficacy of 
national quarantine policies had become diluted due to the technological advances of 
railways and faster ships; cholera in particular has been likened to the 19
th
 century 
version of an emerging infectious disease (Fidler 2001). The next 100 years saw a 
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rapid expansion of initiatives and actors in international health co-operation, 
particularly in the area of infectious disease. Merchants in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries involved in the movement of people and goods around the world were 
frustrated by national quarantine efforts; as such the private sector played a major 
role in exerting pressure on states to co-operate on laws and policies for the control 
of infectious disease. Similarly, nongovernmental organisations such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the International Union against Tuberculosis were 
instrumental in supporting and developing international treaties and laws.  
 
Following the first International Sanitary Conference in 1851, a number of “global” 
public health initiatives were held whereby states adopted treaties, staged 
conferences and created several international health organisations with specific 
mandates to facilitate co-operation on infectious disease control (Table 6). Science 
took a lead role in informing policy and treaty development; for example the 
advances on germ theory initiated by Koch and Pasteur (Fidler 2001). By 1951 this 
movement had resulted in the creation of four international health organisations
79
 and 
a single set of laws, the International Sanitary Regulations, which subsequently 
became the International Health Regulations (IHR) (Box 4). Looking at health 
governance throughout this 1851-1951 period demonstrates that today’s challenges 
in global health governance are not new; in fact the health picture over a century ago 
“exhibits the same paradox as has been identified by contemporary analysis of the 
globalisation of public health” (Fidler 2001). States, non-state actors and 
international health organisations need to therefore be realistic about what can be 
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accomplished through international law and other governance templates alone as a 
means for tackling global health issues. 
 
Table 6: International Treaties for Infectious Diseases 1892–195180 
Year Treaty 
1892 International Sanitary Convention 
1893 International Sanitary Convention 
1894 International Sanitary Convention 
1897 International Sanitary Convention 
1903 International Sanitary Convention 
1905 Inter-American Sanitary Convention 
1912 International Sanitary Convention 
1924 Pan American Sanitary Code 
1924 Agreement Respecting Facilities to be Given to Merchant Seaman for the 
Treatment of Venereal 
Disease 
1926 International Sanitary Convention, modifying the 1912 International 
Sanitary Convention 
1927 Additional Protocol to the Pan American Sanitary Convention 
1928 Pan American Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation 
1930 Convention Concerning Anti-Diphtheritic Serum 
1930 Agreement Regarding Measures to be Taken Against Dengue 
1933 International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation 
1934 International Convention for Mutual Protection Against Dengue Fever 
1938 International Sanitary Convention, amending the 1926 International 
Sanitary Convention 
1944 International Sanitary Convention, modifying the 1926 International 
Sanitary Convention 
1944 International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, modifying the 
1933 International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation 
1946 Protocols to Prolong the 1944 International Sanitary Conventions 
1951 International Sanitary Regulations (precursor to the current International 
Health Regulations, IHR – see Box 3) 
 
                                                          
80
 From Fidler (2001) 
90 
 










3.3 International Health Governance from the 1950’s: The 
Rise and Fall – and Rise Again – of the World Health 
Organisation   
 
Since the inception of the World Health Organisation in 1948, the tension between 
socioeconomic and technical approaches to healthcare has “waxed and waned”, 
largely defined by shifting global politics, dominant international players, and 
commitment from key individuals (Brown et al 2006). The WHO has been a 
consistently significant actor in the shifting global context in recent decades, despite 
having its role as “unquestionable leader” in international health severely challenged 
towards the end of the 21
st
 century, with some heralding it as an “organisation in 
crisis” at the time (Brown et al 2006). The literature documents fundamental events 
in the WHO’s history including changing membership as a result of independence of 
International Health Regulations of the WHO 
“To prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to 
the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and 
restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade.” (WHO) 
Consolidation of the numerous sanitary conventions of the 19th and 20th centuries 
resulted in a single set of rules; officially named the International Health 
Regulations 1969. The IHR are updated to reflect major changes in the world health 
picture, for example smallpox eradication in 1981. The only legally binding set of 
international rules on infectious disease control for all 194 WHO member states, the 
current IHR was endorsed in 2007 to reflect 21
st
 century threats such as emerging 






former colonial powers in the 1960’s, changing financial leadership in the 1980’s 
reflecting the rising influence of the World Bank and other actors, and finally the 
rising fear of “global health threats” and a greater securitisation narrative towards the 
end of the 20
th
 century. An understanding of its changing role since its formation in 
1948 is an interesting background to perceive the current global health contexts 
within which One Health finds itself today.   
 
3.3.1 The 1940’s and 1950’s: Early years of the WHO   
The idea of permanent institutions for world health can be traced back to 1902 with 
the Pan American Sanitary Bureau which eventually became the Pan American 
Health Organisation (PAHO) (Brown et al 2006). The Rockefeller foundation was 
also an influential non-state actor in world health in the early 20
th
 century. In Europe, 
the 1907 creation of the Office International de l’Hygiène Publique was mandated 
with the exchange of epidemiological information and the overall administration of 
the international sanitary agreements as outlined in Table 6 (page 88).  In 1923 the 
Health Organisation of the League of Nations established its Geneva offices, 
extending the work of the Office International de l’Hygiène Publique through the 
sponsorship of international disease commissions and epidemiological intelligence 
and technical reports.  Despite claims of poor budgeting and opposition from the 
American establishments, the two European health actors were at the forefront of that 
“critical” post-WWII moment “when the future of international health would be 
defined” (Brown et al 2006).  Official approval for the United Nations, with 
additional support for the formation of a specialised agency for health, occurred at an 
international conference in 1945. According to Dr. Szeming Sze, a member of the 
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Chinese delegation in attendance, the idea for a single world organisation for health 
came about “quite accidentally” over lunch between Sze and the other two medical 
doctors present (Sze 1988). An interim commission of “prominent individuals” held 
a series of meetings between 1945 and 1948, under pressure to establish the WHO 
“as quickly as possible” amidst fears that “time had been lost in the field of health” 
in the years post World War II (WHO 1946, cited in Litsios 1997). The formal 
establishment of the WHO constitution occurred on the 7
th
 April 1948, headed by 
Brock Chisholm.  The new WHO incorporated the Office International d’Hygiène 
Publique (OIHP), the League of Nations Health Organisation and the Health division 
of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), with PAHO allowed 
to remain autonomous under a “regionalisation scheme”, consisting of six regions
81
. 
In this way the United States, although committed to the UN charter, maintained its 
right to intervene independently in the Americas in the interest of “national security” 
(Brown et al 2006).  
 
3.3.2 The 1960’sand 1970’s: Shifting World Power  
The 1960’s and 1970’s saw a period of emphasis on socioeconomic reforms, largely 
attributed to independence of former colonial powers and the spread of various 
socialist movements, including the civil rights movement. Unlike the World Bank 
and other large agencies where nation votes are weighted according to financial 
contribution, all member states of the WHO shared an equal vote in the World Health 
Assembly (WHA). The increase in the number of WHO member-states at this time 
has been attributed to its broadening agenda; by the late 1960s, Latin American, 
                                                          
81
 The Americas, Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, Eastern Mediterranean and Western Pacific 
93 
 
Asian, and African states held over two thirds majority in the WHA (Walt 1993). Up 
until this point, the WHO’s purely technical mandate had “spared it the political 
conflicts wracking the rest of the United Nations”, however the new demands of 
health systems in developing nations
82
 ultimately drew the WHO into a “key role” in 
international health policy (Brown et al 2006, Godlee 1994).  Training of primary 
level healthcare workers and a multidimensional approach became a focus; with the 
famous 1978 Alma-Ata declaration that primary healthcare would be the means to 
achieve “Health for All in the year 2000” (Brown et al 2006, Godlee 1994).  As early 
as 1979 however, the Alma-ata declaration was being challenged by a number of key 
health actors, including the World Bank, the Rockefeller Foundation and UNICEF, 
who launched an alternative concept of “Selective Primary Healthcare” based around 
practical interventions that were easy to measure impact, such as childhood 
immunisation, breastfeeding and oral rehydration of children (Brown et al 2006).  
 
3.3.3 The 1980’s and 1990’s: WHO in crisis 





 the role of the WHO, most likely reflecting the wider dialogue 
occurring at the time. Hiroshi Nakajima’s appointment as the WHO director general 
in 1988 sparked fears that he “lacked leadership” to deal with conflicts including 
vested interests from WHO member-states, tobacco marketing and population 
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See Godlee (1994), Walt (1993) , Vaughan et al (1996), Silver (1998), Lee et al (1996) 
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 (Godlee 1994). In 1991, extrabudgetary funding overtook WHO member 
state contributions for the first time (Table 7 below), resulting in the World Bank, 
UNDP and wealthy nations states “largely calling the shots” through a series of 
vertical programs. The resulting difficulties in co-ordination and donor pressures to 
suit their interests led to what Walt termed “a cycle of decline, with donors 
expressing their lack of faith in its central management by placing funds outside the 
management’s control” (Walt 1994). Further accusations the WHO was in danger of 
losing its leadership role in international health issues “just when the world is 
looking for health leadership” appears to be well founded (Godlee 1994). 
 
Table 7: Shifting Trends in EBF up until the 1990’s 
Year WHO budget from 
Member States  
(US$ million) 
Extrabudgetary 





1950 6 0 N/A 
1971 75  >25  25 
1986-1987 543 437  44 
1990-1991 654 770  54 
 
3.3.4 The 1990’s and beyond: Reassertion of WHO as a leader in 
global health 
Until the 1990’s, the term “global health” was not a common feature of international 
health discourse; used mostly in referral to the failed 1960’s global malaria 
eradication programme, and intermittently by the environmental movement and 
others on the “political left with various world agendas” (Brown et al 2006). By the 
                                                          
85
 In 1952 the WHO declined to undertake a population programme because of the religious and 
political implications. By the 1970’s amidst growing concern over rising human populations, the 
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1990’s however, discourse surrounding a “palpable disease threat” began to draw the 
attention of both major health actors and the general public
86
; CDCs Emerging 
Infectious Diseases journal went into publication, and referral to diseases such as 
West Nile Virus, Ebola and bioterrorism could be found in mainstream media 
(Brown et al 2006).  
 
Responding to accusations the WHO was “in danger of losing the initiative on 
international health issues”, it began to promote itself as a “co-ordinator, strategic 
planner and leader of ‘global health’ initiatives” (Brown et al 2006, Godlee 1994).  
Former Norwegian prime minister Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland was appointed to 
guide the WHO through this new era. By all accounts, Brundtland wanted to 
reposition WHO as a key actor in global health, “gain(ing) a seat at the table where 
decisions were being made” (Kickbusch 2000).  Brundtland’s Commission on 
macroeconomics and health, chaired by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, included 
influential leaders, former finance ministers and officials from the World Bank, 
World Trade Organisation and UNDP. Under Brundtland’s leadership, the “Global 
Health Decade”
87
 was born; stakeholders from the private and nongovernmental 
sectors were brought together with governments and other agencies in an attempt to 
strengthen WHO’s financial position, leading to an explosion of public-private 
partnerships (later termed Global Health Initiatives or GHIs)
88
. The Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation became one of the most prominent, and within a few years, over 
seventy partnerships had been created. Despite some criticisms, the WHO was once 
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 As coined by Hotez & Fenwick (2009b) 
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 For example Roll Back Malaria (1998), Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) 
(1999) and Stop TB (2001) 
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again “a credible and highly visible contributor” to the world’s health issues, which 
has by all accounts largely continued into the 21
st
 century (Brown et al 2006).  The 
narrative of Emerging Infectious Disease threats has continued well into the 21
st
 
century, with high profile examples such as SARS and H5N1 largely contributing to 
continuation of the response which has helped propel One Health into the centre of 
global health policy dialogue. The appointment of Margaret Chan in 2006 as director 
general of the WHO has been attributed to the fact she was the only contender “who 
had been tested in global health crises; avian influenza in 1997 and SARS in 2003” 
(Jeffrey Koplan, former director of the CDC, quoted in Shuchman 2007). 
 
3.4 The 21st Century: From International Health Governance 
to Global Health Governance   
 
We have seen that until the 1990s, international health was largely governed by 
nation-states in conjunction with multi-lateral bodies such as the WHO. Health 
funding was mainly bilateral; funds were transferred from donors to recipient health 
ministries tasked with the responsibility of health service delivery. In addition, the 
WHO was responsible for the co-ordination of worldwide efforts such as smallpox 
eradication whilst also providing for disease surveillance and control through the 
International Health Regulations (IHR, Box 4). In this context, International Health 
Governance was moderately simple, with roles and responsibilities shared between a 
relatively small network of actors. However there have been claims that this form of 
governance overwhelmingly serviced the interests of western powers (Ng and Ruger 
2011, Fidler 2001). Additionally, some feel that prior to the 1990’s, threats of 
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emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases were not as imminent (or well 
understood) and by all accounts, nation states felt confident to handle health 
emergencies within their own countries (Ng and Ruger 2011).   
  
3.4.1 The Securitisation of Health  
Securitisation is a term which effectively describes the politicisation of an issue that 
was previously non-political; a “model which explains the transition by which an issue 
such as influenza can be moved from the non-political sphere to the political sphere, 
and ultimately into the realm of security” (Collins 2007).  Once an issue is perceived 
to be “negative” to a country or region’s well being, for example human deaths, high 
costs of control, or long term detriment to a population’s resources, it becomes of 
increased importance to utilise part of a nation’s resources to protect against the 
threat (Leboeuf and Broughton, 2008).  Although issues of health securitisation seem 
to be appearing more frequently in the literature in recent years, particularly 
surrounding One Health in the context of Emerging Infectious Diseases, the notion of 
controlling disease in another country for the benefit of your own has been noted for 
many years.  For example Italian professor Missiroli, speaking at the Third session of 
a joint WHO/FAO meeting on malaria in 1948, claimed “Africa cannot be fully 
exploited, because of the danger of flies and mosquitoes; if we can control them the 
prosperity of Europe will be enhanced” (Packard 1997).  Similar views existed in the 
United States during the 1950’s and 1960’s; there was a strong belief that economic 
growth as a result of health improvements in developing countries would expand 
markets for US goods (Packard 1997). During the years of the cold war, malaria 
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control for under-developed nations was used as a political pawn for “wining hearts 
and minds” in the war against communism (Brown et al 2006).   
 
Towards the end of the 20
th
 century, particularly in the United States under Clinton, 
human health was conceptualised as “a limited resource to be defended” (Leboeuf 
and Broughton 2008). Bill Clinton famously stated that infectious diseases such as 
HIV posed “a threat to US national security because of its catastrophic social 
consequences, particularly in the developing world.” (CNN news report 2000, cited 
in Leboeuf and Broughton 2008). The high profile securitisation of HIV/AIDS has 
undoubtedly resulted in a huge amount of advocacy and resources to the cause; 
including the creation of a specific UN agency (UNAIDS), explicit reference in the 
Millennium Development Goals, and debate on the crisis all the way up to the UN 
Security Council
89
.  However, those working at the community level to “normalise 
social perceptions” of HIV/AIDS saw securitisation of the disease to be detrimental 
to HIV positive individuals, who “viewed through this narrow framework of security, 
could be wrongly identified as the risk rather than the referent object” (Elbe 2006, 
cited in Collins 2007). The same could be said for any high profile disease including 
SARS, HPAI and tuberculosis, highlighting the “fine line” between the health rights 
of the nation versus the health rights of its individual citizens in the era of 
globalisation. The ever-changing process of health governance has led to 
acknowledgment of the “heterogeneity” of the securitisation process;  
“researchers and policy makers have been unable to reach consensus on what 
constitutes environmental, human and national security, as what, if 
any,relationships exist between these variables” (McCab and Bailey 2007, 
cited in Leboeuf and Broughton, 2008).     
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3.4.2 SARS 2003: The “Nail in the Coffin”90 on Traditional Health 
Governance  
Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome, the “first severe infectious disease to emerge 




, has been attributed to permanently 
changing the way in which global health is governed. One author attributed it to the 
“coming-of-age of a governance strategy for infectious diseases more radical than 
any previous governance innovation in this area of international relations” (Fidler 
2004).  Although SARS had features similar to diseases which could be governed by 
traditional International Health Governance such as cross border mobility, the 
mechanisms that were available at the time for its control were irrelevant: SARS was 
a new disease, therefore was not subject to the IHR.  
 
The international response to SARS paved the way for a permanent “change in 
attitude” of traditional gate-keepers of disease control, such as the UN agencies and 
national governments. SARS demonstrated how epidemiological information in a 
globalised world does not respect sovereignty. When the Chinese government 
showed reluctance to openly report on the magnitude of the problem in China
92
, the 
WHO had to rely on non-traditional sources to gain epidemiological information 
such as media reports, the internet and individual medical reports. Furthermore, 
previous restrictions on agencies to “dictate” outbreak control measures in the name 
of sovereignty were overruled. The “economically damaging” issuance of global 
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 As an emerging disease, SARS was not on the IHR list and as such there were no legal ties to 
ensure that countries reported on outbreaks 
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alerts and radical travel warnings
93
 revealed an unprecedented power of the WHO 
over nation states at the time (Fidler 2004).  The governance response to SARS also 
reinvigorated policy dialogue surrounding human rights in the event of public health 
emergencies, to some extent reigniting 1980’s HIV/AIDS dialogue regarding civil 
rights. Several authors have noted the ethical issues which arose during management 
of the SARS outbreak; for example the balance of professional duty with fears for 
personal safety, economic losses against containment of disease and other balancing 
acts required to ensure public health whilst protecting human rights (Fidler 2004, 
Singer et al 2003).    
 
3.5 Major Global Health Actors (GHAs) and Networks in the 
21st Century   
Lack of structure has been described as a “conspicuous feature” of global health 
governance within the 21
st
 century; the realisation that infectious disease could now 
affect people regardless of their geographic location gave “new urgency to 
addressing health on a global scale” (Ng and Ruger 2011). The result was a complex, 
relatively un-coordinated health governance structure, with a multitude of actors and 
activities exerting varying levels of influence. In keeping with the previous 
governance perspective theory outlined in section 3.1 of this chapter, it has also been 
acknowledged that although new actors bring new methods of resource access and 
ideas, the lines of responsibility can very easily become blurred (Kickbusch 2000). 
This was prominently demonstrated in the previous section, where the voice of the 
WHO was seen to be diminished during the 1980’s and early 1990’s as a result of 
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increasing challenges from external actors such as philanthropic organisations and 
the World Bank.   
 
Today in the global health sector alone, there is estimated to be over 40 bilateral 
donors, 26 UN agencies, 20 global and regional funds and 90 global health initiatives 
(Sridhar 2010). Despite calls that there is “no architecture to global health”, a review 
of recent literature could imply a vaguely defined structure, captured in Figure 2 (Ng 
and Ruger 2011). Despite the assumption that non-traditional actors are currently the 
defining feature of the “organisational chaos” that is global health governance, it 
appears WHO is still relatively central to the process. 
   
   




   
3.5.1 Nation States 
Literature confirms the ongoing responsibility of nation states in global health 























N (WHO)  
Figure 2: Perspectives of Global Health Governance (Ng & Ruger 2011) 
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health assistance, and national resources funding the bulk of global health spending 
(Ng and Ruger 2011).  Disease surveillance and control still largely depends on the 
capacity and co-operation of nation-states as the implementers of international 
decisions
94
.  Furthermore, individual nations, particularly the rich and powerful, can 
affect health outcomes through trade agreements and agenda-setting within the 
WHO. The “walking out” of the UN system by the USSR in 1949 is a key example; 
it allowed the United States to exert a “dominant influence”
95
on international health 
governance at the time. However, upon her return in the 1960’s, the Soviet Union 
“wanted to make its mark on international health”, leading to the launch of the 
Global Smallpox Eradication Program (Brown et al 2006).   The influence of nation 
states was also pertinently seen throughout the 1990’s, with extrabudgetary 
contributions from powerful nations affecting WHO’s technical authority (Table 7).  
 
3.5.2 United Nations Organisations (UNOs) 
Broad-based UN development agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF have 
increasingly been accused of “taking the initiative” on health, challenging WHO’s 
status in international health governance. Growing tensions between  health and 
development actors in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, famine in the Horn of 
Africa, the Rwandan genocide and  rising concerns surrounding environmental 
degradation in the 1990’s lead to calls for “strategic thinking into the next decade”, 
and suggestions that the WHO’s “heyday” was over (Walt 1993, Godlee 1994).   A 
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prime example is the launch of UNAIDS in 1993, effectively removing the WHO’s 
largest budget from its control (Godlee 1994).  Moreover, the 1990 Children’s 
Vaccine Initiative proposed by UNICEF, UNDP, Rockefeller and several other 






 have acknowledged the diminishing influence of the WHO and 
other UN agencies in light of the growth of major Global Health Initiatives 
incorporating public private partnerships and philanthropic foundations. The UN has 
been accused of “lacking a master plan” for health, with duplication and competition 
“rife” amongst its agencies (Lee et al 1996). The WHO in particular has a history of 
vulnerability to political pressures, with little power to enforce decisions or direction 
of nation states, as discussed in the previous section. Critics further accuse UN 
mandates to be over-focused on technical matters and vertical programmes, as well 
as performing conflicting roles as advocate, advisor and evaluator of health 
interventions worldwide (Ng and Ruger 2011).  Despite these short-comings, and in 
the absence of any real alternative, the WHO is today still considered the 
authoritative voice on global health governance, with some deeming its perceived 
neutrality on health issues as the only actor to combine “institutional mandate, legal 
authority and public health expertise” (Ng and Ruger 2011).  
 
3.5.3 The World Trade Organisation, World Bank, G8, G20 
The World Bank has been described by some as having a “more influential power 
than the WHO” since the 1990’s in setting the global health agenda, with its 
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increasing recognition of the linkages between human health and development (Ng 
and Ruger 2011).  Formed in 1946, the World Bank’s initial mandate was to finance 
the post-WWII reconstruction of Europe; from this evolving into its present-day role 
as a provider of loans and other financial assistance to developing countries. Whilst 
initially concentrating on physical infrastructure, by the 1970’s the World Bank had 
become increasingly involved with issues of health and education. The forging ahead 
with structural adjustment programmes at the height of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
“drew angry criticism, but also underscored the Bank’s new influence” (Brown et al 
2006). From the first loan for family planning in 1970 to the establishment of the 
Department of Population, Health and Nutrition in 1979, it has been argued that 
World Bank assistance to governments could help overcome the health problems of 
developing countries whilst at the same time promote economic growth (Brown et al 
2006). The World Bank’s ability to mobilise huge amounts of funds (often exceeding 
WHO’s total annual budget) affords them a large stake in the global health agenda. 
This was emphasised in 1993, describing how the World Bank, not the WHO, was  
leading consortiums to co-ordinate national health policy in countries such as 
Bangladesh, highlighting how WHO “is not seen as an equal partner spearheading 
policy” (Walt 1993).  
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), although not traditionally health related, is 
also becoming an increasingly important 21
st
 century stakeholder in global health. 
Trade regimes controlled by the WTO can have a significant impact on access to 
medicines and other health system inputs, as well as influencing the distribution of 
non-communicable disease risks such as tobacco and food safety.  Issues surrounding 
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the influence of nation states and trade on international health began to surface as 
early as the 1970’s, when the WHO was facing pressure from multinational 
companies and the United States surrounding breast milk substitutes for children in 
developing countries (Brown et al 2006).  WHO’s promotion of the Essential Drugs 
programme in 1977, opposed by major US-based pharmaceutical companies, resulted 
in the United States withholding its WHO contribution and paying only 20% of its 
contribution to UN agencies across the board (Brown et al 2006, Godlee 1994). 
The G8 has been flagged as a potential 21
st
 century leader in global health, citing 
examples such as the Global Fund emerging out of this informal and therefore 
relatively flexible network (Ng and Ruger 2011). Concerns have nevertheless been 
raised as to the extent in which the G8 can make objective decisions about global 
health, given its access to significant human and financial resources. For example, 
lack of action regarding the tobacco industry has led to fear that the G8 could 
prioritise its own concerns over that of  health, or conversely, some feel the G8 has 
been forced to act given their status; a phenomenon described as the “great global 
guilt trip” (Garrett and Alavian 2010).  
 
Alternatively, the G20, of which most member states are developing or recently 
emerging economies such as Brazil, China, Indonesia and Egypt, have been 
suggested as potentially powerful stakeholders in future health governance. Some 
argue the G20 could in fact be a better platform for health leadership as they are “not 
vulnerable to such pleas to share their wealth” (Garrett and Alavian 2010). Whereas 
the G8 has traditionally used health within a security or development narrative, the 
G20 appears to be using health to pursue some quite different policy issues, for 
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example Indonesia’s recent challenge to the WHO’s long-standing influenza virus 
sharing agreements (Fidler 2008).  Despite this, there is hope the G20 countries will 
provide a “voice” to the concerns of the developing world in the global health 
agenda, particularly against trade and intellectual property rules that for example 
hinder access to medicines. With growing economic concerns of several G8 
countries, the future role of the G20 within global health power will be watched with 
interest.     
 
3.5.4 Non-government organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) 
WHO’s “Primary Health Care” approach in the 1970’s was touted as the beginnings 
of a more “grass roots” approach taken by the organisation towards health, 
particularly in Africa.  This shift in direction drew significant consultation from 
nongovernmental organisations and medical missionaries, who at the time held the 
greatest experience in developing countries. The stake of NGOs in the international 
health agenda gradually grew throughout the 1970’s; lobbying of delegates at the 
World Health Assemblies during the 1980’s resulted in further pressure on WHO and 
its member states (Walt 1993).  Non Government Organisations and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) are considered by some to have the greatest potential to 
override national state efforts in health service delivery in many low-income 
countries (Ng and Ruger 2011). Their flexibility, access to communities and claims 
they give a “voice to the poor” allow NGOs and CSOs to raise pertinent health issues 
which may lie outside existing government agendas.  However, competition for 
donor funds, territorialisation, and underlying mandates such as religion can all affect 
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the design and delivery of health programmes to beneficiaries. They are also not 
exempt from donor pressure (even if that donor is “joe public”) and as such can 
never be completely independent from outside interests. Moreover, questions 
surrounding NGO accountability and recruitment processes are continuously raised, 
with accusations that the highly inflated salaries and benefits paid to NGO staff in 
developing countries result in “brain drain” from national administrations (Ng and 
Ruger 2011, personal observation). Moreover, it appears the independence 
maintained by many NGOs from national government systems can mean they 
become dismissive of wider national planning processes and macroeconomic policies 
(personal observations). 
 
3.5.5 The Private Sector, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and 
Philanthropic Foundations 
The explosion of private sector and philanthropic authority into the arena of global 
health into the 21
st
 century has been highly visible. Some have attributed this to the 
“longer standing trend towards the private” as a result of World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes, whilst others credit it to the new direction taken by WHO 
under Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland (Williams and Rushton 2011).  Historically, 
philanthropy and health have always held close interconnections; for example the 
Rockefeller Foundation played a lead role in attempts at global malaria eradication in 
the 1960’s (Brown et al 2006).  More recently, Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) such 
as Stop TB, Roll Back Malaria, the Global Fund and GAVI Alliance
98
 have all been 
formed as Public Private Partnerships and are now considered central – and thus 
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difficult to dismantle - to health interventions in their particular area of focus. 
International support for these partnerships is growing; economist Jeffrey Sachs 
described the Global Fund as “arguably the most successful innovation in foreign 
assistance of the past decade” (Sachs 2010 cited in Williams and Rushton 2011). 
Additionally, the weight of private philanthropic foundations, of which the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation is probably the most influential at present,   is 
unprecedented:  
“When Bill speaks, they listen. And as long as the Gates Foundation has the 
ability to deploy such huge resources, these organisations will continue to 
listen” (Williams and Rushton 2011).    
 
Despite the positives, reports of “unease and some tension” at the decreasing 
financial importance of traditional health actors are beginning to surface
99
. There are 
also reservations about the long term sustainability of public private partnerships. 
Private sector actors, particularly the smaller or less publicised, could be tempted to 
use development projects as a public relations manoeuvre, promoting short term 
corporate social responsibility strategies to the detriment of any long term investment 
into actual change. Others, claim “the private sector reaps the benefits whilst the 
public sector carries the risk”, thus jeopardising long term, sustainable approaches to 
improvement of health systems in developing countries (Ng and Rugen 2011, Ollila 
2005). Additionally, as the “public” funding in the majority of PPPs come from 
external donors rather than the public sector of nation states, there are quite strong 
criticisms emerging that global health initiatives are “ignoring a wider problem” of 
the state of health systems in many countries. Relied upon for the delivery of large 
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scale interventions against malaria and HIV/AIDS for example, the health systems in 
most developing countries are “fragile and unable to provide effective health 
services” (Marchal et al 2009). Despite claims that GHIs support health systems
100
, 
most have been found instead to “support disease-specific activities essential for 
implementation of their own programmes” (Marchal et al 2009).  The reality is that 
GHI funding overwhelms national institutes; for example Uganda’s entire Ministry 
of Health budget of $112 million USD was swamped by the $167 million USD 
HIV/AIDS funding from PEPFAR, the World Bank and the Global Fund in 2005 
(Marchal et al 2009). In this way, huge disease-specific cash injections into fragile 
systems may not be the most efficient way to tackle the world’s health problems, and 
at worst encourage complacency and corruption (personal observation).   
 
 
Within the group of purely private sector actors, various accounts exist of attempts to 
undermine the health of the poor in developing countries altogether; the 
multinational pharmaceutical and food industries being two prime examples. As 
described previously in this chapter, the 1970’s was a period of intense pressure for 
the WHO, “being aggressively lobbied by industry on the one hand, and industry 
groups on the other” (Godlee 1994).   Two such instances of pressure from the 
private sector, which translated into withdrawal of WHO funding from the United 
States, were the “babyfood story” in the mid 1970’s, and the WHO Action 
Programme on Essential  Drugs in 1978 (Walt 1993).  By the end of the 1970’s, a 
large network of activists was campaigning for WHO and UNICEF to act on growing 
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concerns about the dangers of feeding infant milk formulas to children in developing 
countries. The public pressure resulted in the 1981 passing of an International Code 
on breast milk substitutes by 118 votes to 1; the sole opposing vote being from the 
United States, objecting to the “interference in global trade” (Walt 1993). Nestle, 
with a large stake in America at the time, controlled a third of the world’s infant 
formula market, amounting to around $3.3 billion in the early 1980’s (Godlee1994). 
 
Around the same time, the WHO’s Essential Drugs Programme aimed to assist 
countries to improve drug policies around short lists of “essential” medicines, which 
countries would be encouraged to manufacture locally.   The pharmaceutical industry 
was a vocal opponent of the initiative; in 1985 when the United States withheld their 
UN contributions in protest, 11 out of the world’s 18 largest multinational drug 
companies were American, with annual turnovers in excess of $14 billion (Godlee 
1994, Walt 1993).  The Access to Medicines debate is still current, however it seems 
that greater efforts are being made to acknowledge and strengthen international 
public-private partnerships to improve the situation in developing countries
101
. The 
changing governance climate in the 21
st
 century, coupled perhaps with the increased 
capacity of countries such as Brazil, China and India to develop and market drugs, 
thus appear to be diluting to some extent the influence of “Big Pharma”.  
 
3.5.6 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) 
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The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research is a 15 member 
global partnership which carries out “sustainable development research” with partner 
organisations including research institutes, academia, nongovernmental organisations 
and the private sector across a wide number of countries (CGIAR 2012). With roots 
in the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations dating back to the 1950’s, the original 
research mandate of the CGIAR was to improve cultivars of staple food sources such 
as rice, maize and wheat, in response to growing concerns throughout the 1960’s and 
1970’s of “a widespread, devastating famine” (CGIAR 2012).   Since this time, there 
has been an ever-widening research portfolio to address issues of smallholder 
agricultural systems and environmental determinants of productivity such as soil, 
water and forests; ultimately to “ensure the conservation of the natural resources 
upon which sustainable and equitable rural development depends” (CGIAR 2012).  
Criticisms of the CGIAR’s lack of accountability and strategic co-ordination go back 
to the 1980’s, resulting in claims of a “more business-like” operational model 
emerging in recent years (CGIAR 2012). Additionally, rising prices of food staples 
and fuel in the first decade of the 21
st
 century prompted calls to “step up to the 
challenges of the 21st Century and better harness the power of agricultural research 
for poverty alleviation, economic growth and environmental sustainability” (Sierra 
2009).  However, some have argued that changing markets, human migration 
patterns and technologies as a result of globalisation have “substantially transformed 
the joint dynamics of agriculture and poverty in developing countries, making some 





In conclusion, a number of historical and political events in recent decades including 
globalisation, securitisation and the increasing influence of non-traditional health 
actors has contributed to the ever-changing health governance context within which 
global health actors now find themselves. The jury is still out on whether the growing 
influence of particularly the private and philanthropic actors in the first decade of the 
21
st
 century is really the best approach; concerns about the investment of huge 
amounts of money into vertical disease approaches such as HIV/AIDS is well 
founded in the literature
102
. Opponents argue that the tendency for Global Health 
Initiatives to concentrate resources on single disease interventions such as HPAI, 
HIV/AIDs and malaria can result in the creation of parallel systems outside of 
existing health structures, decreasing the human and technical capacity of national 
institutions, particularly in resource-stretched health ministries of developing 
countries (Cavalli et al 2010). Other concerns of health securitisation echo wider 
unease felt by some that transition of health issues outside the technical sphere, for 
example to the military or private sector, may in fact “remove agency” from  health 
specialists (Katz and Singer, cited in Collins 2007).   
 
Many authors feel that global health governance “still lags behind the ability of 
human society to create and spread disease”; with 21
st
 century issues such as genetic 
engineering, emerging infectious diseases and access to medicines continuing to 
“complicate matters” (Fidler 2001). Innovative solutions towards health governance 
will need to be found in order to overcome the challenges of co-ordination of such a 
wide variety of actors with varying agendas. There is a requirement to balance the 
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needs of individuals with that of populations, of donors with their beneficiaries, and 
agenda setting from powerful Global Health Initiatives with that of more traditional, 
technical institutes such as the WHO and national health ministries. It is within this 
complex maze of interactions that One Health could potentially play a role of “over 
seer”. Through exerting an objective influence over alliances between divergent sets 
of global health actors, One Health could help ensure the underlying philosophies of 
an holistic approach to health, including collaboration and multi-disciplinarity, 
remains prominent.  In essence, global health governance of today needs to address 
the “tightly linked questions about the roles various organizations should play, the 
rules by which they play, and who sets those rules” (Clark et al 2010). The next 
section therefore discusses one proposed effort to achieve this, the One Health 
Global Network.   
 
3.6 One Health Governance and Development of the One 
Health Global Network (OHGN) 
 
3.6.1 Introduction  
The acceleration of institutional and individual effort to promote One Health has led 
to a rebound concern that obtaining a current understanding of “what is going on 
with One Health has become mission impossible” (quote by Alain Vandersmissen, 
cited in Normandeau 2011). Whilst conceding that One Health is not “owned” by 
any single organisation or institution, a requirement for some form of co-ordination 
body to keep all the “puzzle pieces” of One Health together, and thus current and 
relevant, has been acknowledged (Normandeau 2011).  As a result, the concept of a 
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One Health Global Network (OHGN) came out of the 2010 Stone Mountain meeting 
(see Appendix) as one of six working groups designed to move the international One 
Health agenda forwards in the next five years.  The One Health Global Network 
Working Group was given two specific objectives, outlined in Box 5 below.  
 








At the time of inception, it was anticipated that the OHGN would be a “virtual 
umbrella”, consisting of a multidisciplinary body of professionals from across the 
globe (Stone Mountain 2010).  A permanently active “virtual coordination team”, 
representing all One Health sectors, was proposed as the model for an initial advisory 
board to moderate the virtual network. In an effort to maintian credibility of 
information passing through the network, it was anticipated that members of this 
team would represent their individual institutions rather than act in a personal 
capacity. The criteria for selection were varied, ranging from One Health experience, 
networking and coordination skills and willingness to participate.   
The One Health Global Network (OHGN) aims to: 
(i) Advocate and garner international support for One 
Health by serving as a vehicle for global collaboration on OH 
programmes and projects  
(ii) Promote One Health and enable connectivity through a 
centralised area where OH success stories are gathered and 
available to a wide-ranging audience 




3.6.2 Outcome of a OHGN Synthesis Questionnaire, August 2011 
As a first step towards development of the OHGN, test phase questionnaires were 
sent out by the OHGN working group co-leaders to 29 “key One Health respondents” 
in June 2011, in order to gain their insights and ideas for what this “network of 
networks” may look like. With a response rate of 38 percent (11 replies), I was 
tasked with developing a synthesis report summarising respondents’ key feelings and 
ideas surrounding the proposition.   
 
All respondents were familiar with the One Health approach; however their 
understanding of it varied quite markedly; usually in accordance to their professional 
background or their representative institution. Whilst everyone agreed that One 
Health involved “to some extent” the integration of disciplines across human and 
animal health; answers were largely biased towards epidemic and zoonotic diseases, 
with little reference to the wildlife/ecosystem aspects and the endemic or non-
communicable diseases. Only one respondent mentioned the economic benefits of 
interdisciplinary collaboration; “(One Health) is any added value in terms of health 
gains in all species, or economic savings from closer cooperation....if we cannot 
show such an added value in any way it is not really ‘One Health’”. 
Two respondents mentioned the need for One Health to be “sustainable and locally 
relevant”, thus broadening the definition from the “outbreak narrative”
103
. The 
majority of respondents indicated interest in participation of the network so long as it 
remained an “informal” platform that could help fulfil the “huge, unfinished 
agenda” of interdisciplinary collaboration, including the promotion of: 
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 Mutual learning and capacity building across sectors  
 Ecological and socioeconomic aspects of global health 
 Information and experience sharing 
 Advocacy and “best practice” for policy makers 
 Encouragement of interdisciplinary research 
 Institutional and inter-regional networking and policy integration  
 Development of “new global standards” for ecosystem health 
 
Respondents overwhelmingly felt that institutionalisation of One Health was not 
required, that is creation of the network should “not lead to a new silo or a new 
discipline”; others were concerned that individual membership may entail funding 
contributions from their member institution. A valuable concluding remark was made 
by one respondent, indicating a major weakness with the One Health approach to 
date;  
“One Health is mainly supported and known by animal health specialists...a 
strong outreach effort towards human health, wildlife and environment 
specialists, development specialists and economists should be supported by 
the network, and all of its members who all have connections in other fields 
than animal health”.  
 
Overall, the achievement of this would go a long way to promotion of the approach, 
and justification for the OHGN’s development.  
 
I was asked to provide my overall comments on answer trends, of which the edited 
version is inserted below. Having been further involved with the evolution of the 
OHGN to date, I feel these comments still stand, particularly in terms of the lack of 
participation from some disciplines and regions:   
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“In general, I felt responses were largely compatible in their understanding of 
One Health, and the role a “One Health Global Network” (OHGN) could play 
in the future. Generally, participants are enthusiastic about using the OHGN 
as a global governance platform; however some indicated concerns regarding 
membership/funding expectations and the possibility of “re-inventing the 
wheel”; concerns which need further discussion and “teasing out” in time as 
the network proceeds.   
The vast range of participant backgrounds was realised with a well-rounded, 
extensive list of publications and further contacts, emulating the human-
animal-ecosystem interface for which the One Health approach is known. 
However, I feel that responses were under-represented by the 
ecosystem/wildlife consortium, and that further efforts to engage with this 
sector should be initiated. Having said this, there are some strong sectoral 
contacts in this initial list, which should enable snowballing to occur for 
maximum representation in future. One concern in the current synthesis is the 
lack of representation from developing countries, especially Africa and Latin 
America. If the OHGN is to be truly “global”, perhaps participants from 
developing countries could/should be encouraged to have more interaction 
with the dialogue at this stage” 
 
3.6.3 Co-ordinating Governance of One Health 
The first Expert Meeting on One Health Governance and Global Network was held 
in November 2011 in Atlanta, USA, consisting of 20 “experts” from mainly Europe 
and the United States. The initial objective of this meeting was to develop a proposal 
for the One Health “network of networks” (OHGN), at the same time recognising it 
is not necessary for any one organisation to “own” or “lead” it.  In particular, 
participants noted that “if governance is right, the One Health will become part of 
our daily lives, it will be relevant, real and there will be a sense of direction” 
(Normandeau 2011). However, further discussions through the course of the meeting 
revealed that many were not comfortable with the word “governance” and felt that 
formation of a “One Health Guidance Group” (depicted as “governance with a small 
g”) would be more appropriate; “aiming to foster and champion the goals of One 








i) Immediate Objectives 
 Ensure coherence of actions, communication and advocacy strategies 
 Unite One Health actors 
 Promote One Health education 
 
ii) Long term Objectives 
 Improve Global Health Security 
 One Health “becomes part of our daily life” 
 Sustainable development  
 
Regardless of the terminology used, there are still a number of issues concerning 
OHGN governance that require addressing. The original intention for the OHGN 
“virtual co-ordinators” to act in their institutional capacity, and therefore bring 
credibility to the governance network, appears to have been lost. This may pose a 
problem for the guidance group to ensure objective facilitation. Despite not wanting 
to appear as though the network is “owned” by any one individual or organisation, 
many participants felt that its endorsement by the major global health actors
105
 would 
promote the network’s credibility, and thus ensure the sustainability outlined in the 
long term objectives. Particularly in the area of policy; it is unlikely the network will 
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improve advocacy and communication if policy makers are expected to seek 
guidance from a “faceless” network. Stoker advocates that a strong governance body 
can actually overcome, rather than exacerbate, sensitivities surrounding ownership or 
leadership, thus strengthening member participation (Stoker 1998). Suggestion that 
the network be housed within a non-governmental or non-multilateral organisation, 
for example a think tank, is still under review; for now the portal remains anonymous 




It may be that re-visiting the concept of “big g” governance
107
 is necessary to 
alleviate this dichotomy of ensuring the provision of One Health leadership without 
overt ownership.  One justification for “housing” the OHGN within a credible 
institution(s) to ensure its integrity could be through Stoker’s acknowledgement that 
“although a single organisation cannot easily command, it may dominate a particular 
step of the governance process” (Stoker 1998).  Pertinently, the long term survival of 
the OHGN may in fact depend on strong, visible governance; well governed 
networks not only influence policy, but allow actors and institutions to blend their 
resources and capacities into a long term partnership “that enables it to have a 
sustained role in governance decisions” (Stoker 1998).  In this way, such 
partnerships become a sustainable decision-making authority within their relevant 
communities; an ultimate objective of the OHGN in terms of encouraging One 
Health approaches within the global community. Ultimately, the complexities 
surrounding One Health governance appear largely similar to the challenges 
surrounding any global health approach in the fast moving, multi-actor 21
st
 century; I 
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feel a strong stance on governance must be taken if One Health is to overcome the 
scepticism and truly become “part of our daily lives”
108
 as implied in the OHGN 
objectives.  
 
3.7 Framing One Health Policy: A Global Public Good?  
 
There currently exists a “wide consensus that One Health is a global public good, 
that is cannot be owned, and that it should remain flexible, based on a broad pool of 
multiple expertises that cross disciplines and countries” (Normandeau 2011).  Whilst 
such a consensus acknowledges and attempts to include the wide variety of contexts 
and countries involved in any global approach, there is a need to look deeper into the 
emerging narrative of One Health as a Global Public Good before One Health is 
irrevocably packaged in this way. By asking “whose world, whose health?
109
” it is 
envisaged an analysis on Global Public Goods perspective will help contribute to the 
evidence within this thesis concerned with “alternative” One Health narratives as 
suggested by Scoones (2010).  
 
3.7.1 The Definition of a Global Public Good 
In basic economic terms, a public good is that which is non-excludable (one person’s 
consumption does not restrict the amount of good available to another) and non-rival 
(everyone in a particular community can benefit at the same time). This is in contrast 
to private goods, which demonstrate high excludability and high rivalry; those who 
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do not or cannot afford to pay will not benefit, and once a private good or service is 
“consumed”, it cannot be consumed again.  In this economic context, a Global Public 
Good (GPG) can be thought of as “public goods with significant cross border 
benefits on a global level” (Smith et al 2004).  An expanded definition of GPG 
pertaining to international health is: 
"a good which it is rational, from the perspective of a group of nations 
collectively, to produce for universal consumption and for which it is 
irrational to exclude an individual nation from consuming"(Smith and 
MacKellar 2007) 
  
Many aspects of One Health ultimately fit within this definition; however in order to 
determine whether its classification as a GPG is the most appropriate in terms of 
long and short term objectives promoting global participation and national decision-
making authority, further examination and understanding of GPG theory is required.  
 
3.7.2 Global Public Goods in the Context of Infectious Disease 
Control  
In terms of infectious disease control, Global Public Goods theory provides a 
framework for the promotion of international collective action towards global 
disease control; a political process which ensures the benefits of  infectious disease 
control are maintained in the absence of “free-riding” by some states.  (Smith et al 
2004, Smith 2003). Since the late 1990’s, policy makers in the world’s richest 
countries have been urged to expand the portfolio of health assistance to developing 
countries, not just from a humanitarian perspective, but also as a “selfish” investment 
designed to protect national health security. Global Public Goods are a key concept 
in this new interpretation (Smith and MacKellar 2007).  It is perhaps within this 
“collective action” discourse that One Health has fallen into its GPG classification. 
122 
 
However not all elements of infectious disease control can fall under the GPG remit, 
as many diseases only occur within specific socioeconomic or geographic domains, 
and as such their control cannot be promoted as a GPG. Some authors maintain there 
exist only a certain number of infectious diseases for which control can be 
considered a “true” GPG, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and eradicable diseases 
with no animal reservoir such as polio (Smith et al 2004). Furthermore, despite the 
benefits gained from infectious disease control at a global level, the ongoing, vast 
amounts of finance
110
 to achieve this can be an issue without a “global government” 
to pay for it. This is in contrast to national public goods for which the government of 
that country will normally intervene either through taxation or direct provision of 
goods (Smith et al 2004).  
 
The other aspect which needs to be considered is the type of interventions which can 
be classified under GPG theory. Despite GPG perspective informing a number of 
Global Health Initiatives
111
cited as the “most promising form of collective action in a 
globalising world” (Clark 2010), the form of intervention taken by these initiatives 
does not always fit with GPG perspective. For example many interventions for 
“Global Public Goods” such as HIV/AIDs and malaria control include free provision 
of private goods such as bed nets and subsidised antiretroviral drugs
112
. The fact that 
a good is subsidised or freely provided does not change the nature of the good; it 
merely widens the scope of who can attain them, usually for a finite period of 
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. Furthermore, whilst the main focus of the GPG perspective may be to 
encourage collective action for health at the global level, there remains one distinct 
emphasis: for GPG theory to work, it must encourage “mutual benefit” through 
financial contributions from both rich and poor countries, as distinct from donations 
of “aid” from the rich to the poor (Ng and Ruger 2011). True GPGs are depicted as 
“self-interested use of domestic money”, therefore different to the donor-recipient 
relationships of most aid and philanthropic partnerships which promote their 
programmes as GPGs (Smith and Mackellar 2007). Therefore the challenge remains 
how to encourage participation of all countries, rich and poor, into the One Health as 
a global public good narrative, when their health priorities are vastly different? As 
will be seen in subsequent chapters of this thesis, notwithstanding their success, One 
Health approaches to date have been largely top down, with intersectoral 
collaboration occurring as a result of specific mandates attached to international 
donor funding surrounding HPAI.  
 
3.7.3 The Policy Challenge of the Global Public Goods 
Perspective: Where Can they be used? 
Despite enjoying increased attention in international health and development circles 
in the first decade of the 21
st
 century as a means for global resource mobilisation, 
GPGs is now at risk of “being attached to anything promoting development” (Smith 
and MacKellar 2007).  In order to overcome the “fuzziness and trendiness
114
” of its 
association with international collective action and development, it has been 
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suggested there are only two areas where the GPG concept can be usefully applied to 
global health issues: research and development (R&D), and infectious disease control 
in the forms of surveillance, immunisation and other preventative measures (Smith 
and MacKellar 2007).    
 
3.7.3.1 Health Research and Development 
The private sector is now the largest provider of research resulting in new drugs and 
technologies (Smith and MacKellar 2007). Despite this, the shortcomings in its 
provision, particularly in low income countries, is well known
115
. A GPG perspective 
promotes collective action to ensure diseases affecting people in the world’s poorest 
countries are considered; as a result there has been an explosion of global public-
private-partnerships (PPPs), particularly in the field of “neglected” diseases (Smith 
and MacKellar 2007).  
 
3.7.3.2 Communicable Disease Control 
Although Global Public Goods have a role in the control of infectious disease, this is 
not the case in all countries, or for all diseases. GPG theory only applies to situations 
where control of a disease in one country is beneficial to another; for example 
eradicable diseases such as polio, swiftly-moving diseases such as SARS and HPAI, 
and trade diseases including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). In this 
sense, defining One Health as a GPG is appropriate. However, some authors argue 
that GPG theory has actually “fuelled the proliferation of specific infectious disease-
targeted programmes” (Smith and MacKellar 2007).  Promoting One Health as a 
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GPG could therefore inadvertently encourage vertical approaches to health 
challenges, such as that seen with the international response to HPAI
116
. This 
conflicts with wider philosophies surrounding horizontal and more holistic 
approaches to health outside a crisis situation.  
 
In conclusion, whilst GPG has its virtues, care must be taken to ensure that framing 
One Health as a GPG will not discourage the participation of developing countries, 
or corrode the wider One Health philosophy of promoting integrated, holistic 
approaches to health
117
 in the 21
st
 century. More importantly, advocates of One 
Health should be aware of the "fuzziness" and "trendiness" associated with “anything 
promoting development considered a GPG” (Smith et al 2004). By definition, 
labelling One Health as a GPG may “neglect most aspects of health”, and certainly 
does not allow for the prioritisation of health issues by individual countries (Smith et 
al 2004).  
Under a Global Public Good label, the OHGN could aid international decision-
making and policy development through facilitating partnerships and alliances 
between developed and developing countries; that is, promote international collective 
action. However, defining One Health in this way could also be seen as simply 
promoting the self interest of particular countries
118
, further contributing to 
suspicions of “clandestine motives” of developed countries, discouraging many low 
and middle income countries from engaging with One Health  discourse (Hwenda et 
al 2011, personal communication).  If One Health is to progress from its current 
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narrative of securitisation and EID prevention towards a more holistic, livelihoods 
approach relevant to a wider number of countries and regions, GPG theory is 
probably not going to support this in its entirety.  Particularly in terms of flexibility 
for individual countries to interpret how the approach is used; we should be aware of 
the limitations of “branding” One Health in this way.     
 
3.8 Conclusion 
Through examining One Health in light of the recent history of global health 
governance and the Global Public Good perspective, this chapter has attempted to 
explore the first, internationally focussed  proposition of this thesis, that 
 
“One Health occupies a precarious position within the complex dynamics of Global 




The examination of the changing approaches and strategies of the WHO since its 
origin in the 1950’s is a good example of how dominant health policy narratives 
come and go – and come again - over the years. As demonstrated in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis, it would seem that One Health has a solid foundation, given its 
overlaying philosophies of multi-disciplinarity, co-operation and holistic, integrated 
approaches. Despite this, One Health advocates should be wary of seeding the 
approach too deeply within a single, currently trending governance framework such 
as the Global Public Goods perspective, to avoid its possible abandonment when the 




This chapter gave a thorough overview of the various actors, sectors and networks 
which have a current stake in global health governance. Additionally, it explored the 
possible reasoning behind recent branding of One Health as a Global Public Good, 
with a warning to ensure valid arguments to do so, in order to avoid criticism around   
use of the GPG tag as a “general purpose fundraiser” (Smith and McKellar 2007).  
Whilst concurring that One Health as a GPG will indeed promote “international 
collective action” to address the interface between animals, humans and the 
environment in the 21
st
 century, one of the biggest challenges is how to ensure this 
occurs in the absence of any “global government” to fund it (as discussed in Smith et 
al 2004). The OHGN may be a step in the right direction; however underlying issues 
of governance and leadership should not be avoided in an effort to protect short term 
sensitivities
119
. Furthermore, as GPG perspective does not provide for disease 
prioritisation, agenda-setting by more powerful nations could occur; an aspect of 
health governance which has been heavily criticised in the past
120
. Additionally, the 
current economic definition of One Health as a GPG could actually restrict many 
underlying philosophies of the concept, particularly alternative narratives 
surrounding “equity, access and rights” (Scoones 2010).  The GPG emphasis of 
mutual benefit to both rich and poor countries does not mean the types of donor-aid 
relationships which have largely driven One Health practices until now
121
.   
 
                                                          
119
 As is implied with the “governance with a small g” terminology (Normandeau 2011) 
120
 See for example Walt (1993), Godlee (1994), Brown et al (2006) 
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 The response to HPAI in Africa and Asia is a pertinent example 
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I feel the background evidence within this chapter justifies my depiction of One 
Health’s position within the global governance context as “precarious”; One Health 
occupies a precarious position in the newly emerging frameworks of global health 
governance as much as any other “new” initiative, given the fickle nature of the 
context. We don’t as yet know where this complex, multi-actor approach is headed; 
Global Health Initiatives may well be a thing of the past in twenty years time, new 
health challenges may emerge, possibly resulting in a return to more rigid health 
approaches dominated by traditional health actors such as the WHO. In essence, One 
Health needs to be prepared for all these situations and more; it should not rush to 
align itself with perceived “buzzwords” if it endeavors to become firmly entrenched 















CHAPTER FOUR  
 
“ONE HEALTH BY ACCIDENT”: CONTROL OF HUMAN 
AFRICAN TRYPANOSOMIASIS IN UGANDA 
 
“Politically endorsed national One Health structures could help ensure successful, 
sustained functioning of less formal collaborations” 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on a multi-dimensional case study conducted in the East 
African country of Uganda, examining the predominant policy narrative for the 
control of Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT) or “sleeping sickness”. Inter-
ministerial co-operation for this historical, “neglected” zoonotic disease of 
significant regional public health significance has been institutionalised for the better 
part of two decades. On the surface, Uganda appears to be a “model country” in 
Africa for the promotion of state-led One Health approaches for zoonotic disease 
control; however further investigation into the ministerial frameworks reveal a 
number of institutional bottlenecks which will require negotiation if this “permanent 
One Health platform” is to succeed in future. This chapter also looks into the 
community responses to “Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness” (SOS) a recently-
administered DfID Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) against HAT, and identifies the 
challenges of implementing a community-driven “One Health approach” to disease 
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control where government resources are scarce, or overarching policies for support 
of the approach are lacking.    
 
The empirical data for this chapter was collected during a number of field trips to 
Uganda during 2010-2011, in conjunction with the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness 
(SOS) programme and ICONZ. This chapter builds on the second proposition 
forwarded within this thesis that “Politically endorsed national One Health 
structures could help ensure successful, sustained functioning of less formal 
collaborations”. Using a qualitative case study methodology, I aim to examine some 
of the current One Health practices undertaken in Uganda to address zoonotic 
disease, including an existing inter-ministerial platform for HAT, and discuss the 
possibilities for its expansion in time to cover multiple zoonoses.  
 
4.1.1 Background to AAT and HAT in Africa 
Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT) is found throughout Sub- Saharan Africa, 
transmitted by the vector Glossina tsetse fly. There are two forms of the human 
disease, roughly separated by the Rift Valley: The acute, zoonotic Trypanosoma 
brucei rhodesiense, found in eastern and southern Africa, and chronic, non-zoonotic 
Trypanosoma brucei gambiense, found throughout western Africa. Uganda is the 
only country to have both the acute and chronic forms of disease (Map 2). “Nagana” 
is name given to the corresponding syndrome Animal African Trypanosomiasis 
(AAT), caused by various species of trypanosome also transmitted by the Glossina 
tsetse fly.  
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Map 2: HAT Endemic Countries showing separation of rhodesiense and 
gambiense and the two forms in Uganda (Simarro et al, 2008) 
 
 
Tsetse and trypanosomiasis control and eradication programmes in Africa have a 
long history, dating from colonial times when European powers were concerned with 
human epidemics
122
 and the loss of animal productivity associated with the disease 
(Schofield and Kabayo 2008).  “Unsophisticated” control efforts
123
 up until the 
1960’s were largely successful, leading to frustration amongst many “elder 
practitioners” at the current HAT status across Africa (Molyneux et al 2010). Since 
independence, cases have been steadily rising; 20 of the world’s 25 poorest 
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 300 000 people were estimated to have died around the shores of Lake Victoria in 1896 (personal 
communication) 
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 Undertaken by colonial powers, based on active surveillance and treatment of human cases along 
with ecological interventions of the tsetse habitat  
T. b. rhodesiense 






 are tsetse-infested African nations, with 50-60 million people currently 
exposed to the bite of a tsetse fly (Cattand et al 2010, Map 3). Some have blamed the 
“wars of independence” for the rise of HAT incidence across Africa since the 1960’s, 
where HAT control programmes were disrupted through the destruction of colonial 
infrastructure, or abandoned as a result of the “punishment of success”
125
 (Schofield 
and Kabayo 2008, Simarro et al 2008). One government official explains 
“In the past there was a tsetse control department equipped with all facilities, 
then the department was absolved - they thought they had solved the problem 
- because the disease had been controlled at the lowest economic levels, 
people all of a sudden think this department is no longer relevant.” (Interview 
MAAIF June 2011).  
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 As determined by gross national income per capita 
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 Described by Simarro et al (2008) whereby successful control campaigns have resulted in lower 
priority given to diseases by public and private health institutions, resulting in loss of capacity to 
maintain disease control  
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The lack of prioritisation has continued; HAT features on WHO’s list of “neglected 
tropical diseases”, and despite “political will at the highest levels” to resurrect 
collective action, many feel that there is still a long way to go before HAT regains 
the attention it deserves and reduces to the pre-1960’s level (Molyneux et al 2010, 
Simarro et al 2008).  Despite WHO reporting a decline in human cases since 2005, 
scepticism remains, especially given the potential for “gross errors” in NTD 
prevalence figures; (Molyneux et al 2010, Odiit et al 2005, and Fèvre et al 2008). It 
is estimated that of the 300 000 new cases of HAT every year, only 30-40 000 are 
recorded due to weakened health infrastructure, and inaccessibility to rural areas 
where the majority of cases are recorded (Cattand et al 2010). A recent article in a 
popular Ugandan newspaper
127
 has reflected what those in the field have known for 
some time; the disease is often mistaken for other high profile diseases such as 
malaria and HIV: 
“Remejio Kijoma, a fisherman at Bumanji village in the District has suffered 
from endless fevers for close to three months.  He had entertained thoughts 
that he could have acquired HIV because he was losing weight by the day 
until he went to Kitovu Hospital in Masaka where he was diagnosed with 
sleeping sickness”.  
 
And later in the article:  
“Fausta Nasebawanga of Busanga village in Kalangala almost lost her 
daughter because she was diagnosed with malaria in Kalangala clinics. It 
was after two weeks of endless malaria that Nasebawanga went to Kitovu 
hospital where her eight-months-old daughter was misdiagnosed with 
sleeping sickness.”  
 
An informant in Serere district has a similar experience: 
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 From an article by Martin Ssebuyira, Uganda’s Daily Monitor Newspaper, 12
th
 February 2012 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/Reviews/-/691232/1320938/-/9o5q5/-/index.html (last accessed 
3rd July 2012) 
134 
 
“Some time back, people were dying from sleeping sickness. They were 
thinking it was HIV/AIDS, because that thing can also make you become very 
thin, so some people were just left to die like that. At least I know of a couple 
- they are surviving up till now - and they were perishing. When they went to 
Serere, and they were screened, found to be positive, and they were treated, 
they are now OK. They are surviving. And they would have died otherwise, 
they would have just died. There is nothing worse than neglected diseases” 
(Interview MAAIF June 2011).  
 
Further complicating the treatment and surveillance issues is that the diagnosis and 
treatment of HAT is not straightforward. Both acute and chronic forms of HAT have 
a first stage, where trypanosome species are diagnosed on a finger-prick blood 
sample, and a second stage, where the parasite crosses into the cerebrospinal fluid 
and can only be detected via lumbar puncture. First stage sleeping sickness is often 
missed by health authorities; patients suffer from vague symptoms common to the 
body’s natural immune response
128
; as such is often recorded as malaria (personal 
communication). This poses a problem once the disease gets to the second stage
129
 as 
the diagnosis is harder to obtain in the absence of trained professionals, and the 
treatment, particularly for rhodesiense, is severe. There is up to 10 percent chance 
that death will occur as a result of treatment, however without treatment, patients will 
certainly die. The current level of technology for HAT diagnosis and treatment 
contributes its “neglected” status; Table 8 shows the currently available treatments 
for both first and second stage HAT, and the years in which they were developed: in 
the case of rhodesiense, no new drugs have been developed for over 60 years. 
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 For example recurring fever, swollen lymph nodes, headaches, joint pain, nausea 
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 Includes confusion, weight loss, slurred speech, encephalitis and prolonged periods of sleeping 
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In conclusion, the intersectoral approach required for the control of tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis “lies at the heart of African rural development”
130
, and as such the 
disease is a good choice for looking at the various policy interactions as part of a One 
Health case study. Despite the obvious linkages with human and animal health in the 
zoonotic rhodesiense form of HAT (herein the focus of this chapter), control of both 
human and animal trypanosomiases has been shown to benefit human health and 
welfare directly through improved health and increased supplies of meat and milk, 
and indirectly through improved agricultural productivity through draught power and 
manure (Cattand et al 2010, Kristjanson et al 1999). 
 
4.1.2 History of Human African Trypanosomiasis in Uganda  
Uganda is presently the only country in Africa to harbour foci of both the acute and 
chronic forms of HAT; with a focus of T b. gambiense in the West Nile region in the 
northwest, and T b. rhodesiense in the southeast region of Busoga. Although tsetse 
flies have been in Uganda for “thousands of years”, the public health impact, and 
consequential academic interest in the disease, started during the early 20
th
 century, 
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 From Cattand et al (2010) 
DRUG TRYPANOSOME 
SPECIES 
STAGE YEAR  
Suramin T br. rhodesiense I 1921 
Pentamidine T br. gambiense I 1941 
Melarsolprol T br. rhodesiense and T 
br. gambiense (although 
usually used for the acute)  
II 1949 
Eflornithine T br. gambiense  II 1990 
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when it was estimated a third of Uganda’s population
131
 died of acute HAT (Waiswa 
and Kabasa 2009). The initial spread of sleeping sickness into Uganda was thought 
to have occurred as a result of European invasion along the Congo River to Lake 
Victoria, with T b. gambiense entering the country as a result of human migration 
from central and western Africa (Waiswa and Kabasa 2009).  
 
Cattle are essential for the maintenance of T b rhodesiense within human populations 
in Uganda (Welburn et al 2006, Fèvre et al 2001, Hide et al 1996). Major HAT 
epidemics in Uganda’s history have been associated with large cattle losses; over a 
million Ugandan cattle died in the 1890’s Rinderpest outbreaks across the country, 
resulting in large tracts of overgrown grazing land conducive to burgeoning tsetse 
infestations. It is thought the tsetse flies “ran short” of cattle to feed on during this 
time, and as a result reverted to humans for blood meals, which perpetuated the 
spread of disease during this period (Waiswa and Kabasa 2009). More recently, 
northwards spread of HAT has been associated with Lord’s Resistance Army 
insurgence during the 1980’s; people fled their homes, taking their livestock with 
them which led to overgrowth of tsetse territory:  
“By 1990, there were only roughly one thousand cattle left in Soroti district 
as most of the cattle had died because of diseases, been rustled or eaten by 
the armed groups in the different conflicts....growth of forests as a result of 
the war attracted the tsetse flies....sleeping sickness was rampant” (Excerpts 
of Informant interviews, from Waiswa and Kabasa 2009). 
 
The first case in the “present” Soroti/Serere outbreak was reported on 31
st
 December 
1998, and despite the implementation of tsetse control measures, 119 cases of acute 
HAT were recorded in the 18 months until June 2000 (Fèvre et al 2001).  Net 
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 Estimated to be around 300 000 deaths around the shores of Lake Victoria in the early 20
th
 Century  
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migration of humans and livestock back into previously overgrown areas has been 
attributed to the northwards spread of disease during the latter part of the 1990’s 
(Picozzi et al 2005, Fèvre et al 2001). 
 
4.1.3 “A Sense of Urgency”: Recently Changing Patterns of 
Human African Trypanosomiasis in Uganda  
Mass rural development programmes, funded by both the Ugandan government and 
foreign donors, were implemented upon the return of civic stability to Soroti and 
Serere Districts during the 1990’s. A major re-stocking exercise commenced, 
promoting the return of cattle and other livestock back into the area, to assist the 
resumption of agro-pastoral activities. As various officials told me, the correct 
procedure which should have occurred during cattle re-stocking of Soroti and Serere 
Districts is contained within Uganda’s Animal Diseases Act: Section 18 Rules for 
Infected Areas, with particular reference to the following Items: 
 
Item 1: No stock or carcass shall be moved in or from any such area without 
the written permission of the commissioner of livestock and entomology or 
the veterinary officer or inspecting officer in charge of the area; 
 
Item 6: no person shall leave any such area without having complied with 
such precautions for preventing the spread of disease as may be required by 




Unfortunately, little concern was given to this policy by either the Ugandan 
government or NGOs during restocking activities in the 1990’s. One official blamed 
the lack of technical input into the re-stocking movement on its highly politicised 
nature; “the re-stocking deal was done in the office of the Prime Minister by the time 
MAAIF was involved” (Interview MAAIF June 2011). Many cattle came from 
rhodesiense endemic regions of the south-east; as such poor adherence to national 
policy advising the treatment of cattle before their removal from rhodesiense-
endemic areas
132
 has largely been attributed to the northwards spread (Fèvre et al 
2001, Picozzi et al, 2005). As one district official explained:  
“(NGOs) have to follow the policy of government, especially when they are 
bringing livestock. They don’t just have to come in (sic). Yet they came and 
distributed their animals without consultation. There is also a government 
programme for re-stocking, NUSAF
133
, that has been here (in Soroti 
District)” (Interview MAAIF August 2010).   
 
By 2005, there was a public health crisis in Uganda, with molecular technologies 
indicating acute HAT had spread into eight new districts in as many years, with only 
150 kilometres separating the acute and chronic foci of human disease (Picozzi et al 
2005). Overlap of the two diseases will spark a public health nightmare; at present 
the only way to differentiate between the acute and chronic forms of disease is by 
knowing which geographical area the human patient comes from. If the two forms 
collide in Uganda, it will be difficult to know what treatment to give the patient as 
the parasites are morphologically similar on blood and cerebrospinal fluid smears, 
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 As yet there is no legal requirement for point of sale treatment 
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however require different treatment. Additionally, there is presently no knowledge of 








Figure 3: Northwards spread of HAT in 10 years showing 150 km 
separation of acute (red) and chronic forms (yellow) of HAT by 2005134  
 
4.1.4 Policy for Animal Disease Control: Uganda’s Animal 
Disease Act 
“We have a very broad Animal Disease Act, which is the major policy document that 
directs disease control in the country, and it has provisions for most of those things – 
the current problem is with the implementation.” 
- Interview MAAIF, June 2011 
The major policy for all disease control within animal reservoirs in Uganda is the 
Animal Disease Act
135
, which describes the requirements for addressing an outbreak 
of the “notifiable diseases” including FMD, anthrax, Trypanosomiasis, rabies, 
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http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Uganda/UG_Animal_Diseases_Act_1918.pdf 






Lumpy Skin Disease and Newcastle Disease.  Two major observations upon reading 
this Act is the “commencement” date of the 1
st
 of January 1918 on the front page, 
and its non-specificity in terms of which diseases it covers.  A separate Veterinary 
Public Health
136
 Act exists, however this has also been described as “old”, for 
example the referrals to abattoir inspection being under control of the Ministry of 
Health
137
. As one official shrugged “these are the policies that are followed as no 
new ones have been written post independence”. (Interview MAAIF June 2011).  
 
A commonly cited reason for the delayed revision of the outdated policy is lack of 
evidence for disease prioritisation; policy dialogue cannot be initiated without 
prevalence data: “you need to provide information on what the problem is, the nature 
of transmission, its economic and public health importance – then you can bring the 
stakeholders on board for their views”. (Interview MAAIF June 2011). Another 
official explained the difficulty in securing funds for prevalence studies in the first 
place; “as much as you don’t want a political crisis, we need the data for justification 
of spending....we are all fighting for meagre resources”.  (Interview MAAIF June 
2011). 
 
Within the Animal Disease Act, the official policy concerning notifiable livestock 
disease is that you cannot move animals into new areas without clearance from 
veterinary officers (GoU Animal Disease Act). In the case of an outbreak, the disease 
must be reported to the local government veterinarian by the LC1, parish or 
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 Traditionally assigned the roles of meat and milk hygiene and inspection for the control of food-
borne zoonoses such as brucellosis and bovine tuberculosis 
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 A common post-independence policy across many East African countries, but since disbanded 
across many districts of Uganda where control of abattoirs and meat hygiene now falls primarily 
under the Ministry of Agriculture   
141 
 
subcounty chiefs. The Commissioner of Animal Health at MAAIF is then directly 
informed, and an emergency policy including quarantine, market closure and 
vaccination is formulated.  
“It takes a short time, because those diseases you should inform the 
commissioner within 24 hours. When the outbreak comes, the DVO must start 
mobilising the farmers to control the disease, deliver vaccines if necessary.” 
(Interview MAAIF June 2011).  
 
4.1.5 Overarching Agricultural Policy: Uganda’s Plan for the 
Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) 
Since receiving cabinet approval in 2000, the Plan for the Modernisation of 
Agriculture (PMA) is a multi-sectoral policy framework developed to shape the 
policy environment for Uganda’s agricultural sector (UMoF 2010).   The PMA aims 
to better co-ordinate donor, government and private sector efforts to drive the change 
from subsistence to commercial agricultural production, with a vision “to eradicate 
poverty through a profitable, competitive, sustainable and dynamic agricultural and 
agro-industrial sector” (DANIDA 2005). The PMA consists of seven “pillars” of 
prioritisation in order to improve agricultural performance, including the National 
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). NAADS was developed as the “new 
approach” to agricultural extension services, consisting of a semi-autonomous 
NAADS Board within the central Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and 
Fisheries (MAAIF) to oversee extension services delivered by the private sector 
(GoU 2004, GoU 2010, Butcher 2009). Previous reviews have suggested a positive 
impact of NAADS (Butcher 2009, DANIDA 2005) however some authors feel that 





 with limited assets and access to groups, thus questioning its efficacy 
(Shinyekwa and Hickey 2007). Empirical data from Uganda suggests the NAADS 
approach is also lacking in focus, with one government official citing its “rejection 
by technocrats” within the MAAIF as the actual reason for its semi-autonomous 
arrangement (Interview MAAIF June 2011). In terms of economic rationalisation, 
one also has to question the fundamental efficacy of privatising what is essentially a 
public good.  Again, overarching questions surrounding this and other examples of 
the “politics of policy”
139
 will be a prominent focus of this Ugandan case study.   
 
4.2 Power to the People? Policy Processes in a Decentralised 
Uganda  
4.2.1 Uganda’s Political History and Current Government 
Structure 
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 
January 1986 after five years of guerrilla war. Uganda’s government system has been 
described as semi-authoritarian; occupying “a middle space” between democracy and 
authoritarianism and distinguished by their “lack of consistency in guaranteeing civil 
and political liberties” (Tripp 2004).  Democracy is described as a political system 
which is “free and fair; where those voting also have an opportunity to stand being 
elected. Conversely, authoritarian regimes are organised political regimes, however 
the citizens – unlike in totalitarian systems – do not have to participate in organised 
political activities (Turner 2005).  Some authors feel semi-authoritarian regimes have 
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 Including the elderly, disabled and HIV/AIDS affected households as described by Shinyekwa and 
Hickey (2007) 
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 See for example Scoones (2010) 
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the capacity to send “mixed signals” to a population; for example despite Museveni’s 
assurance of press freedom, human rights organisations have described cases of 
illegal detention and torture of suspects critical of the government, particularly 
journalists (HRW 2011). Museveni defended Uganda’s no-party “Movement” 
system, in place until 2005, with the rationale that “preindustrial countries like 
Uganda were not ready for parties because of the persistence of sectarian tendencies” 
(Tripp 2004). This statement may have some underlying truth; despite progressing to 
multi-party politics in 2006, Museveni has retained his hold over Uganda’s 
presidency for a further two terms; leading some political commentators to surmise 
that, despite the criticisms of his leadership style, “Mr. Museveni brings security to a 
country that remains ill at ease with itself and is still haunted by the bloody rule of 
Idi Amin” (The Economist 2011)  
 
4.2.2 Decentralisation and Public Participation 
 
Decentralisation structures were put in place from the inception of Museveni’s rule 
in 1986, when elected Resistance Councils promoted political and administrative 
decentralisation. The Local Government Act was passed in 1997, renaming the 
Resistance Councils as Local Councils and outlining their roles and responsibilities 
(Kapiriri et al 2003). To this end, Uganda has decentralised all its line ministries – 
including the ministries of health and agriculture – resulting in a transfer of power to 
the district level. Figure 4 (page 144) shows the “main vehicles of public 
participation” through the democratically elected local councils from district down to 
the village level (Kapiriri et a, 2003). However, concerns have been raised that 
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citizens in Uganda are “unlikely to take full advantage of opportunities to 
participate” as result of the aforementioned lack of respect of civil liberties, and 
government clientelism (Turner 2005).  
 
Although the decentralised structure may be appealing in terms of its “power to the 
people” rhetoric, in the case of infectious disease control, decentralisation has been 
blamed for a wide variety of inefficiencies within the health and agricultural sectors. 
Interviews with government officials captured their frustration at the “lack of 
prioritisation” given to disease control at the local government level; describing how 
the implementation of a co-ordinated national approach for zoonotic diseases such as 
rabies was difficult within such a governance framework.  Another area of grave 
public health concern is the situation of abattoirs across the country; despite the core 
function of meat inspection in the prevention of zoonoses crossing into the food 
chain, their control under local government authority means the national ministry 
“can’t touch them”
140
. Interviews and several publications have alluded to a process 
of “recentralisation” of veterinary services in recent years (for example with abattoir 
inspections), however it is yet to be fully implemented, with some authors citing 
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Figure 4: Uganda’s Structure of Decentralisation (Adapted from Kapiriri 
et al 2003) 
 
Theoretically speaking, Local Councillors (LCs) can produce policy development 
workplans for submission to the district councillor (LC5) of that ministry, who can 
then forward them onto Entebbe for discussion. One District Veterinary Officer 
(DVO) also described the existence of participatory policy processes at the parish or 
subcounty level. He gave the example of livestock disease control, whereby local 
government councillors (LC2 and LC3) have the power to form policy and police it 
locally 
“Yes they have the power, especially when they know the danger - even the 
farmers themselves have measures in place as a gap-stop (sic) in the villages, 
for example if they don’t want other farmers to bring their animals to a 













Despite such claims by ministry officials, I found relatively little evidence that 
communities understood the various roles and responsibilities of government, or the 
position they could play
141
. The only policy farmers could describe was quarantine 
for the notifiable diseases
142
, and some had experienced treatment of their cattle at 
market places by government veterinarians. Opinions of some ministerial 
representatives revealed the notion of increased political power of local communities 
as a result of decentralisation was at best optimistic, at worst misleading, with 
complaints from senior level technocrats that the whole policy system in Uganda is 
“a process where the technical authority has been eroded.....the political decision is 
made prior to the process” (Interview MAAIF June 2011).  Accounts from another 
informant at the district level of government supported this observation:  
Policies are supposed to be designed from the grass roots. But what we 
normally do here, most of the ideas, most of the policies, some of them are 
made without consulting the local people; they just assume people want this, 
most likely the politicians. The politicians are supposed to be coming to talk 
to their people, then also the heads of department, the professionals, they are 
supposed to also be getting their ideas from the people asking the people 
what they want, but it’s rarely done. At least I’ve never seen them coming 
here to consult – they just come and say ‘this is the policy’ (Interview 
MAAIF August 2010).  
 
This sentiment was also supported by accounts from the farmers, who largely felt the 
government should listen more to what they really want, given the contribution of 
livestock to the community:  
“The problem we have, people who are in this (local government), the 
majority who have no cows are very more than us. When we raise our hands, 
say that we want treatment, they say no, we want a bore-hole. OK so now we 
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private sector shall sensitise the public on livestock policies” (GoU 2001)   
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 including FMD, CBPP and rabies 
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are defeated, and they are not clear on us. We are behind.”(FGD Serere 
District, August 2010).  
 
As often appears to be the case within government departments across Africa, whilst 
it was deemed “definitely possible” for communities to become engaged within the 
policy process, poor funding was blamed for why consultation does not occur: “It 
requires a lot of money, going to talk to the people” (Interview MAAIF June 2011).   
 
4.2.3 The Policy Process in Uganda 
Through the course of my research, government officials initially described 
Uganda’s process of policy development as a largely rational, linear process
143
, 
whereby stakeholder participation is encouraged in response to a technical issue as 
determined by technocrats within the ministries (see Figure 5). Once the technical 
issue has been identified, district government representatives obtain the inputs of 
local stakeholders (largely farmers in the case of agricultural policy) from a sample 
of districts across the country, in order to “identify issues that are concerns of the 
local people” and include their representative views. Subsequently, a new policy is 
presented (in draft form) to what one ministry official deemed the “serious 
stakeholders” at the national level
144
; in the course of a one or two day meeting the 
draft policy document undergoes a rigourous process of review and consolidation.  
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Figure 5: Uganda’s “Official” Policy Process145 with its similarities to 
the “conventional” linear view of policy146 
 
When the draft policy is agreed upon at the national stakeholder level, the Ministry 
of Justice develops a legal draft which is then sent to the Permanent Secretary (PS); 
the PS must then “sell” it to the minister. At this point “the department has done its 
job, it is up to the PS to look out whether it’s compliant with overall government 
agenda” (Interview MAAIF July 2011). If approved by the Minister, a “certificate of 
financial implications” will be sought, whereby the Ministry of Finance determines 
the financial requirements for policy implementation, and guarantees funding. After 
this, the Minister for Agriculture will present it to cabinet for final approval, upon 
which it becomes official policy. In the event a policy requires legislative 
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“Official” Policy Process in Uganda 
1. Policy initiated in response to a 
known issue 
2. Views sought from the public 
3. Results from step (2) sent to the 
ministerial policy unit; draft policy 
constructed with input from 
ministerial technocrats 
4. Stakeholder workshops conducted 
with experts for consolidation of the 
draft document 
5. PS needs to “sell” draft from step 
(4) to the Minister. If this is 
successful, policy  taken to cabinet 









amendment or the creation of a new law for implementation, the process of enacting 
a bill will begin which can slow the process even further; “it takes time, even some 
years, but depending anyway on how active the policy actors are – (laughing) we 
have seen some laws enacted in record time.” (Interview MAAIF, June 2011).  
 
4.2.4 The “Politics of Policy”147: Diminishing Role of Technical 
Contribution  
“The decision making is normally political. Yes, because the whole policy process 
moves towards a political decision, that is the intention....but the political decision is 
made prior to the process” 
Interview MAAIF July 2011 
 
In terms of factors which influence the policy making process, the “politics of 
policy” cannot be ignored; understanding “who gains, who loses and who calls the 
shots” is crucial in understanding policy decisions outside the paradigm of cost 
effectiveness and technical recommendations (Scoones 2010).  
 
Incidences of politics overriding “common scientific sense” is not restricted to 
African nations alone; Tony Blair’s handling of the United Kingdom’s 2001 FMD 
outbreak is a prime example
148
. In the case of Uganda however, and possibly other 
countries whose macroeconomic policies are determined through World Bank 
PRSPs, some feel there is a growing tendency for ministerial decisions to be made 
“based on theories” of the external (usually international) actors, as such 
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overshadowing the views of local people and problems. One official felt there is less 
time afforded to ministerial technical advisors compared to in the past; the entry 
point for policy decisions “used to be from the technical wing”
149
, however the 
World Bank officials now “just come, sit in the ministry of finance, discuss with 
those economists, then comes (sic) to MAAIF, meets the PS and the ministers, make 
their decision and go away.” (Interview MAAIF July 2011). Some blame this 
“erosion of technical authority” on the rapid approach to policy change currently 
favoured by development specialists; perceived to be “not appreciated by technical 
people”, and as such they are becoming excluded in the policy process (Interview 
MAAIF June 2010).  Whilst this could be brushed aside as just another example of 
public sector frustrations, it could go some way in explaining the ubiquitous apathy 
which seems to flood African government departments across the continent at 
present; 
“By the time these (policies) come to us, political decisions have been made. 
So you have no choice but to keep working and implementing things you are 
so certain are wrong.  Some of us we have lived through agony because all 
the time they are coming with the wrong decision - all we can do is try to 
“moderate” the exercise of the wrong thing, so that’s what we do.” (MAAIF 
June 2011). 
 
Examples of externally driven policies include the “National plan for the control of 
Neglected Tropical Diseases” which had come from the WHO; so (as an official in 
the MoH clarified) “not really a “national” plan at all”.  Within the MAAIF, 
NAADS was another clear example of how a “programme that had been rejected by 
the technocrats” was nevertheless pursued by the World Bank as a pillar in the PMA, 
and set up as a parallel programme outside the ministry:  
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“Right from the word go, (MAAIF technical advisors) opposed (to NAADS), 
but because there was too much money at stake, it acted as a bait for some of 
the policy makers to accept. Even the PMA it failed to move on. That was also 
a World Bank driven programme – but you know these are the issues – you 
design a programme for which you have no capacity to fund. I wouldn’t mind 
if NAADS was implemented in a PMA environment, but the environment 
never existed! NAADS is ending in failure, in fact it is a disaster - we warned 
them long ago these things cannot work, it is too advanced for our farmers, 
that theoretical thinking is out of context of the realities on the ground, but 
once something is politically pressed we technical people stand aside. We 
don’t have a say – you know the thing doesn’t work, but because the 
politicians are supporting it, the donors are supporting it, you come out 
publicly and say it will work (laughing).” (Interview MAAIF June 2011).  
 
4.3 Situating the Field Research: Overview of Soroti and 
Serere Districts of Uganda 
 
As described in chapter two, the fieldwork for the Ugandan Case Study was 
undertaken in selected villages in the Soroti and Serere districts of eastern Uganda. 
Access to these villages was gained through a series of field visits in 2010 and 2011, 
as part of my involvement with the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness (SOS) campaign
150
.  
Soroti and Serere districts lie in the middle of Uganda’s “cattle corridor” (Map 4) 
and covers an area of 2663 square kilometres, of which 2256 Km2 island and 406 
Km2 is water (GoU 2003). Situated on the shores of Lake Kyoga, the district is 
largely made up of wetlands and swampy areas draining into the lake, with an 
average of 81% of agricultural activities the result of mixed subsistence farming of 
livestock and annual crops such as cassava, groundnuts and millet (GoU 2003). 
Poultry and goats are the most commonly owned livestock in the districts; with 57% 
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of farmers owning cattle, of which a major productivity output is draft power (GoU 
2003). Soroti and Serere are the two districts which received targeted interventions 
against Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT) in phase two of the Stamp Out 
Sleeping Sickness programme. My first visit to the field occurred in July-August in 
2010, at the time of baseline sample bleeding, with the second visit in June 2011, 
around seven months after the restricted application spray and trypanocide 
intervention had taken place in November 2010.  This gave a unique opportunity to 
discuss with local communities both pre and post-intervention, and ascertain their 
response in terms of HAT risk perception, particularly with their understanding of 
the role of cattle.   
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4.3.1 Animal Health and Management in Soroti and Serere 
Districts – Community Perspective  
 
Focus Group Discussions undertaken in 2010 and 2011 (Map 5 next page) with 
farmers helped identify the major aspects of animal keeping in the area, and the 
challenges of disease control.  The priority problem cited in all groups was ticks and 
associated tick borne diseases (TBDs) including East Coast Fever (ECF), “Epio” 
(Anaplasmosis), “Heartwater” (Cowdriosis) and Babesia. Whilst some communities 
named the actual diseases, for others TBDs were assumed present given the 
described symptoms, for example blood-stained urine
152
 in the bulls. Mastitis, a 
secondary consequence of tick attachment and inflammation around the udder, was 
also cited as a problem in some communities.  Other diseases include suspected cases 
of nagana
153
, the acute viral infection Lumpy Skin Disease, and cataracts
154
. Lesser 
mentioned diseases included Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), fascioliasis and 
Thelazia (eye worm). Some villages mentioned Newcastle Disease, stating their 
chickens “look like the person putting on the coat”
155
 before dying acutely.  Another 
village mentioned their concern about the effect of disease on their draft cattle, 
emphasising the significance of this often-neglected livestock output; “when the bulls 
get an infection, especially in the rainy season, they have no power and they can’t 
plough, so there is no money in the bank, the account is closed”.  
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When questioned about existing government programmes, respondents remembered 
the FITCA
157
 and Rinderpest programmes from some time ago, along with recent 
vaccination programmes for CBPP, FMD and Lumpy Skin Disease. Cost sharing 
rabies vaccination is done yearly in most subcounties; triangulation suggests good 
participation in the programme, likely reflecting the high level of community 
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sensitisation and the reported decrease in human cases since its inception. 
Unfortunately the same could not be said for a 2010 CBPP programme, where 
infection and necrosis as a result of subcutaneous tail vaccinations caused the tails to 
slough off in many cases. Besides the physical distress caused to the animals
158
, 
participants complained tail-less cattle are difficult to sell at the market, resulting in 
loss of income. None of the communities interviewed had experience of the 
government driven National Agricultural Advisory (NAADS) extension service, 
similar to a previous survey in the area where over 80% of respondents had either not 
experienced agricultural or veterinary extension services, or had not used them in 
over 12 months (Butcher 2009b).   
 
In terms of the affordability of veterinary drugs and services, most respondents 
across the 16 villages indicated the drugs were “expensive” and they had to travel 
“far” to buy them (“sometimes to Soroti”). The majority of respondents indicated 
they bought their animal drugs from “quacks” (non-professional traders), with many 
concerned about the efficacy and storage of drugs. “Quacks can’t tell live weight, we 
are suspicious of under-dosing, they don’t give the full course”. Others bought their 
drugs on market days, although voiced similar concerns about the lack of 
professionalism from these drug suppliers; “You know the storage of the drugs is not 
safe, in the market there. We are not trusting them (sic)”. Accounts of “weak” drugs 
were common, particularly those who have their animals sprayed at market places
159
; 
with many concerned about drug efficacy; “after 2 days the ticks still haven’t come 
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off  - there is someone who is spraying these animals, it’s his business, but he is 
diluting the spray so he can make more money.” For other cases such as mastitis, 
there is simply no known effective treatment. Lack of professional advice 
necessitates the use of a “hit and miss” approach to therapeutics; “people are using 
dewormers for other things apart from stomach worms then wondering why they 
can’t get rid of the ticks”. It is in this way that the absence of veterinary services 
contributes to the issues of drug resistance and residues in meat and milk ubiquitous 
across Africa. Another observation was that farmers appeared willing to pay for 
accessible veterinary drugs and services, in order to avoid wasting money on the 
“half cooked jobs” of non-professionals.  
 
In general, community attitudes to government animal health services were 
surprisingly positive, with most villages accepting the need for quarantine, and also 
willing to take responsibility for the health of their animals, provided private 
veterinary services became more accessible and affordable. Some farmers wanted 
further development and enforcement of disease control policies; as one farmer 
explained “what we had wanted, is for the government to come with a certain law, a 
policy, yes, so that people are forced to do something, and at the end, they will like 
it” (FGD Serere District, August 2010). 
 
4.3.2 Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Zoonotic Disease 
Community knowledge of zoonotic diseases was extremely low in most of the 
interviewed villages, possibly accounting for the low perception of risk for those 
diseases they did know about. Rabies was the most easily identified zoonosis; all 
157 
 
villages were aware of this disease, with some, such as Awoja in Gweri district, 
experiencing human deaths. Cost-sharing rabies vaccination programmes had been 
ongoing in most of the Soroti-Serere parishes and despite supply issues in some 
cases, the programme was relatively well attended, possibly as a result of 
sensitisation from the human deaths;  
“One dog bit a woman’s breast and a school boy some time back...there was 
a lack of sensitisation (they) just treated the wound – the wound healed but 
the boy died. But now people are sensitised and bring their dogs when there 
is a vaccination programme”. (FGD Soroti District, July 2011).  
 
Outside of rabies however, there was an obvious lack of awareness of zoonoses, 
possibly attributed to the vague symptoms and lack of correlation with risk factors; 
“it is rare, we don’t know it. Some of the people here even eat the dead meat, so we 
have not experienced any problems”. Respondents in almost all villages described 
drinking “bongo” (raw milk); “it’s traditional to eat sour milk, with the bread made 
from cassava, we mix it into a paste and eat it”, with others saying “we drink milk 
straight from the teat, it is hot and nice”. Others were aware of the health risks 
associated with drinking raw milk; one man described how his wife became sick 
after drinking bongo, and they were told not to drink unpasteurised milk. Some 
respondents also indicated their possible experience with brucellosis, explaining “it 
has malaria, when you take unboiled milk – you get fever which comes and goes, like 
malaria”
160
 .  
 
In terms of meat hygiene and associated food borne zoonoses, a common perception 
was that meat “in carcass form” induced suspicion; “If someone came (with meat) on 
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the bicycle with a lot of flies around it, we would not eat that meat, we would not buy 
that one”.  As long as the animal had been seen alive beforehand, communities were 
happy to eat it: “It is all good meat – as long as we see the cow standing up, we don’t 
mind”.  This extended to the “green meat” of pork
161
 and the commonly eaten cystic 
pork meat which is a risk factor for epilepsy (neurocysticercosis). Many people 
described how epilepsy cases seemed to be increasing in the district, admitting 




Knowledge of a particular disease seemed to come from a witnessed association 
between a habit and the symptoms; for example, some who felt consumption of 
cystic pork was “bad” described their knowledge of “a butcher slaughtering pigs 
only, the family is only eating pork, but most of the family members became epileptic, 
so we related it back to pork” (FGD Soroti District July 2011).   Some individuals 
also mentioned they had received sensitisation through a local NGO programme, 
indicating they now “feel unsafe” purchasing meat which had not been inspected by 
the veterinarian as “quacks will treat with drugs which put chemicals into the meat”. 
One woman was particularly well sensitised on zoonoses from trainings given by the 
local veterinary officer; I feel women are an important investment in zoonoses as 
they are more concerned, and have a greater impact, on food preparation and 
hygiene. At one FGD my question on milk practises was met with bursts of laughter 
by both men and women; an explanation by the translator revealed the men in that 
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village blame the women if they get sick from eating bad meat or drinking unboiled 
milk. 
 
Jokes aside, it appears there is a strong requirement for increased advocacy across 
the board for the “silent” zoonoses such as brucellosis, cysticercosis and Bovine 
Tuberculosis; the majority of communities are simply unaware they exist, and as one 
central government informant explained, they do not get political backing because 
there are “bigger problems” in terms of risk perception; 
“The public will co-operate with Public Health programmes for diseases 
which spread quickly and are dramatic, for example Ebola, Marburg, Rabies 
– but for these chronic endemic illnesses it’s difficult to make people believe 
it was because of a practice or something they ate, when they have been 
eating meat and drinking milk every day of their lives” (Interview UMoH 
July 2011).   
 
Even more upsetting is the “fatalistic” attitude of the rural poor which I have seen so 
often across Africa; as this extract from an interview with the local government 
veterinary officer shows, people accept they are sick because they simply do not 
know what the problem is, and as such cannot find a remedy:   
 
“Like the story that the man who was telling us
163
 he really suffered for quite 
a long time. He kept on treating himself against malaria, when it was not 
actually malaria. There are people in the villages there who are sick every 
day. They have given up with the treatment, they think it’s just the way it has 
to be - “me I am always sick like this, let me just wait until the day I die” - 
this is because they fail to discover what they are suffering from.” (Interview 
MAAIF, August 2010).   
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4.3.3 Marketing Livestock  
The majority of farmers market their animals locally on fixed days of the week, 
although some sell amongst themselves without involving the major markets. 
Markets where livestock are sold include Arapai, Tubur, Gweri, Bukadea, Kasilo and 
neighbouring Kumi District, with most farmers indicating they walked their animals 
to these markets, often between four and six hours away. As is often the case in 
smallholder systems, farmers indicated they sell livestock when cash is required; for 
example school fees, dowry or when someone is sick. One farmer illustrated this by 
explaining the size of animals they sell “depends on the demand, the pressure you 
have – if you have big problems, you sell the biggest animals, if you don’t have big 
problems, you just sell the small animals!” The younger animals are preferential for 
dowry, so farmers often find themselves disposing of young stock out of necessity (a 
guaranteed sale) when these animals should theoretically be used to build up the 
herds.  
 
Farmers have little control over what prices they receive for their animals; a 
phenomenon common to many parts of Africa
164
. As one farmer explained “we sell 
at a low price because we have walked them”; the bargaining power to get decent 
prices for livestock is lost due to the long distances from market. Many farmers 
indicated they sell unhealthy animals
165
 (despite only wanting to buy those in good 
health), which has repercussions on meat entering the food chain. Some indicated 
that word of mouth will alert them to days when good market prices can be expected; 
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“when the traders arrive from Sudan, we get good prices. And also the NGOs and the 
government (for re-stocking programmes) they give us good prices”. 
 
4.4 Where there is no Policy: Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness  
 
4.4.1 Community Based Control: Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness 
(SOS): Phase One 2006-2008 
The Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness (SOS) campaign was launched in October 2006 in 
Kampala, Uganda. This campaign brought together public and private stakeholders 





. The aim of the campaign was first and foremost to maintain a 
barrier zone between the acute and chronic HAT foci, resulting in an initial 
“emergency campaign” to block treat all cattle in the northern-most HAT affected 
districts of Apac, Lira, Dokolo, Amolotar, and Kaberamaido.  This huge effort
168
 
mobilised students from Makerere University’s FVM, leading to the creation of the 
Makerere In-training Community Service (MINTRACS) model still used for final 
year veterinary students. Subsequent to the initial trypanocidal administration to 
“clean out” the cattle, students delivered a series of three sprayings with deltamethrin 
(Vectocid®), an acaricide which is also active against tsetse flies, thus prevents re-
emergence of trypanosomiasis (including the human infective form) through the bite 
of infected tsetse flies.   
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The Restricted Application Protocol (RAP) spray technique was used; a cost-saving 
and environmentally friendly technology that maintains endemic stability through 
spraying the predominant tsetse-feeding areas of cattle
169
 (Torr et al, 2007). It was 
hoped that farmers (with the help of the 3V vet spray teams) would be encouraged to 
adopt a routine spray practice, thus leading to sustainability of the approach once the 
campaign ended. SOS partners also supported the mobilisation of five privatised “3V 
vet” operations within these initial districts, with the aim of sustaining the recently 
generated “spray” momentum and providing holistic veterinary services into the 
northernmost areas.  A vast amount of literature has been published on Phase I of the 
campaign (2006-2008), including the political and institutional environment, 




4.4.2 Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness: Phase Two 2008-2011 
Phase two of the campaign (Map 6) aimed to treat a further 250 000 cattle across 
Soroti and Serere districts, and it is under this that my field work took place in 2010 
and 2011. The first group of FGDs for this thesis were undertaken at the time 
baseline seroprevalence surveys were being conducted across the 55 intervention in 
August 2010, and the second half took place six months after the students completed 
the November 2010 spray and treatment regime (July 2011). Through the use of 
FGDs, I wanted to ascertain community knowledge and perception of risk 
surrounding zoonotic diseases, and evaluate the effect of the SOS mass treatment 
campaign had, particularly for zoonotic HAT. 
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4.4.3 Community perceptions regarding the purpose of SOS 
When asked what the purpose of the SOS campaign was, answers were vague, with 
most respondents simply replying “diseases”. Some indicated their cattle had been 
sprayed for ticks and tsetse flies but did not mention any association with HAT, nor 
understanding why their cattle were sprayed for these diseases. Further probing 
revealed many communities assumed the intervention was for FMD or CBPP, with a 
small number indicating nagana; others said they would be told what diseases people 
were testing for “when the results come back”
171
. Communities remained largely 
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unaware of the campaign’s human disease objectives. This is similar to post-
intervention findings obtained from the SOS I target areas, where only 12% of 
respondents knew their cattle had been treated to reduce the chance of contracting 
HAT (Butcher 2009b).   
 
4.4.4 Community perceptions regarding tick and tsetse control  
Given the importance of monthly spray regimes against tick and tsetse flies in order 
to break HAT transmission, I wanted to ascertain the current spray practices of 
farmers, particularly post-SOS. Respondents in both pre and post-intervention SOS 
villages described irregular spray patterns; “every now and then”, “when we see 
ticks” and “when we have money”. Only two individuals indicated a consistent 
approach to tick control: one a successful owner of improved Friesian dairy cattle, 
frustrated at the carelessness of neighbouring farmers: 
“Some spray. Not all. Some can spray in 3 months once, in six months only 
once (sic). People are not willing to spray their animals, they are lacking 
education”. (FGD Serere District, August 2010) 
 
None of the farmers across the 13 parishes reported they were currently using the 
Restricted Application Protocol (RAP).  In terms of drugs used, only one farmer 
(Gweri) indicated he sprayed his cattle with Tsetse-Tick®
172
, all other respondents 
indicated the use of acaracides only, with popular brands being Norotraz®, Amitix®, 
and Tacktick®. No-one used Vectocid®, even in those in Awoja, where a 3V 
veterinarian reportedly has a drug shop.  
Out of all the FGD participants, only one man remembered the name Vectocid®; “we 
didn’t ask, and we were not told”, with others indicating “we noticed the drug didn’t 
                                                          
172
 Effective against both tick and tsetse flies 
165 
 
look the same as the ones we are used to, but they didn’t tell us the name”.  
Respondents in Asuret subcounty appeared marginally better informed than the 
majority, with one respondent replying “we knew the drug was killing both tick and 
tsetse and if another one bites during time period it will not become infectious – but 
being old like me I can’t remember the name”. Despite participants being to “keep 
spraying” by the students, the message about using a tsetse-effective insecticide 
seems to have been lost. Of special concern was the lack of understanding towards 
use of the Restricted Application Protocol (RAP); in contrast to a March 2011 project 
update document
173
, I received no indication that RAP was understood by the 
communities during the November 2010 intervention, or subsequently taken up by 
farmers across the district. As is often the case, I found communities had formed 
their own conclusions about why “only half the cow was sprayed”; ranging from the 
students being generally careless, to the more serious accusation that the students 
wanted to “save the drugs and sell them later for their own money”.    
 
4.4.5 Community Perceptions Regarding SOS II Implementation 
Field notes taken in August 2010
174
 indicate that although I felt the SOS sensitisation 
visits to be largely well done, I was concerned the “one way” process
175
 could 
potentially result in misunderstandings about the aim of the intervention, resulting in 
a low impact rate. I also felt a major message surrounding long term sustainability of 
the intervention was unclear, as this extract from my field notebook shows: 
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“Lack of discussion re sustainability – students need to include this and 
explain the 3V system. They also need to get an idea of what is currently 
available in terms of animal health treatments and delivery system – i.e.  
what are they currently spraying with, where do they get it – what are the 
community’s concerns?” (Field Notes). 
 
In terms of community perception about how sensitisation was conducted, many 
informants mentioned the language barrier; “they were speaking Luganda, they 
couldn’t communicate to us”. Others felt they received the information too late, and 
as such many cattle missed the treatment:  
“The mobilisation was not good. There was no awareness. In fact it was even 
late when they communicated, so not enough people knew about the 
programme and didn’t bring their cows.” (FGD Soroti District, July 2011)  
 
Many indicated they only brought their cattle that were “sick” as they thought these 
were the ones that needed treating
176
.  Another village told how they were simply not 
sensitised: “They never met with the farmers, and that is the problem”. At the central 
government level, an informant familiar with SOS was also concerned at the level of 
community sensitisation that occurred under the SOS programme;  
“If you come in, don’t tell people what you are doing, start something for free 
then tell them they have to pay they won’t accept.....you need to assess 
whether people really can effectively participate in T&T control – farmers 
don’t see the need unless there is adequate sensitisation.”(Interview MAAIF 
June 2011). 
 
Community sensitisation always has its challenges, many of which stem from 
internal village politics and as such cannot be avoided. Of greater concern however, 
was the perceived lack of professionalism students displayed towards the 
communities and their livestock. Remarks to this effect included: “they just treated 
the animals then left, they said they were tired”, “some of the vets were rude”, and 
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“they were just spraying their backs, they were speeding the work. They were not 
taking it seriously”. One woman laughed as she explained  
“These guys come and rush the work, they don’t explain things, they don’t 
talk to us – they are isolating themselves, it’s like they are scared of us”. 
  
It appears that it was not just the communities who felt this way; a district 
government official who had been involved with the SOS campaign explained:  
“You see I’ve told you, this spraying, it was not professional – the same as I 
saw it, in Akire, in Tubur, in Katine – here, the spraying was not done in 
crushes, they were just spraying as though they were spraying mosquitoes, 
they said they were tired!” (Interview MAAIF, July 2011).  
 
In defence of the students, the impressive number of animals covered by the 
campaign in the allocated time-frame
177
 undoubtedly resulted in a certain element of 
fatigue. However, poor mentorship has resulted in a loss of professional credibility in 
the eyes of the community. One of the major stated aims of the MINTRACS
178
 
programme is “to enable Makerere University to produce veterinary graduates able to 
address community’s needs” (Waiswa and Kabasa 2010).  Increasing the exposure of 
veterinary students to rural communities is intended to bolster their confidence in 
preparation for the work force. However if students are not suitably mentored in 
communication skills and professional conduct, the result will be detrimental to the 
student, the communities, animal welfare and the SOS campaign in general. Greater 
post-intervention analysis is required to further understand the community perception 
of SOS Phase II, and as a result, the extent to which the intervention has impacted 
community attitudes and behaviour towards HAT prevention. Current perceptions 
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that the student model was “well received by communities and DVOs”
179
 however, 
appears to be somewhat in contrast to the field experience.   
 
Furthermore, I felt my insights received at this time closely matched independent 
evaluation reports from SOS Phase I
180
. In general, I felt communities appreciated 
the SOS programme, even if many did not understand, or had forgotten, the main 
objectives. One of the biggest challenges to long term impact remains the lack of 
post-intervention follow up
181
: notwithstanding the fact that the August 2010 blood 
results were yet to be disseminated to communities, by July 2011 the “prophylactic 
period” of trypanocide cover was at its tail end, and I worried if community-based 
spray regimes did not get started soon, a re-treatment campaign would have to be 
initiated. An informant familiar with the long-standing HAT activities in the area 
expressed concern that some areas already required re-treatment, based on recent 
HAT cases appearing at Serere Hospital;  
“Oburin and Katete are very bad, I don’t know how much sensitisation went 
on, if any, as farmers are not spraying their cows, I fear the whole side of the 
Oburin parish has been missed out”.  (Interview Serere Health Facility, July 
2011).   
 
When questioned, the 3V veterinarian in Serere had not heard of the Oburin cases, 
two of which were from the same village. It appeared that despite the proximity of 
the 3V veterinary shop to Serere Hospital
182
; there had never been contact between 
the 3V vet and the hospital. Ideally, veterinarians in HAT endemic areas should have 
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an awareness of where human patients are coming from, using the information 
prevent disease and simultaneously boost their own profits. 
 
In conclusion, despite most participants knowing “nagana” in cattle, it appears the 
SOS Phase II campaign has struggled to alter current knowledge and risk perception 
surrounding HAT. The majority of participants maintained a poor understanding of 
what HAT is, or how it spread, with one man lamenting “if we don’t know the 
symptoms how do we know we have it?” In terms of risk perception, the most 
powerful mobilising tool appears to be known patients in the same areas. For 
example, a number of individuals in Tubur subcounty (close to the Kaberamaido 
border) knew of HAT patients being treated in Serere hospital. Similarly, informants 
in Idupa village (Olio subcounty close to the Serere treatment centre) had witnessed 
two cases of HAT in 2009, and were worried about the disease. In Asuret I was told 
about a current patient in Serere hospital
183
, and that two people had previously died 
of HAT before the SOS programme started. Despite this small number of people in 
Soroti and Serere Districts with knowledge about what HAT actually was, few, if 
any, understood the role of the cattle reservoir.  
 
An independent SOS Phase I evaluation concluded “Greater understanding by cattle 
keepers of the aims of the campaign would have helped lay foundations for future 
interventions under SOS, and helped farmers to make future treatment decisions 
based on sound information” (Butcher 2009b).  It seems this opportunity was again 
missed in SOS phase II, despite a greater period of planning being available (in 
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contrast to the “emergency” campaign of SOS I).  Possibly greater mentorship of 
students within the MINTRACS model, in addition to more active participation from 
the government and/or the private sector, could ensure sustainability of HAT control 
once the donors have left
184
. This is particularly important in areas with fewer human 
cases, where community mobilisation for prevention may be more difficult.    
 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from speaking with communities in 
the SOS Phase two target areas is that in terms of neglected zoonoses, the disparity 
between progress towards the “essential” illnesses such as rabies (which has its own 
Act within the MAAIF), compared to the “less dramatic” endemic diseases such as 
brucellosis, HAT and cysticercosis, can be strongly related to public awareness and 
risk perception of disease. This aspect should be remembered in future efforts to 
control disease in the absence of government enforcement of policy through national 
platforms, or where policy does not exist in the first place;  
“Depending on the importance to the public, government becomes more 
sensitive to certain (issues) and moves it through faster.  But when it is not of 
significant public interest, then it can take you on the shelf for a long time, 
people just taking their time”. (Interview UMoH June 2011).  
Another informant lamented “People need to die before the money comes in”  
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4.5.1 Interministerial Collaboration at the Central Government 
Level  
Interviews with government representatives revealed relatively strong, if informal, 
linkages existed between the Ugandan Ministries of Health and Agriculture. Uganda 
is one of the few countries in east Africa that established a Veterinary Public Health 
division within the central Ministry of Health in response to a 1996 WHO request, 
and this, along with several high profile zoonotic disease cases
185
, has “made it 
easier” for the health and veterinary departments to join forces when required. As 
found in Nigeria, the international response to HPAI became an important yardstick 
for inter-disciplinary co-operation in Uganda; however government officials were 
fast to point out that inter-ministerial co-operation has always been externally 
funded.  One high level MAAIF official explained the reason Ugandan ministries 
worked well together was due to long term working relationships and trust between 
individuals: 
 “It’s basically the people. Like the politics comes in later – ministries mainly 
operate as separate entities, so the thing you do is form a taskforce, you ask 
for money for this taskforce, and the different players contribute, so it’s no 
longer a Ministry of Health  issue , or an agriculture issue, it surpasses this”. 
(Interview MAAIF June 2011). 
 
When asked whether a permanent inter-ministerial platform for zoonoses control 
would eventuate in Uganda, the reply indicated that the backbone of a national 
taskforce already exists in the country. This “largely permanent” arrangement that 
meets on a regular basis, changing its make-up according to the disease outbreak and 
the expertise required to control it. To date, this taskforce remains a merely technical 
                                                          
185
 Including Marburg Haemorrhagic Virus which killed a Dutch tourist in 2008, Ebola epidemics, and 
the periodic deaths of hippos in Queen Elizabeth National Park due to anthrax 
172 
 
structure controlled at the ministerial level
186
; currently co-chaired by the 
Commissioner of Livestock and a representative from the Ministry of Health. 
Although it sits “outside” of the ministries, it appears that in the event of an outbreak, 
financial and political support is garnered thorough its association with the office of 
the Prime Minister in charge of disaster management: 
“We leave it at the technical level most of the time for co-operation, when 
something big comes then we take it up. The beauty is that the office of the 
Prime Minister is also in charge of disaster management, so when you have 
an outbreak like anthrax, you can treat it as a zoonosis as well as a disaster, 
so that we don’t have to really now chase things up and down”. (Interview 
MAAIF July 2010) 
 
Others however, feel that in the absence of a “specific challenge”, the task forces 
collapse. Despite their ability to become rapidly resurrected based largely on good 
personal relationships, for the low profile endemic zoonoses this does not offer much 
hope:  
“When we are in the same room everybody sees the benefit of all these (One 
Health) initiatives. The problem is that all these initiatives are set up based 
on a specific challenge. That is why you hear them being called “taskforces”; 
they address a specific outbreak of this and the other. The challenge comes 
after the problem is reduced to a manageable level or removed, then the 
issues of funding this task force comes into play. And once the funding 
component is removed, it is very difficult for each of these ministries to 
budget for this taskforce because it belongs to no ministry. Until again 
another donor comes in to budget for it.”(Interview UMoH June 2011).  
 
To overcome the sustainability issues, in July 2011 there was talk of MAAIF joining 
with the Ministry of Health to establish a permanent, politically endorsed inter-
ministerial body that deals with all zoonotic diseases, essentially a formal “One 
                                                          
186
 As opposed to a political  structure endorsed by the president and controlled by legislation passed 
by Cabinet  
173 
 
Health” government platform. The main constraint is that under Ugandan law, a 
permanent collaboration must be housed within a single ministry “If you don’t want 
it to get confusion of funding it needs to have a home” (Interview Makerere 
University July 2011). One academic informant felt that the closest thing to a 
permanent One Health platform has already occurred with the aforementioned VPH 
department within the MoH; 
“The Ministry of Health did it beautifully, they invited a vet to come and 
manage the department concerned with zoonoses.  So instead of making this 
body, this department is supposed to be expanding and it gets endorsement as 
a department, and then it has a budget line in the Ministry of Finance but 
now they are creating another body which is like a taskforce”. (Interview 
Makerere July 2011). 
 
4.5.2 Interministerial Collaboration at the District and Local 
Government Levels 
When questioned on existing platforms for zoonotic disease control at the lower tiers 
of government, the ubiquitous HPAI district level taskforce for outbreak responses 
was mentioned, again cited as being “non-operational” as a case of HPAI has not 
been detected in Uganda. This invited criticism of the external agencies that money 
is put forwards for a disease which is not present, despite many other problems in the 
area in terms of zoonotic diseases; 
“The (HPAI) workshop was just about bird flu, we didn’t have the 
opportunity to talk about other diseases. But I think it is important to get a 
forum there for all those diseases that are of our own interest”. (Interview 
MAAIF August 2010) 
 
The lack of sustainability of externally driven ventures is evident, as one DVO 
explained of Uganda’s FAO-driven response to H5N1;  
174 
 
“Since we met that day, there’s no more meetings. Even we made a rapid 
response plan for the district, but since then nothing has been done” 
(Interview MAAIF August 2010) 
 
Despite a certain level of inter-sectoral collaboration at the central government level, 
discussions with informants in the lower levels of government felt that a “very big 
gap” still existed between the disciplines; 
“Especially like sleeping sickness, there’s a very big gap. See the health 
people are saying that it’s the work of the vets, but the vets are also saying 
that sleeping sickness is the work of the health people. So, there is some gap 
there, there’s nobody who is really sensitising the farmers as to who’s at risk 
of the problem.” (Interview MAAIF August 2010). 
 
Outside of HPAI, there was little awareness of the existence of inter-ministerial 
platforms. Another district level veterinarian quoted the previously described 
“outdated” Public Health Act as the policy for zoonotic disease control at the district 
level, however this Act focuses mainly on meat inspection which, whilst important, 
will not cover transmission and prevention of all zoonoses, for example rabies. When 
asked whether there could be a place at the local government level for a joint 
approach for zoonotic disease surveillance and control; at least for the “public 
goods” aspects such as sensitisation and other extension services, the response from 
the local level was positive, however indicated it may be some time before change is 
seen:  
“Yes, a special programme which addresses zoonoses, I think this would be 
fair. Because our lives are just surviving on God’s grace. There is no 
preparedness - that is our scenario here. We work out things when there is 
crisis.” (Interview MAAIF August 2010).  
 
4.5.3 “One Health by Accident”: The Co-ordinating Office for the 
Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU)  
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The Co-ordinating Office for the Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU) is 
the Secretariat of the Ugandan Trypanosomiasis Control Council (UTCC), formed by 
a parliamentary Act (Statute 16) on the 8
th
 of October 1992. This permanently funded 
inter-ministerial platform is mandated to co-ordinate policy for all stakeholders 
involved in tsetse and trypanosomiasis control in Uganda, as set out in the Vision, 
Mission and Mandate statements in Box 6 as described by Uganda’s Ministry of 
 
VISION 
Healthy and prosperous people in a Uganda free from tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis with highly productive agricultural sector that 
ensures improved quality and increased quantity of food for all 
people and good returns on investment. 
 
MISSION 
To create tsetse free zones and eliminate sleeping sickness and 
Nagana in Uganda 
 
MANDATE 
The Uganda Trypanosomiasis Control Council (UTCC) with its 
secretariat, the Coordinating Office for Control of Trypanosomiasis 
in Uganda (COCTU) is mandated to formulate policies, guidelines 
and to ensure that tsetse and trypanosomiasis control and research 




Agriculture Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF)
187
: According to MAAIF, 
COCTU has several objectives under their role as the secretariat to the UTCC, 
including to ensure general co-ordination between the various Trypanosomiasis 
actors in the country, and overseeing project monitoring, outputs and communication 
of results to local, national and international stakeholders.  COCTU is also mandated 
with a major role in the formation and implementation of policies concerning 
Trypanosomiasis, ensuring adequate human and financial resources are available for 
their enforcement. 
 
COCTU sits within the Ministry of Agriculture and is possibly the earliest, if only, 
example of a “true” One Health initiative in Africa; formed long before the term 
“One Health” had become fashionable.  The basis for the formation of COCTU lay in 
the disaggregated “vertical” approach to control of the ongoing issue of zoonotic 
HAT in the south east of the country. As more and more actors (and donor money) 
became involved during the 1980’s (coinciding with a major rhodesiense epidemic in 
the late 1980’s around the Busoga region) it became obvious a more co-ordinated 
approach was required:   
“Prior to (COCTU’s formation) there existed very many players in 
T&T.....no-one knew what was happening in the other sphere. The 1988 
epidemic rapidly brought down cases by 1990 because vets, medics, vector 
control and researchers were all in the same area using known amounts of 
money. It was very controlled and co-ordinated. After this, it was agreed that 
whenever these things happen we should not use a single intervention” 
(Interview COCTU July 2011).  
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The joint intervention of the early 1990’s depicted COCTU as a “good arrangement” 
that should be institutionalised. A law was subsequently passed in 1992 for the 
formation of the Ugandan Trypanosomiasis Control Council (UTCC), with COCTU 
as its secretariat. The UTCC Board is composed of various ministerial and 
international representatives
188
 with the private sector providing animal drugs and the 
WHO providing HAT drugs free of charge. Ministries absent at the time of UTCC 
formation will send a representative if necessary, and the office of the Prime Minister 
is responsible for overall co-ordination. Since its formation, MAAIF and the Ministry 
of Health have been the two main stakeholders, down to the local government level. 
The National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) was the main research 
partner involved, however Makerere’s Faculty of Veterinary Medicine (FVM) has 
been actively working with Edinburgh University to identify and answer research 
questions.   When asked where the decision came from to sit COCTU within the 
MAAIF, the Deputy Director was not sure, but felt those spear-heading HAT control 
at the time were mainly in the MAAIF, although ownership and joint ministerial 
funding were certainly problematic within the structure.  
  
4.5.4 Weaknesses in the Current COCTU Structure 
Despite the potential for COCTU to become a “beacon of One Health” in Africa, 
there are several challenges with the institution in its present form.  Some feel 
COCTU needs to be more dynamic, claiming it has “missed an opportunity” to better 
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co-ordinate field activities between the various stakeholders involved in T&T 
control. An example was given of a recent HAT outbreak in Apac district that was 
left “hanging” as no-one knew where the money to fund an intervention should come 
from (Interview MoH July 2011). By the time the District Health Officers “stormed 
into Kampala and demanded something be done”, there were twelve HAT patients 
and further deaths reported in the community (Interview UMoH July 2011). It is felt 
that in such circumstances, COCTU should take a lead role.  
 
Examples such as this imply roles and responsibilities, particularly in terms of 
financial resource allocation, have become blurred, with MAAIF questioning what 
the MoH is doing, and vice versa. As COCTU is “owned” by MAAIF, all budget 
lines for the secretariat go through there by law. However COCTU representatives 
feel there is a tendency for other ministries to under-budget activities related to their 
component, expecting MAAIF will cover the deficit (Interview COCTU July 2011).  
Conversely, MAAIF only budgets for activities under the mandate of the secretariat, 
leading the MoH to question where funding for vector control and interventions for 
the animal reservoir should come from; 
 “(MAAIF) are taking advantage of the structural weaknesses in COCTU, 
they need to renew this structure and funding - with a good functioning 
platform, the Ministry of Health will not question what MAAIF are doing”. 
(Interview UMoH July 2011).  
 
Upon my visit to the COCTU offices in July 2011 they were empty of staff; I was 
told the Director was on “extended leave” and had not turned up to the office for 
“months”
189
. One government official observed; 
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“(COCTU) looks like a sanctuary for retired people without a drive for 
research, review, monitoring....it should be a vibrant body...the people who 
envisaged COCTU had a good vision but lacked structure”. (Interview 
UMoH July 2011). 
 
Others are openly frustrated with COCTU’s lack of action, citing for example a T&T 
policy which had been in development since 2002 and was still not finalised; “this 
policy needs to be finalised by COCTU, but COCTU is two people, they keep on 
meeting over it but nothing is moving forwards”(Interview UMoH June 2011).  
 
 It seemed COCTU’s credibility was being eroded due to the prioritisation of internal 
issues such as salaries and finance at quarterly meetings, rather than the policy and 
advisory role they are supposed to play.  When I questioned a MoH informant 
whether COCTU would function any better there, the answer was surprisingly 
honest, leading me to believe that the criticisms of COCTU in its current state were 
genuine, and not merely a case of political jealousy: “Wherever it is housed, it must 
be well managed, not beauracratic.  If it sits in the Ministry of Health it will have the 
same problems with day to day running”. (Interview UMoH July 2011). 
 
When questioned as to these criticisms, the COCTU informant blamed the internal 
issues primarily on funding; “COCTU has challenges when human cases fall; HAT 
decreases & so does the funding” (Interview COCTU July 2011). When questioned 
further on what COCTU’s role should therefore be (and require funding for) outside 
an outbreak situation, many options necessary for long term control were outlined; 
 “(COCTU) still has a lot to tell people, to sensitise them to the benefits of 
T&T control. When you tell someone their healthy looking animal is sick, you 
need a lot of conviction and a good rapport with farmers, especially in an 
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area with low literacy....if people are not sensitised enough they will not pay 
and the intervention won’t work.” (Interview COCTU July 2011).  
 
4.5.5 Expansion of COCTU’s Mandate to become a One Health 
Platform 
Overall, various informants felt the way HAT control in Uganda has been co-
ordinated is potentially a “good springboard” for control of other zoonoses under the 
One Health approach. As one official observed; 
 “A well functioning COCTU could act as a warehouse for all things 
concerning zoonoses: data management, consultations, expert meetings, 
inventory of manpower, control measures. It would be a good idea to have a 
strategy for a structure like COCTU in all the HAT countries across Africa – 
as a policy and endorsed by governments – to help co-ordinate even beyond 
sleeping sickness to encompass zoonotic diseases”. (Interview UMoH July 
2011).  
 
The COCTU Deputy Director also agreed “It’s true that COCTU is an important 
“one stop” centre that various stakeholders are able to form a taskforce from more 
quickly than if you were starting from nothing”. The idea of expanding COCTU into 
a generalised platform to address other zoonotic diseases in Uganda has already been 
discussed between MAAIF and the Ministry of Health. On a certain level, the 
political support for this is there, but as one informant explained, changing the 
mandate of COCTU from a single disease to multiple diseases will take time as it 
involves restructuring budgets, personnel and policy. The advantage however, is that 
COCTU is already legally endorsed by the Office of the Prime Minister, and 
regardless of its structural shortcomings, is already embedded within the political 
framework. Such proposals should take advantage of the One Health momentum 
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currently being generated; the enthusiasm for COCTU’s expansion may drop “if you 
don’t push your case within the relevant ministries” (Interview UMoH July 2011). 
This is particularly relevant amidst calls by some in the UMoH that “treating the 
animal reservoir doesn’t work, we need to go back to a vertical approach” 
(Interview UMoH July 2011).   
 
4.6 Disease Spread as a result of Poor Implementation of 
National Policy  
 
The problem experienced to date with HAT in the country is symbolic of wider 
national policy issues in Uganda, particularly surrounding prioritisation and control 
of livestock disease in the country. Throughout the course of this research, I held 
many discussions with government officials into the reasons for lack of policy, or 
poor enforcement of existing disease control policies in Uganda, given that this 
aspect forms an important narrative in the SOS case study. Several solid examples in 
the area of zoonotic disease control were observed, discussed herein. 
 
 4.6.1 Meat Inspection at Abattoirs 
Control of food borne zoonoses is assumed to occur through implementation of the 
Animal Disease Act, along with various policies on meat hygiene and abattoir 
inspection such as the Veterinary Public Health Act, both of which are outdated and 
failing as a result of poor implementation. Ugandan abattoirs currently operate within 
a “messy” framework; premises and responsibility for meat inspection is under the 
control of the Ministry of Local Governments, but they are privately run in terms of 
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day to day operations. Local government authorities tender renewable contracts for 
abattoir management to the public; those that win the tenders then “lease” the 
premises from the government, which they recover by charging a fee to the animal 
owners for each animal slaughtered. Interestingly, MAAIF does not feature in this 
structure and cannot infiltrate this arrangement; “I can’t hire and fire” (Interview 
MAAIF June 2011). Cabinet has recently passed a resolution to bring the whole 
system back under central government control. This would help improve standards 
towards the OIE recommendations, and also enable cohesive national surveillance 
and control programmes to be carried out which are difficult under the current 
structure.  
 
A MAAIF informant conceded that the current risk of community exposure to unsafe 
meat products remained high, blaming in part the poor abattoir system across the 
country. There is no compensation policy in Uganda, so whether a carcass is 
condemned depends on the vigilance of the meat inspector; “Most slaughterers are 
very experienced and know when something looks “bad”, so they quickly hide it 
away in the food chain before the inspector sees it” (Interview MAAIF June 2011). 
More importantly, the person who slaughter animals are mostly employed on a 
casual labour basis; whoever “turns up in the morning” is given a job. They are paid 
in kind
190
; therefore if an animal is condemned, they lose their cut. 
 
 In addition to abattoir control being brought back under central government control, 
the MAAIF Assistant Commissioner for Livestock Disease Control would “love” to 
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see animal slaughterers on agreed long term contracts (Interview MAAIF June 
2011). In this way, those slaughtering the animals would not be “personally 
involved” with the slaughter, and therefore more inclined to comply with meat 
inspection laws
191
. Coupled with compensation for condemned carcasses, this would 
guarantee greater efficacy of the meat inspection processes and improve the quality 
entering the food chain.  
 
4.6.2 Pre-movement Treatment of Animals  
This is particularly pertinent to the Uganda case study, as improper adherence to 
policy guidelines demanding the pre-movement delivery of a trypanocidal drug to 
cattle in rhodesiense-endemic areas before moving them to a new area has been 
largely attributed to the northwards spread of human african trypanosomiasis (Fèvre 
et al 2001, Welburn et al 2006, Picozzi et al 2005).  The SOS campaign underlined 
the importance of adherence to existing policy surrounding movement control and 
treatment of animals sold in market places (Morton 2010). It appears that field 
observations, in addition to farmer experiences, support recently published concerns 
that “(policy) implementation continues to be very patchy, and it appears some 
traders and even some NGOs wholly bypass controls” (Morton 2010) .  
 
When asked whether they have witnessed government veterinarians treating animals 
at the market places, the majority of farmers indicated this was done “from time to 
time”. Most said they had to pay for treatment (1000 to 5000 USh) and they received 
certificates; “there is a doctor there, after you buy the cow, they tell us that they are 
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treating for a certain disease, and it is a must; we cannot go without them treating 
our cow, it is under order”.  When probed, few individuals knew what treatment 
their animals were receiving, justifying their lack of knowledge as “the government 
vets are trying to reduce the diseases, they themselves know what they are treating 
for”.  Although this may be true to some extent, the lack of community sensitisation 
is an issue: if farmers are not aware of the relationship between their cattle and T b 
rhodesiense transmission, they will not see the importance for continuous post-
treatment spraying, and therefore risk contracting the disease if their cattle are in 
endemic areas.     
 
There was also variance in reports of the efficacy of government treatment; some in 
Budekea market indicated “treatment occurred long ago but not now, not seen 
anything past few years”, whilst others indicated the markets at Tubur and Katine 
have strict protocols.  Farmers in some areas were suspicious of government 
veterinarians under-dosing “as the dose is very small”. A farmer on the 
Kaberamaido-Soroti border explained how he pays USh5000 for treatment with 
Samorin®; when I asked the amount of drug given, he replied “it is not a full syringe 
– maybe one or two ml”. My clinical experience of Samorin®, triangulated with 
information from farmers and a local private veterinarian, means I am wary that   
under-dosing or diluting of these drugs is occurring in some areas. Correctly 
constituted, cattle should receive either 1.25ml/50kg for a curative (1%) dose of 
Samorin®, or 2.5ml/50kg for a prophylactic (2%) dose.   Assuming from experience 
an average weight of 200kg, cattle should receive at least a 5ml dosage of Samorin®, 
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10ml if the intention is 3 months prophylaxis. In short, no correctly-constituted 




4.6.3 Prioritisation of Quarantine Measures   
Whilst undertaking my second round of fieldwork in July 2011, Soroti and Serere 
were experiencing a three month FMD quarantine which had effectively shut down 
all livestock trading. Brooke’s Corner and Arapai markets were silent; indicating 
quarantine was well enforced (field observations). Despite the reasons for quarantine 
being largely understood and respected by farmers, it was evidently placing a strain 
on livelihoods in the area; accounts of meagre farmer cash flows were echoed by a 
private veterinarian in the district:  
“(the quarantine) has been devastating for families and this time it has 
collided with going back to school – parents have no money for school fees or 
books, and this has been reflected in the low school attendance” (Interview 
private veterinary sector Serere June 2011).   
 
Some farmers explained how the lack of available animals for dowry has effectively 
ceased marriages in the district: “nobody is getting married, we have been told to 
hold off the marriage until the quarantine lifts” (FGD Soroti District July 2011).    
 
The government’s “hard line” taken to control FMD, which ultimately has little 
effect on poorly producing animals, is puzzling. When compared to accounts in the 
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previous section of “careless” administration of trypanocidal drugs at market places, 
and the lack of quarantine which introduced brucellosis into Soroti district from 
South African goats (see next section), one does have to question the “hit and miss” 
adherence to disease control policies in the country. 
 
If movement policy can be so easily enforced for a disease such as FMD
193
, arguably 
causing greater socioeconomic pressure to the district than the disease itself, why is 
policy not enforced for fatal diseases such as HAT? The scientific evidence verifies 
the requirement for cattle treatment at markets, and government technocrats appear 
aware of the transmission; so where is the bottleneck? Is it truly a problem of 
ministerial advocacy, and if so, where? Or is it simply that the rural public are not 
adequately sensitised towards the “neglected” zoonoses, and therefore do not place 
sufficient pressure on the government to prevent it?  Similar “all or nothing” 
approaches to the control of poultry populations in south east Asia were seen 
following H5N1 diagnosis, leading me to question whether the Ugandan 
government’s heavy-handed approach to FMD control could possibly be due to 
dominant “pro-eradication” policy narratives coming down from the OIE. Such 
disease control approaches have been deemed “very much ‘first world’”, in that 
“hordes of white suited professional vets” expect implementation of disease control 
policies which are unrealistic and inappropriate to the local situation (Undisclosed 
informant, quoted in Scoones 2010).   One MAAIF official supported this theory:   
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“FMD is not a killer disease, but do you see how much the governments 
spend on procuring vaccines? Even if FMD came to your farm it will die out 
eventually – but you find they are willing to finance that one, simply because 
of this crazy thing of international markets, yet (the farmers) don’t access 
these international markets. These are the realities – you are busy spending 
so much money on those diseases (rather) than controlling those that are 
impeding production in your own region.”  (Interview MAAIF June 2011).  
 
Disease spread as a result of non-compliance with disease control policies may not 
only be due to systemic causes within the country. There are several accounts in the 
literature of HAT spread in Uganda as a result of dismissive attitudes of both NGOs 
and government in cattle restocking programmes into districts such as Soroti and 
Serere (Picozzi et al 2005, Fèvre et al 2001).  Another severe lack of adherence to 
quarantine laws has been strongly felt in Serere and Soroti Districts, where 
brucellosis was recently introduced by infected Boer goats from South Africa as part 
of another government restocking programme.  These “improved” species of goats 
caused abortion storms when they were introduced to the district; one veterinary 
officer described his frustration in such situations; 
 “When they brought these goats from South Africa I was in Entebbe doing a 
short course, I saw them there when they arrived. Actually we told (MAAIF 
officials) those goats were infected with brucellosis but the politicians refused 
- when we started making noise (the politicians) came with the farmers and 
took the goats – when the politicians get involved, sometimes we have no 
power.” (Interview MAAIF August 2010).  
 
This is a perfect example of the technocratic frustrations discussed in section 4.2; a 
veterinarian knows that keeping an animal in “passive” quarantine for six weeks is 
not going to detect brucellosis, however bridging this gap between science and policy 
to make the “administrators” of policy (politicians) understand the intricacies of 
animal health is the challenge.  
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4.7 Sharing of National Ministerial Resources: What would 
One Health success look like? 
 
The final part of this chapter explores a number of ministerial opinions as to what a 
successful Ugandan One Health collaboration would look like. When this question 
was put to interviewees, common responses surrounded mutual professional respect 
between the health and veterinary disciplines
194
, and endorsement of the concept by 
the country’s leadership;  
“The first thing is to make the concept appreciated by the leadership of a 
country; you know that if they accept it as an institutional establishment, a 
department, (it) means you have recognised that there is a problem”. 
(Interview Makerere July 2011).  
 
One informant used a recent example to explain the institutional and professional 
barriers which exist within the ministries;  
“There are always people who struggle for “total” control – there has been 
an issue to reform the national drug authority, housed in the Ministry of 
Health. Now if they transform it into the National FOOD and drug authority, 
where is it supposed be? Agriculture, but health is insisting it should be in 
health. So already there is a fight”. (Interview MAAIF June 2011).  
 
An official at the MAAIF agreed there was a long way to go before disciplinary 
barriers were weakened in the country;  
“Even at the national level in parliament when you are from the animal 
sector and you reason that we must control the disease in the human beings, 
they may think you have not understood the way government runs” (Interview 
Makerere July 2011). 
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blaming ‘these vets are not doing their work’ and so on, but your One Health it is not the time for 
that! It was the time to talk and say ‘how can we work together, how can the Ministry of Health 
help?’”(Interview Makerere July 2011)  
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Another MAAIF official agreed;  
“Immediately you go to the Ministry of Health and you say OK can we budget 
for animal spraying, they will think you are crazy. But actually when you 
spray the animals your target is to protect the human beings. It has nothing to 
do with the animals. Until I see the Ministry of Health putting  a budget line 
to control this vector which is presumed to be more of a risk to the people 
than the animal, that’s when I will believe (in One Health).” (Interview 
UMoH June 2011). 
 
This is an interesting point: when I asked various Ministry of Health officials 
whether they would ever spend money treating the animal reservoir, their first 
response was laughter “even at an accounting or Ministry of Finance level you would 
currently have problems justifying it, accounting would not allow it” (Interview MoH 
June 2011). However, when further questioned, it seems that an institutional shift in 
thinking may occur in time, provided the economic evidence was there. To 
demonstrate this, I questioned a UMoH official on how much a single case of human 
rabies costs the Ministry of Health. He replied that a full course (3 doses) of human 
rabies Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) is 120 000 USh
195
. For this, you could 
vaccinate around 150 dogs, thus saving money to the Ministry if even just one case 
of human rabies was spared. Officials agreed this is the type of case you would have 
to make to convince the Health Minister, however it would take some time  
“especially with the (people) at the top - most are old and get there by 
working up through the system, so are slow to change as they still have ideas 
from 30 years ago.” (Interview UMoH June 2011) 
 
Another respondent indicated that as discussed previously, a body such as COCTU 
could be used for such advocacy in the case of HAT, for example convincing the 
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Ministry of Heath to purchase Vectocid®, “but the way it is now it can’t do anything, 
no-one takes them seriously” (Interview UMoH July 2011).  
 
Finally, another informant thought that a successful One Health platform would be 
something that was owned by Ugandans, and not driven by external funding; 
“There are many more problems that worry people in Uganda than avian 
influenza. If we wanted to kick off One Health here, you promote it as 
something to benefit people - the real test comes when you get part of your 
taxpayers’ money to fund it”. (Interview Makerere July 2011). 
 
 
The notion of using taxpayers’ money, rather than donor funds, to support a disease 
control programme is valid. Countries cannot say no to external funding for a 
particular issue; as was seen in the HPAI response in Uganda, the problem was 
arguably there, it just wasn’t the biggest problem.  
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
COCTU is an important example of a functional, legally endorsed inter-ministerial 
platform which was formed in response to a severe zoonotic disease at the end of the 
1980’s. Taking this as an example, in light of the various “taskforces” which also 
exist in the country for outbreak situations, I have tried to examine the original 
proposition for this empirical chapter:  
 
“Politically endorsed national One Health structures help ensure successful, 




This conclusion aims to tie together the various themes in this chapter surrounding 
disease prioritisation, inter-ministerial co-operation and policy enforcement within 
Uganda’s national government framework, looking at how One Health approaches 
could be used to address the issues of endemic disease facing the country. Through 
examining the long history of a One Health approach to Trypanosomiasis control in 
the country, in light of the various policy approaches to more recent “crises” such as 
Marburg, anthrax and FMD, I concluded that sustainable One Health interventions 
emerge from good working relationships and strong political support.  
 
It appears the level of political prioritisation of disease – and the corresponding 
political commitment to its control – revolves strongly around public perception of 
its impact. As an interviewee stated, money can always be found within governments 
for diseases which threaten economies or cast a poor picture in the eyes of the 
international public. Even without external funding, some feel that resources can 
always be secured for zoonoses that negatively affect the tourism industry or other 
aspects of the national economy, but as long as neglected zoonoses remain in the 
rural areas, “everyone will keep quiet”. As one informant wryly explained;  
“Trypanosomiasis will continue not to attract much attention of both national 
government and probably the international agenda - as long as people don’t 
get infected when they go to the national park”. (Interview Makerere July 
2011) 
 
It seems the “dramatic” zoonoses will continue to attract attention for some time, 
unless good prevalence data can sway the policy process towards long term 
approaches to the control of endemic zoonoses, given the real value of One Health in 
192 
 
developing countries potentially lies with control of the “silent” diseases such as 
HAT and brucellosis.  My research in Uganda concludes that bodies such as 
COCTU, or any corresponding legally endorsed One Health platform, have a real 
opportunity to provide the political pressure to overcome such issues.  Nevertheless a 
major message to be taken away is that in the majority of cases, One Health will not 
“just happen”, and its efficacy will be diluted if an externally driven, permanent 
platform is set up without due adherence to basic national structures, and ownership 















CHAPTER FIVE:   
AFTER THE CRISIS: SUSTAINING “ONE HEALTH” 
MOMENTUM IN POST-HPAI NIGERIA 
“The evolution of One Health from the ‘emergency to the everyday’ necessitates 
integration of local perspectives” 
 
5.1 Introduction to the “Custodians” Of Nigeria’s Cattle 
Herds196  
“How to reconcile modernism with traditionalism, consumption with production, needs with 
expectations, land use with land conservation, and policy formulation with policy 
implementation?” 
  Iro 2001 
The Nigerian Fulani account for almost one third of Africa’s 30 million pastoralists. 
Despite this, their ever-changing status
197
 indicates they fall victim to the fate of 
many pastoralist societies across Africa which “represent complex but poorly 
analysed systems, tending to be denigrated by policy-makers and romanticized by 
novelists” (Nori et al, 2006). However, the potential contribution of the Fulani to 
national food security and economic growth in Nigeria should not be underestimated; 
the livestock sub-sector accounts for one third of the annual agriculture Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), with the Fulani contributing to over 90% of this (Fabusoro 
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 From perceived “favouritism” by the British during the colonial era, to shouldering the blame for 
an underperforming livestock sector by contemporary government regimes 
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2007).  Nigerians, particularly those in the “consumer south” depend on the Fulani 
livestock “holding states” in the north for a variety of animal products including 
meat, milk, manure, skins, cheese, honey and draught power. Thousands of Nigerians 
make a living from the sale, transport, butchering and marketing of Fulani products 
every day; in Abuja alone 4000 goats and 400 cattle are slaughtered daily, with 1500 
cattle a day slaughtered in Lagos (personal communication). There is a huge 
potential for the Fulani, particularly from the grazing reserves, to supply meat and 
animal products to Nigeria and across West Africa.  Despite this, Nigeria’s Fulani 
continue to be “amongst the most neglected” of Nigeria’s ethnic groups today (Iro 
2001). Although various attempts have been made by state and non-state actors to 
address issues such as land conflict, education and service provision, many remain of 
the sentiment that “every attempt to bring Nigeria’s Fulani into the fold of so-called 
progressive society has failed, leaving the Fulani at the mercy of the weather and 
faulty government actions that impoverish rather than promote the welfare of the 
pastoral producers.” (Iro 2001).  
 
It is within this historical and political context that the empirical data collected 
during three field trips to Nigeria in 2010-2011 serves to explore the third and final 
proposition forwarded within this thesis that “the evolution of One Health from the 
‘emergency to the everyday necessitates integration of local perspectives”. Whilst 
this proposition may seem obvious to many, particularly those familiar with the 
participatory methodologies
198
 now a common part of everyday development 
discourse, the reality is that building indigenous knowledge into wider government 
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policy or decision making processes is at best difficult, at worst “provides more 
effective instruments with which to extend technocratic control or advance external 
interests and agendas whilst further concealing the agency of outsiders” (Mosse 
2005).  
 
5.1.1 Setting One Health in Motion: Nigeria’s 2006 HPAI Outbreak 
On the 6
th
 of February 2006, Nigeria reported Africa’s first case of HPAI in a 
commercial poultry farm in Kaduna state. The outbreak was initially suspected in 
early January, with laboratory analysis taking almost one month to confirm HPAI 
from an Asian lineage (EMPRES 2006). In the meantime, outbreaks were confirmed 
in Plateau, Kano and Bauchi states.  The delay in disease confirmation left “ample 
opportunity” for colonisation of HPAI in other areas across the region, with fears that 
the disease may have originated in another country altogether and only been 
identified in Nigeria (EMPRES 2006).  
 
Initial measures taken by Nigerian authorities to reduce the risk of spread included 
the mobilisation of rapid response teams to de-populate affected farms, enforcement 
of movement restrictions and awareness campaigns across the country. FAO and OIE 
took a lead supporting role in the initial stages, sending an envoy to Abuja and 
promoting collaboration with the WHO (EMPRES 2006). By March 2006, funding 
had been secured for a three year action plan; the “Nigeria Avian Influenza 
Emergency Control Preparedness and Respond Project” developed by the Nigeria 
ministries of Agriculture, Health and Information with input from a variety of 
stakeholders. The political and financial backing was unprecedented; “the 
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government was giving money before they were even asked to”
199
, with an alleged 
USD $50 million credit received from the World Bank to commence activities. The 
project aimed to “minimise the threat of HPAI to both humans and the poultry 
industry through reducing the spread of disease, whilst promoting poultry production 
in the country” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2006). The National Technical 
Committee on Avian Influenza (NTCAI) brought together stakeholders from both 
human and animal health, with provision for interministerial collaboration through 
joint workshops and creation of state and local positions such as desk officers. By all 
accounts, whilst the funding was available, successful containment of the disease 
occurred amidst inter-ministerial collaboration and compensation of poultry farmers. 
The remainder of this case study seeks to evaluate the activities that have occurred 
since the completion of the project in 2009, and where One Health is headed now the 
“crisis is over”.   
 
Interviews conducted within the ministries of health and agriculture across all three 
tiers of government described the various levels of interaction which occurred during 
the HPAI crisis, some of which is ongoing despite project completion. In particular 
the joint workshops and training which occurred during this time were by all 
accounts positive; with health officials “opening their eyes” as to what vets could 
assist with in terms of PH and zoonotic disease control. Pressure from external 
agencies resulted in formation of the National Inter-Ministerial Committee on Avian 
Influenza, set up at the federal level for HPAI control under a formal presidential 
directive. Multi-disciplinary teams were developed from the Ministries of Health and 
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Agriculture in conjunction with the Ministry of Information, and included various 
technical advisors from both within and external to Nigeria. It was expected that the 
federal level set-up would be replicated at the state and local government levels, 
given the “decentralised and demand driven” nature of the project (Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 2006). Respondents were mixed in their views as to whether the state level 
technical committee existed at the time. Some indicated they were quite weak, but 
others indicated good progress was made, for example in Plateau State where 
collaboration was co-chaired by the commissioners for NMoH and NMoA, with 
technical input from various government departments, the Ministry of 
Communication, NVRI, WHO and the Jos University Teaching Hospital.  If nothing 
else, the HPAI outbreak of 2006 resulted in reinvigoration of communication 
between the ministries of health and agriculture, at least at the federal level, which 
had been lacking in recent years; “This HPAI it brought us close together and 
strengthened the bond” (Interview NMoH March 2011). 
 
5.1.2 Nigeria’s Government Structure  
Nigeria has a federal set-up, consisting of 37 states divided into 774 Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs). Ministers head the various ministries at the Federal 
level, whilst Heads of Ministries at the State Level are termed Commissioners. 
Federal budgets feed into State budgets across all Ministries according to state 
populations. For issues such as national security, states do not have decision making 
power. However for items not on the concurrent list (including all activities under 
the Ministry of Agriculture), states have authority over policy decisions, including 
disease control. Traditional chiefs (community tribal leaders) have the highest level 
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of authority in each LGA; ministries are represented down to this level, however 
policies are directed and funded by state management.  Funding to the different tiers 
of government is allocated through a formal process written into the Constitution, 
administered by the Financial Allocation Committee (FAC).  
 
The majority of animal disease control acts are under state government law. 
Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs) and Diseases of National Economic 
Importance (DNEI) are governed under federal law, with the States acting as 
implementers; in this way the federal government is able to co-ordinate control for 
diseases affecting many states. Vaccination programmes including Rinderpest, PPR 
and CBPP are driven by FAO/Nigerian government but not nearly as regularly as 
before Structural Adjustment (SAP).  There are no “official” zoonotic disease control 
policies in Nigeria; these come under general disease control in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, with some addressed in the Ministry of Health’s Neglected Tropical 
Disease (NTD) policies. Funding, monitoring and implementation of animal disease 
control policies (including zoonoses) is the responsibility of the Federal Department 
of Livestock, seated within the Ministry of Agriculture. The Department of Livestock 
contains several “arms”, including animal health (control of animal disease), 
Veterinary Public Health (VPH) (zoonoses control, policy formation for VPH, 
abattoir management and other food safety issues), and the epidemiology unit 





Figure 6: Nigerian Government Structure showing Key Decision 
Makers at each level 
 
At the state level, livestock activities fall within the Division of Veterinary Services 
(DVS) under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA); although some states have separate 
Livestock Development ministries. Local government offices should all have 
veterinary divisions, however these have collapsed in some LGAs; one informant 
complained “LGA clinics are managed by incompetent people, such as agricultural 
production graduates, not vets, therefore clients become dissatisfied and don’t 
go”(Interview, MoA June 2010). A similar picture exists within the Ministry of 
Health; desk officers supported by the Health Commissioner move around the LGAs 
to give support to local authorities, however time and financial restraints limit the 
frequency with which LGAs are visited. For both ministries, resource restrictions 
appear to dilute the support of both human and animal health at the community level. 
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5.1.3 Policy Process within the Ministries of Health and 
Agriculture 
The National Council of Agriculture (NCA) is the uppermost platform in Nigeria for 
policy makers concerned with the agricultural sector (including livestock 
development and disease control); it is a body consisting of ministers, policy makers 
and state commissioners.  The NCA is seated at the federal level, where technical 
researchers and policy advisors assist the heads of ministries to determine national 
agricultural policies, supposedly through an interactive process using information 
from the State level.  The NCA meets annually around March every year; in 2011 it 
was the meeting place where I conducted a number of interviews with federal 
representatives of the livestock sector. Memos are presented to the NCA by various 
agricultural sector representatives (including those from livestock, fisheries and the 
environment) in a two-page format similar to a policy brief; explaining the 
background to the problem, the current situation in Nigeria, and a “prayer” of what is 
hoped will be endorsed by the NCA by the meeting conclusion. Memo presentations 
are short – usually only lasting five minutes as many are made.  If the NCA agrees to 
support a proposed policy, its funding arrangements (through the FAC) and 
implementation process will appear in a legally binding NCA agreement; states have 
to carry out activities if passed by NCA and the memo appears in the communiqué.   
 
For the livestock sector, memos presented to the NCA must first be approved by the 
National Livestock Development Council (NLDC), consisting of a committee 
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consisting of mostly veterinarians.   The NLDC is subsequently responsible for 






Figure 7: Policy Process in Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
 
Memos presented to the NLDC are presented by the state Chief Veterinary Officer 
(CVO), however can come from any stakeholder group concerned about a particular 
issue, for example farmer’s associations, veterinarians or the private sector. A recent 
example includes a memo advocating for policies on donkey welfare, drawn out of 
concerns of dwindling numbers available for work purposes as a result of their 
consumption in other states. Respondents also indicated that the Federal Ministry of 
Health is able to be represented at the NLDC and NCA for the purposes of memos 
involving inter-ministerial collaboration
201
, however I ascertained this involvement at 
the policy level is at present “skeletal” at best, with dialogue around joint policy 
processes reflecting token appearances from the corresponding ministries rather than 
any concrete inputs and planning for policy funding and implementation. 
“Policy for disease control is still trying to be streamlined. Contingency plans 
exist for high profile diseases such as HPAI and Rinderpest, however no official 
policies exist for control of zoonotic disease – “officially” Nigeria doesn’t have 
brucellosis in the country.” (Interview MoA March 2011) 
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201
. Whilst I was in Nigeria, a memo was passed to present a case to the NCA to resuscitate the 
National Zoonosis Centre within the University of Ibadan, as well as calls for “Control of zoonotic 
diseases in the light of One World one Health initiative”   
Approved memos 
forwarded to NCA 
State CVO receives 
stakeholder input 
for livestock issues 
Presents memo to 
NLDC for approval 
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The higher human health policy making body in Nigeria is the National Council of 
Health (NCH), chaired by the Minister of Health. Depending on the particular issue, 
the Minister presents health issues to the Federal Executive Council for the final 
decision, however project or programme steering committees also exist that develop 
and adopt policy decisions on behalf of the Minister. For example, policy decisions 
for zoonotic diseases fall under the mandate of the Neglected Tropical Disease 
Steering Committee, formed by managers of the various NTD programmes within 
Nigeria’s Ministry of Health, along with academic and international representation 
such as UNICEF. The NTD steering committee makes decisions and reviews issues 
on behalf of the health ministry, after which policy decisions are taken to the minister 
for adoption. Similar to the Ministry of Agriculture, within the Ministry of Health the 
basic policy process is formed according to a defined need:  
“Policies are not really adopted and approved until the (Federal Executive 
Council) are convinced; there’s a lot of research, a lot of enquiries are made, 
after which (issues) are presented of course from the lowest level to the state 
level and then to the federal for consideration”. (Interview NMoH March 2011) 
However within this explanation, there appears to be a certain amount of leniency;  
“We have to have good negotiating skills to convince the (policy makers at 
the federal level) that it’s really a problem, especially with serious public 
health issues, before it gets worse. For example if there is a big outbreak, 
let’s say what happened (with HAT) in Delta State, we requested support 
from WHO and FIND
202
, and I endorsed it and communicated to the Minister 
- that’s the policy really, that’s how we do it” (Interview NMoH March 2011) 
 
5.1.4 The Reality of the Policy Making Process in Nigeria 
“The minister wants everyone together in the next one hour. He says no exceptions. 
Just jot down some points for him to talk about – this is a public private partnership, 
                                                          
202
 Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics, started up by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 




the terrible state of abattoirs across the country - we need a list of points for him to 
discuss right now!” 
Chief Veterinary Officer, NCA Meeting March 2011 
 
The above quotation, captured at the conclusion of an interview with a Federal MoA 
official at the 2011 NCA meeting, shows perhaps the best evidence of the “political, 
incremental and haphazard
203
” realities of the policy making process in Nigeria, 
despite the official process outlined in the above section.  The CVO came over to our 
table in an agitated state, demanding my interviewee get a memo summary together 
for presentation to the Minister for Agriculture in an hour’s time. This was at the 
annual NCA stakeholder meeting, where all the policy decisions for Nigeria’s 
agricultural sector in the coming years are decided, and is a good example of the 
difference between the structured, evidence-driven policy process that exists on 
paper, and the reality.  
 
Throughout the course of my research, I was given numerous accounts of the 
“informal” processes of communication and policy development which exists within 
Nigerian ministries; as one high level official proudly informed me “If I want to 
communicate to the Minister of Health, I can seek his office, and I mean if he’s free, 
he will see me because I am a director”. (Interview NMoH March 2011). 
Particularly, technocrats at the lower government tiers cited frustrations with the 
current decision making and communication process;  
“The problem I have here, if you bring your idea, you’re not really allowed 
to have that shot (at change); they are finding it hard to understand 
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technically, I can’t remember the last time a Minister of Agriculture knew 
anything about livestock issues.” (Interview MoA March 2011)  
 
Other responses indicated that even for those at the federal ministerial level, 
participation is low; 
“The Health Act is the new overall health policy in Nigeria – it has been 
adopted by the FMOH but is still in approval stage. Everyone from all health 
departments including PH have had an input - as much as they have the 
opportunity to make the inputs – you are asked to have an input but before 
you are done it has already gone through.”(Interview, NMoH March 2011). 
 
Secondary data sources obtained through a series of questionnaire interviews in 2010 
gave an idea about the knowledge and level of participation in policy processes with 
stakeholders outside the ministries. Most respondents felt that despite working within 
communities at the ground level, people outside the ministries had “little access to 
policy makers”, with consultations rarely, if ever, occurring between the government 
and the public; “They claim to do it but it’s not really done. If it ever is done, the 
information is not used in policy”. Others were more vocal in their contempt for the 
current process of policy development and implementation in the country, borne 
from the frustrations of working within the system at the grass roots;   
“The government is corrupt and self-protecting, there is poor allocation of 
resources for example the hospitals can be well equipped but they are not 
being used. Policies are the problem- they are not applicable to the field 
situation, poorly implemented and with very little enforcement - It is the 
vulnerable that suffer, the poor and ignorant are most at-risk of poor 
decisions made at the policy level.” (Interview, Health Sector March 2011) 
 
5.1.5 Animal and Human Disease Surveillance and Reporting 
Systems  
Passive animal disease surveillance and control is at state level; area veterinary 





. State epidemiologists co-ordinate the monthly field reports and 
send to the federal epidemiology unit in Abuja
205
, who subsequently distributes 
information within the ministry and to the OIE. An OIE immediate notification 
system is in place for emergencies or outbreaks
206
. If definitive diagnoses are 
required, samples will be sent to the Nigerian Veterinary research Institute (NVRI) at 
Vom. For routine wildlife disease surveillance, or outbreaks in wild populations, a 
separate form
207
 is used. Recent examples include HPAI where surveillance officers 
captured wild birds for active surveillance, and sent samples from dead birds. 
 
Besides the AVO passive surveillance, there exists what has been described as a 
“passive-active” surveillance at “high risk” areas across the country where animals 
gather together; such as markets, abattoirs, and state/international border control 
posts. At these risk areas, vehicles carrying animals must stop for inspection by 
surveillance agents. This system may fail for endemic diseases due to lack of legal 
endorsement, but interestingly during the HPAI outbreak AVOs and surveillance 
agents were generating a lot of data on suspected outbreaks; everyone was reporting 
it, most likely as a result of panic and increased community sensitisation .  
 
Surveillance and reporting of human disease in Nigeria falls under the Ministry of 
Health’s Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
208
 (ISDR) system. Disease 
Surveillance and Notification Officers (DS&NO) are employed by the LGA to 
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 Not all LGAs have AVOs; one may cover two or three localities. Currently 594 AVOs cover 774 
LGAs 
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 “OIE Monthly Disease Report Form” 
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 Notifiable diseases in Nigeria include NCD, PPR, CBPP, LSD, FMD 
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  “OIE Wildlife disease reporting format”, see Annex  
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 ISDR, a framework developed by WHO for African and Eastern Mediterranean member states for 
streamlining disease response 
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collect village level data on Nigeria’s 40 “priority diseases” and report it to the state 
epidemiologist on a monthly basis, who sends it to the country’s Chief 
Epidemiologist, also on a monthly basis. The State epidemiologist is responsible for 
all human disease control at the ground level, including outbreak investigations, 
sampling and reporting on disease status. The Health Commissioner is supposed to 
summarise the state health picture and present it to the federal government, however 
an official at the federal NMoH indicates there are some shortcomings in the current 
system;  
“There’s a lot of (state epidemiologists) who haven’t been reporting on HAT 
which is a problem, they are supposed to report suspected cases but they 
don’t. I know in Benue State they were found to have suspected cases, but we 
never got the reports formally, we got them first as rumours, so these are still 
issues that need to be corrected”. (Interview NMoH March 2011) 
 
This scenario is typical of the widely documented shortcomings of disease 
surveillance and reporting across Africa; “in developing countries we have problems 
in the disease reporting system, we don’t have data. It’s not peculiar to animals 
alone; it’s even in human beings.” (Interview MoA March 2011).  The Nigerian 
government has acknowledged the situation needs addressing; Item 7 on the 2011 
NCA memo
209
 is entitled “Status of Disease Reporting in Nigeria”, which “expressed 
great concern” over the state of disease reporting in the country. There are currently 
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5.2 Situating the Field Research: Background to the Kachia 
Grazing Reserve, Kaduna State, Nigeria 
 
5.2.1 Changing Patterns of Land Use in Nigeria 
“We who live in this place were the ones that named the place - a name that can suit 
this place and the mode of our lives – we named it “Ladduga” 
 
- Interview with Heads of Blocks, Kachia Grazing Reserve, March 2011 
 
In order to contextualise the primary data surrounding Fulani culture within this 
chapter, there is a need to understand the recent history of land tenure and conflict in 
Nigeria. Found in over twenty countries throughout West Africa, and known by 
many names
210
, the Fulani belong to Africa’s “most diffuse ethno-cultural group” 
(Iro 20010). It is thought the Fulani originated from the Arabian Peninsula, migrating 
south-west to Senegambia and then east across to Sudan towards the Red Sea (Iro 
2001, citing others such as de St Croix, 1945). The exact time when Fulani 





(Blench 2010).   Historically the Fulani have a long association with political 
leadership, scholarship and wealth, having developed an urban (sedentary) class of 
religious scholars by the early 19
th
 century. At this time however, the Hausa rulers of 
northern Nigeria were conquered by jihadist Fulani invaders under Usman dan 
Fodio; he became the Sultan of the Sokoto Caliphate, which at the time was the 
largest African state south of the Sahara.   
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 “Fulani” being the Hausa term used in Nigeria 
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The Sultan of Sokoto declared ownership of all Hausa lands in the Fulani Empire, 
with land tenure organised according to Islamic inheritance law (Ezeomah 1985). 
With British colonial rule however, ownership of land by the Sultan was stopped, 
and northern Nigerian land became government property, from which permission had 
to be sought before land rights were granted for farming or grazing. Post 
independence 1960’s saw the introduction of a land tenure under which land rights 
were either “statutory” (a grant of land for a specific number of years) or 
“customary” (allowing an individual or community to use land in accordance to 
Sharia law), symbolised by a “Certificate of Occupancy” from the Ministry of Lands 
(Ezeomah 1985). In 1978, the Military Government gave complete authority to the 
state and local level governments to assign and lease land under the 1978 Nigerian 
Land Use Decree
211
. Changes to land use laws over time helped establish 
relationships between “indigene”
212
  owners and Fulani “strangers”
213
 , whose 
tradition of “loaning” land from indigenes has left them permanently “on the 
outside” of land tenure (Ezeomah 1985).  This is clearly in violation of Section 43 of 
the Nigerian Constitution that states “subject to the provisions of the Constitution, 
’every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own immovable property 
anywhere in Nigeria’” (ILO 2009). It is against this background the issue of land 
conflict, particularly concerning the Fulani, can be introduced to support the data on 
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The 1978 Nigerian Land Use Decree removed the power of traditional leaders to distribute land, 
giving all financial and legislative powers to indigene officials within the local government areas. One 
example from Kebbi State details the opening up of a Fulani grazing reserve to cultivation as a result 
of a declaration by a prominent politician from the region (Blench 2010). Similar stories could explain 
in part the innate suspicion of the Fulani on KGR, and their reluctance to welcome and participate in 
the activities of “strangers”. 
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 The idea of “indigeneity” – a distinction between “host” and “settler” communities—is attributed 
by some to ensuring the cultural preservation of Nigeria’s more than 250 ethnic groups. This rationale 
has however “been twisted beyond recognition” by state policies, leading to non-indigene 
marginalisation in areas such as employment, university fees and admissions, political participation 
and provision of basic services, that government does nothing to discourage (HRW 2006). 
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 As a result of their constant migration 
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government-governance issues between the Fulani and official government of 
Nigeria.  
 
Accounts of pastoralists moving southwards into the subhumid “Middle Belt” zone 
(including the grasslands of the Jos Plateau) appear as early as the 1820’s, however 
they were forced back northwards into the semi arid zone during the rainy season, 
largely due to tsetse flies and trypanosomiasis (Blench 2010).The reasons for this 
gradual southern movement are many; however many cite the creation of dairy 
markets by Hausa traders, and the “relative security” of the British colonial period, 
whereby armed raids on Fulani grazing herds were largely curtailed (Blench 2010).  
The subsequent introduction of veterinary trypanocidal drugs and vector control 
resulted in Fulani settlement and increased pressure on the high quality Jos Plateau 
(Blench 2010). A MoA official expanded, 
“there’s been a gradual movement of livestock population towards the south, 
because of this desert encroachment and the ability to treat or manage 
trypanosomiasis – before it was a serious problem now we have all sorts of 
drugs on the market so you can have your animals down in the rainfall area 
and keep dosing them with (trypanocides) and they are doing fine.”(Interview 
MoA March 2011). 
 
By the 1960s, settled Fulani communities were appearing in areas previously 
occupied year-round by indigenes; one Fulani man in Mangu LGA (Plateau State) 
said that despite his family residing there for over 200 years, it could be reclaimed at 
any time by the indigenes (Field notes, Plateau State June 2010). Cultivation in the 
semi-arid zone has also been expanding since the 1960’s, with farmers progressing 
210 
 
northwards as a result of growing human populations
214
 and pressure on existing 
subhumid areas; further encroaching on the uncleared bush which the Fulani view as 
common grazing land (Blench 2010). In addition to the ecological factors, a number 
of social factors have been attributed to the southwards movement of Fulani. One 
proposed theory is the collapse of the burti
215
 system in the 1970’s, with farmers 
claiming the rights to land and fertile waterways which Fulani cattle had been 
grazing for over two centuries (Blench 2010). Years of manure depositions had made 
these traditional cattle routes very fertile; land tenure laws at the time meant farmers 
– with more advanced education and therefore the ability to obtain the “certificate of 
occupancy” necessary to prove legal ownership of land – were supported by the 
government. Coupled with the decreasing necessity for the Fulani fresh milk 
products in favour of processed or non-traditional food items
216
, the Fulani were 
running out of bargaining chips coming into the 21
st
 century.  
 
5.2.2 Pastoralist Conflict in Nigeria and the Grazing Reserve Act 
of 1964 
Despite the long history of grievances between indigenes and the pastoralist Fulani, 
tensions seem to be increasing, particularly in Plateau State
217
, with conflicts over the 
past decade reported in international media and brought to the attention of human 
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 Nigeria’s population is estimated to have grown from 5 million in pre-colonial times to over 88 
million at the 1991 census (Blench 2010) 
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 A system of stock migration routes across Nigeria agreed between Fulani leaders and the local 
government officials (or its predecessors), existing since colonial times or possibly before to reduce 
conflict.  
216
 I observed the abundance of available soft drinks and cheaply produced sweets on the Kachia 
grazing reserve 
217
 For example the November 2008 killings which left over 700 people dead in two days of violence 
in Jos (HRW 2009) 
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rights groups (HRW 2009). Although largely attributed to religious conflict between 
the indigene Christians and non-indigene Muslims (HRW 2001, HRW 2009), there 
are many who believe that tensions are purely economic in nature “irrespective of the 
religious, cultural and political colourations that might be diluted to advance certain 
objectives” (Abbass 2010). Recent reports of indigene farmers “baiting” pastoralists 
through encroachment on grazing routes, and crop destruction by cattle cited by over 
40% of respondents as a predominant cause of conflict (Abbass 2010, Adebayo & 
Olaniyi 2008), whilst another calls for the government to “end the rhetoric” and take 
concrete steps to address the grazing needs of the Fulani herds (Adebayo and Olaniyi 
2008).  
 
An initial attempt to promote peace in the farmer-pastoralist debate was the creation 
of “grazing reserves” across Nigeria in the early 1960’s, whereby the local 
government was enabled by law to appropriate land for grazing purposes (ILO 2009). 
The overall purpose of the Nigerian Grazing Reserve Act of 1964 was to increase 
Fulanis’ access to grazing land for their cattle, whilst simultaneously encouraging 
their settlement
218
; whereby land for grazing and water is offered in exchange for 
sedentarisation (Ingawa et al 1989). In a broader policy sense, it was also expected 
that the law would help address some of the wider constraints facing livestock 
development in Nigeria at the time (Ingawa et al 1989). However, various accounts 
reveal that the Act has not achieved many of its objectives; a recent report reveals 
that to date, a total of 2.82 million hectares (out of a stated 9.8 million in the 1988 
policy) has been acquired for grazing, a total of 313 reserves (ILO 2009). 
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Criticisms surrounding pastoralist access to services and amenities have long been the argument for 
encouraging sedentarisation of the Fulani people in grazing reserves 
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Additionally, it appears that only around 24 of the established reserves have to date 
been formally gazetted by the government, meaning the occupants of remaining 
reserves do not have the rights to demand services set out in the grazing reserve laws 
such as roads and water provision (Kaufmann et al 1986). There have been calls that 
“relevant policies need to be put in place in order to address land accessibility, 
livelihood security and security of land rights (including) the protection of grazing 
routes and the full implementation of the National Agricultural Policy” (ILO 2009).  
 
5.2.3 Description and Location of Kachia Grazing Reserve (KGR)  
The community-level data collection for the Nigerian case study was undertaken via 
a series of focus group discussion at the Kachia Grazing Reserve (KGR) during 2010 
and 2011 (see Chapter Two). Kachia Grazing Reserve was one of a number 
established by the Nigerian government under pastoralist settlement schemes in the 
1960’s (Kaufmann et al 1986). Access to the reserve was gained via my involvement 
with the EU-funded Integrated Control of Neglected Zoonoses (ICONZ) project, of 
which brucellosis is the main zoonotic focus of the Nigerian component. Kachia 
Grazing Reserve is situated in Kaduna State in northern Nigeria, and covers an area 
of 31 000 hectares divided into six geographically-distinct administrative blocks (see 
Maps below).  The reserve lies within the African tsetse-belt, and tsetse flies remain 
a large problem to both human and animal health on the reserve, despite being 



































In the early years, inputs for the development of Kachia Grazing Reserve were 
received from the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) which had a 
research station there. By 1981, twelve families had settled; a smallholder dairy 
scheme, fodder crops and a permanent veterinary assistant deemed KGR “advanced 
in comparison” to others in Nigeria around the same time (Oxby 1984). The reserve 
currently has a population of 5252 people, distributed amongst 581 households over 
the six administrative blocks. Despite being “settled” pastoralists, the majority of 
Fulani on Kachia Grazing Reserve still take their cattle away to graze during the dry 
season
219
. Block two (see Map?) is the most populated, containing 188 households, 
compared to only 80 households in blocks five and six combined (ICONZ 2011).  Of 
the 581households on the reserve, 569 own cattle; currently estimated to be 23 327 in 
number, with around 5914 sheep, 5058 goats and 123 donkeys (ICONZ 2011).  The 
median number of cattle owned per household is 29, with numbers ranging from 1 to 
303. Despite these livestock numbers, there is no permanent veterinarian on the 
reserve, although two slaughter slabs exist. The prevalence of most diseases are 
largely unknown, although animal brucellosis has an estimated prevalence of 8.6%, 
while another study found the prevalence of bovine trypanosomiasis to be 8.4 % 
(Enwezor et al, 2009, ICONZ 2011).  
  
5.2.4 Establishment of Kachia Grazing Reserve 
Primary accounts of KGR’s history and establishment are varied. Various 
respondents indicated the reserve was formed as a result of a “gift of land” to the 
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At my visit in March 2011 only 40% of the total cattle population remained on the reserve. 
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Fulani people by the Sardauna of Sokoto
220
. This is true to sorts; “romanticised” 
accounts from the Fulani cited how Ahmadu Bello “asked us to come here” and 
“called our head men to this place”, providing them with an opportunity to live in 
relative peace with their cattle. Others are quite clear in the government’s role: “the 
federal government said there is no way to help Fulani people and the head men 
unless to call them into the reserve....if you come and be based in this place nobody 
will come to disturb you”. (FGD KGR March 2011). Despite an objective of grazing 
reserve establishment being to settle “nomadic” pastoralists, it appears the majority 
of Fulani on KGR originated from neighbouring local government authorities, where 
they viewed themselves as relatively settled; “We were the indigene of this place 
since from the beginning - we didn’t go out from our local government.” This was 
reiterated by1980’s research findings, where it was stated that at the time, all 
inhabitants “are Kachichere Fulani who have been resident in southern Kaduna State 
for generations” (Kaufmann et al 1986). It appears in recent years however, possibly 
due to the aforementioned increasing tensions in northern Nigeria, that settlers are 




By all accounts, life on KGR was difficult in the early years of its establishment. 
Many indicated how the land given to them was thick bush, with no access roads, no 
water, and the only inhabitants a large variety of wildlife including “elephants and 
bulls (buffalo) and lions and a big snake that used to swallow people”. Several 
mentioned the appearance of a “hunter” who killed a lion, after which residents were 
                                                          
220
Sir Ahmadu Bello; a prominent Nigerian politician and premier of northern Nigeria from 1954 up 
until his assassination in 1966 – an event largely attributed to Nigeria’s civil war and creation of 
Biafra    
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 Many FGD respondents indicated recent familiar origins from Bauchi, Kano and Nassarawa States 
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happy to move in; all wildlife on the reserve has largely disappeared now due to 
clearing of the land and the bushmeat trade. An older woman remembered the 
problems of childbirth: “when a woman wants to deliver a baby we used to find some 
sticks, sew them together, put the woman on top and we used to carry her on their 
head (sic) and go into Kachia”. It is little wonder the Fulani name given to Kachia 
Grazing Reserve by the original occupants is “Ladduga” meaning “wilderness”.  
 
Accounts in the literature describe how the grazing reserves established in the 1960’s 
were all “situated in places previously avoided for sound ecological reasons” due to 
the difficulty displacing populations in highly productive areas (Ingawa et al 1989). 
An ILCA research group attempted to keep cattle on Kachia without supplementation 
found that almost half suffered severe malnutrition (Ingawa et al 1989, Kaufmann et 
al 1986).  An often-referred to challenge in the early years was the flies; “if you’re 
moving around you have (sic) to carry a leaf for protecting yourselves from flies 
biting, but now the place is OK to live you can even come with your sleeping mat to 
sleep outside”. Besides references to the effects of these flies
222
 on themselves and 
their children, respondents also remembered the effects of flies on their cattle at the 
time; “because of (the flies) you will see blood on the body of our cattles and after 
this you will see tears coming out of their eyes then they will fall sick”. Respondents 
indicated how the situation became so severe in the wet season that they were forced 
to move their cattle off the reserve; literature implies that this may have resulted in 
tension with nearby settled farmers as a result of crop destruction (Ingawa et al, 
1989). There were accounts of the original inhabitants moving off KGR in the 1960’s 
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 Presumably disease-causing flies such as tsetse and black flies causing trachoma 
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as life was too difficult, and even in the period between 1978 and 1988 only 34 
households settled on Kachia (Ingawa et al 1989).  
 
Since the establishment of KGR in the 1960’s, it appears that whilst the Nigerian 
government has provided some assistance under World bank directive, the Fulani 
have relied heavily on their own initiative and inconsistent help from donors to 
establish even basic infrastructure and systems of health and education.  Despite 
these challenges, the Fulani are optimistic, with many describing their “peaceful life” 
and pride at how their “Ladduga” is developing to date. World Bank grants have 
helped to build dams, as well as an (albeit appalling) access road. Schools, a 
marketplace and other necessary buildings including the hospital have been built, and 
each Fulani household owns a small plot on which they can farm millet and other 
agricultural foodstuffs.  Additionally, the feelings of “safety” and “security” 
associated with life on the reserve
223
 were apparent; “no-one can come and enter 
your house and claim that it is their house; where you fence your house, that is 
yours”. Another respondent remembers from Plateau State: 
“We were living peacefully, then people are coming so the place is very 
crowded. So because of that people start fighting for this land and we are not 
able to rear our cattles - that is why we migrate from there to this place”. 
(FGD KGR March 2011) 
 
I remember one day being unable to get public transport from Kachia town back into 
Jos because the taxi drivers were convinced they were “going to be killed” if they 
drove us there; indicating the very real fear that exists within the areas that have 
experienced recent tension.  
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 As opposed to the daily security issues in Plateau State and other areas faced by Fulani not settled 
on reserves  
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In conclusion, the long standing land issues between migrating Fulani and the settled 
“indigenes” in agricultural areas show no sign of abating. Despite the introduction of 
grazing reserve policies to encourage settlement, it seems the conflicts and tensions 
between ethnic groups are ever on the rise; the first decade of the 21
st
 century was 




 for the 
Nigerian government to seriously address land accessibility and livelihood security 
issues seem to have been recently heeded; a memo presented to the NCA in March 
2011 “urged the National Assembly to accelerate the process of passing the bill on 
the National Grazing Reserve Commission which will go a long way in addressing 
the issue of Pastoralists – Farmers conflicts”
226
.  A recent USAID report echoed the 
sentiment that the continued conflicts over land were impeding agricultural 
development; “unless the issue of land use in Abuja in particular, and Nigeria in 
general is reviewed and the needs of traditional livestock producers accommodated, 
(dairy development) will be very slow and strenuous” (USAID 2007).  
 
It would be easy to push aside the issues of land conflict, claiming that for the 
purposes of this thesis the seemingly endless political turmoil is not relevant to 
livestock policy and disease control processes. However a concluding remark from a 
government official in Plateau State reminded me that nothing is independent of 
anything else, and we must continually look at the whole picture in order to make 
sound governance and policy decisions:  
 
“Land issues are the underlying problem on the Plateau, these go far beyond 
any policy issues concerning animal production and disease control. Until 
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 For example the 2003 and 2008 massacres in Jos, Plateau State (HRW 2009) 
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 For example see ILO (2009) and Adebayo and Olaniyi (2008) 
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 Item 5 2011 NLDC Communiqué, see Annex V 
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land use policies which diffuse conflict between Fulani and indigenes is 
developed and promoted, we will never get to address animal health; it would 
be futile.” (Paraphrased from Interview, MoA June 2010) 
 
5.3 Fulani Governance Mechanisms  
“We follow rules, we don’t break rules” 
- FGD KGR March 2011 
 
Literature refers to Fulani governance structures as “quasi-governmental”, whereby 
identifiable leaders have strong decision-making authority (Iro 2001). Field 
observations and focus group discussions held during my time on the reserve 
illustrated the “institutionalised political leadership” described in the literature
227
; 
insights into the daily lives of the Fulani revealed the strict governance structure 
where everyone has a place, and everyone knows what their place is.  Although FGD 
participants seemed slightly uncomfortable discussing their political set-up, there 
were indications that the structure on the reserve loosely fitted with documented 
accounts of the “Ardo”, (mediator between the Fulani and the “modern law” of 
official government) and the “Lamido” (clan head and spiritual advisor who can 
advise according to Sharia law).     
 
When questioned about the different types of “laws” or “rules” which existed on the 
reserve, the variation in answers paints a complicated governance framework, 
consisting of many actors with varying levels of influence (Figure 7). Some indicated 
the laws of the Nigerian government were the predominant influence on their 
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behaviour; using the example of the application process through the Ministry of Land 
and Survey (via the village heads) necessary for land acquisition. Others however 
indicated the government enforced “no rules at all”; possibly emphasising the 
feelings of neglect and isolation from official government processes which appears in 
a number of interviews and secondary literature sources
228
. For important life events 
such as inheritance and marriage, guidance is sought from religious leaders so as to 
correctly follow the “Laws of Islam”. Other times, it was difficult to distinguish 
between whether the ward or village heads developed the laws, or were responsible 
for enforcing those of the government:   
“They used to make rules in situation where our cattles used to drink water, 
that nobody should go there and fetch water for drinking because the water is 
not good for drinking by humans. So the law have been made on this and 
nobody is going there” (FGD KGRMarch 2011). 
 
When asked how they feel about decision-making and communication of various 
laws and rules on the reserve, responses were typically guarded; “we feel happy, 
because when the rule comes, it works on us, it is for our own benefit”. Others 
indicated that possibly the “top-down” governance structure of the KGR was not 
enjoyed by everyone “because of the behaviour of our people, some people will start 
murmuring and arguing why are they prevented from going to such a place. So this 
is how our people are”. Still others indicated the enforcement of laws and rules was a 
necessary part of life, whatever the circumstance; “everywhere people are based, if 
they have their leaders, there will be laws”.  
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Figure 8: Venn Diagram Showing Relative Stake of Various Actors 
within the Fulani Governance System on KGR 
 
5.3.1 The Role of Government  
By all accounts, the relationship between the Fulani and official government 
structures has been weak for some time, possibly since the early 19
th
 century. 
Historical accounts of British-Fulani relationships indicate that despite the relative 
peace brought to the Fulani at that time
229
, the hated cattle tax “jangali”, abolished in 
1976) was a bone of contention, and resulted in suspicion of government. To this 
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 Attributed by some as the original cause of southwards migration by the Fulani, see for example 
Blench 2010 























day, tensions between the Fulani and Nigerian government remain strained, 
particularly in the livestock sector; structural adjustment measures have been blamed 
for the government’s inability to amass funds and justify vertical disease prevention 
programmes such as herd vaccination (Interview, MoA June 2010, other personal 
communication).  
 
FGD participants, particularly the males, readily voiced their opinions on the subject 
of government
230
 provision of livestock health services. Many respondents recalled 
frequent government vaccination programmes against “harbin darji” (blackleg), 
“bakkale” (brucellosis), “bauru” (FMD), “bushiya” (Rinderpest) and “huhu” (CBPP) 
under military rule (1984-1993).  They mentioned that outbreaks were taken 
seriously by government and responses were swift, especially the highly contagious 
“huhu” or “bushiya” indicating the importance placed by government on livestock 
prior to World Bank structural adjustment programmes. There currently exist no 
government animal health programmes; the only external interventions experienced 
on the reserve in recent years have been through research projects such as the 
“Sammore” (trypanosomiasis) programme mentioned by some
231
; “there is no 
programme. If there is a problem with disease here I have to go and inform the 
district head and he will inform the project manager
232
”.  
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 I wondered at one point whether referral to “government” was a broad term used to describe any 
donated goods or services, regardless of the source. With time I realised a clear understanding existed 
of where donations and other forms of external assistance were coming from; ultimately I am 
confident that referrals to government assistance do actually mean the Nigerian government at one 
level or another.  
231
 Assumed to be earlier trypanosomiasis work from NITR in conjunction with NVRI in Vom, some 
of which has been published for example Enwezor et al (2009) 
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 The KGR government programme officer in Kachia, but there was little indication anything is ever 
done about disease notification or requests for assistance 
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When asked why these government programmes ceased, one response was simply 
“everything is about siasa” (politics), which I assumed to be a loaded statement, 
however further probing revealed respondents merely felt government priorities had 
changed since democratic rule took over from the military
233
. Despite it never being 
specifically mentioned, I sensed some Fulani feel the government has rejected them 
and their role in Nigeria’s livestock sector: “now we do everything on our own” and 
“you cannot wait for anybody to come and do it for you”. It seems that the 
government is all too aware of such sentiments, and they too are concerned at the 
widening gap between the Fulani and government: 
“In the past we had national campaigns for disease control; there was a 
good relationship between Fulani and the government. Now, since structural 
adjustment, most of the free government programmes have collapsed - this 
leads to a widening gap between Fulani and government officials, as the 
government now has nothing to offer the Fulani in terms of animal health 
services” (Interview MoA June 2010). 
 
Even if human and financial resources were available, it appears that the overall 
health of Fulani livestock has deteriorated to such a degree that some government 
officials were at a loss to what could actually be offered; with “blanket” vaccine 
programmes considered a waste of time and money in the absence of good overall 
herd health:  
“Before you even vaccinate, you may have to think of deworming, you may 
have to treat (for clinical disease) - these are not the well planned farms that 
you know - you discover that the general health status of the herd is another 
problem”. (Interview MoA March 2011). 
In terms of other government-assisted agricultural inputs, fertiliser was the only 
commodity mentioned
234
, and many complained the cost was still prohibitive:  
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 Possibly indicates a lack of communication and awareness surrounding higher international policy 
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 Aberman et al (2009)provides a good background to the policy process regarding privatisation of 
fertiliser in 2006 
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“Government is not helping matters. Because if you want to farm you have to 
buy fertiliser and now there is no fertiliser is below 2000 naira
235
 so sincerely 
speaking, the fertiliser is not reaching us – even if it does, it comes at a high 
cost” (FGD KGR March 2011) 
Polio vaccination programmes remains the single government-driven health 
intervention on the reserve today
236
, despite frequent circulation of communicable 
diseases such as measles (personal communication).  Accounts from older Fulani 
recall times when emergency assistance would be provided by the government, for 
example during cholera outbreaks or times of famine, whilst other more recent 
government activities have included grading the access road, and some construction 
assistance such as building of schools.  
 
Liaison with government officials appeared to be the responsibility of several 
influential individuals on the reserve, such as one of the ICONZ project facilitators 
who worked for the LGA and headed of one of the male co-operatives. The grazing 
reserve is supposedly represented at the local government level by a Ministry of 
Agriculture Project Officer within the Kachia LGA, and a government veterinarian 
who I was told rarely came to the reserve “because of the too much work he has 
(sic)”. The aforementioned KGR Project Officer was deemed the only “official” link 
between activities on the reserve and the wider local or state laws. Understanding 
and impact of official government policy processes remains low; possibly reflecting 
the limited contact between the Fulani and government representatives. Apart from 
the leaders of the male co-operatives (see later), the teachers were the only 
participant group who indicated an understanding of higher level political processes, 
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 Extensive literature exists of the 2003 boycott in northern Nigeria of federally sponsored polio 
vaccination campaigns, with many believing “evidence” that the vaccine was contaminated with anti-
fertility drugs to sterilise Muslim women – see for example Kaufman and Feldbaum (2009)  
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indicating the National Union of Teachers (NUT) as being informative on the current 
policy debates occurring at higher government tiers.   These groups were however 
the exception; more often than not, respondents indicated they get messages from 
their village heads if there is some legal government business concerning them, thus 
having little participation in government policy or other decisions made outside the 
reserve . 
  
One government official suggested reinvigoration of the government extension 
system could help improve government-Fulani relations. Extension services have 
currently collapsed across many parts of Nigeria, particularly in pastoralist areas; 
blamed on the expense and logistics of maintaining constant contact with isolated, 
transhumant communities such as those on the reserve. The extension service was 
regarded an integral component of successful implementation of disease surveillance 
and reporting policies “because that’s what leads to communication with these 
Fulanis, not this once in a year communication” (Interview MoA March 2011). 
However, government extension services are no replacement for clinical (private 
good) services, nor are they supposed to be due to their public good nature. This 
differentiation needs to be understood by both the government and Fulani alike; if the 
Fulani cannot understand why immediate problems of sick animals cannot be 
addressed by extensionists, it will only lead to further lack of trust and confidence in 
government services.  
 
Interestingly, when the Fulani were asked what areas they would like to see 





. Overwhelmingly, the Fulani’s expectation of government was to 
maintain provision of water and roads, which, being a gazetted reserve, is not outside 
the expectations of government as outlined in the Grazing Reserve Act of 1964.  
 
5.3.2 The Role of Islam 
 The influence of Islam on Fulani identity is well documented in the literature (for 
example Iro 2001, Riesman 1977).  Despite having “so many ethnic groups”, 
participants overwhelmingly considered themselves to belong to only one; “the 
Fulfulde, joined by Islam”. Religion, rather than state law, appears to play the most 
prominent governance role in everyday life; these “traditional laws” determine social 
behaviour such as marriage, inheritance and daily rituals. Celebration ceremonies 
were strongly Islamic in nature, such as Sallah (Eid al’Kabir) or naming ceremonies; 
there was no mention of harvest celebrations or others involving the livestock and 
environment which play such a major role in their lives. Any mention of nbodoto 
(traditional beliefs or myths) initially resulted in vehement denial: “no we don’t have 
them, there is nothing like this”, however further probing revealed the existence of 
traditional medicine and other beliefs
238
 indicating that despite what is projected to 
outsiders, strong traditional practices may still exist. 
 
5.3.3 The Role of the District and Village Heads 
The hierarchy for internal governance on Kachia Grazing Reserve consists of the 
much-respected head of the reserve, followed by the heads of blocks, then the ward 
or village heads.  At the community level, it appears that outside of religion, 
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 One account gave their belief that you should only travel on certain days of the week 
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behaviour of individuals is largely determined by what the village and district heads 
deem appropriate or necessary behaviour. Selection of the block and village heads 
was done “the way that Shaihu Usman dan Fodio
239
 taught us to do, that is 
according to our knowledge of Qur’an”. When asked about their role, one of the 
village heads likened it to “what the village heads of the world are doing”; they are 
responsible for overseeing development of the reserve, and promoting peace. Many 
respondents indicated that their behaviour, particularly in terms of their interaction 
with “strangers” from outside the reserve, depended on what their “leaders” (usually 
the village or ward heads) told them to do. For example, if visitors did not have 
permission to speak to the Fulani, no-one would turn up to the meeting (field 
observations). Powerful individuals could turn a whole community against the 
“outsiders”; such as our experiences described in chapter two.   
 
By all accounts, enforcement of rules and laws by local leaders seemed relatively 
easy on the reserve; at least that is the picture portrayed to foreigners. As one 
respondent replied, “we respect our leaders and we respect what they say to us and 
we follow rules – if a leader makes a rule no-body disobeys”. This appears to be the 
case regardless of what the rule was or who it affected. Further probing revealed 
village heads and elders would enforce rules on where to graze cattle, where their 
children could  play, and when they could leave the reserve; “if he says no-one is to 
go to crossing, then no-one will go to crossing”.  It also seemed that village leaders 
or elders could make and enforce rules about social interaction if it appeared to be 
detrimental to the wider community; 
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“There is one game played during the night where one sees his colleague 
and he beats that colleague with a stick. The head of the village called the 
villagers to attention and gave them a law forbidding them to play that 
game”.  
 
5.3.4 The Role of Co-operative Societies  
There are a significant number of co-operative groups on the reserve; discussions 
were held with both the female and male co-operative leaders. No mixed-sex co-
operative groups exist and little known about the activities in groups of the opposite 
sex; the only activity mentioned where both female and male groups worked together 
was for an HIV/AIDS enlightenment campaign led by an external NGO. The 
majority of informants seemed to be aware od the existence of co-operative societies 
on the reserve, but unless they were directly involved or received something from 
them
240
, responses about activities were usually vague. 
 
5.3.4.1 Female Co-operative Groups 
Female co-operative groups exist on the reserve under the umbrella group 
“Mbigeweti” (“now we are enlightened”), and include other societies such as “Wuro 
Nyako” (House of Nyako), “Wuro Fulƃe”, (House of Fulani), “Mayo Borno” (River 
Borno) “Wuro Lobi” (House of Lobi), and “Wuro Tale” (House of Tale). Only one 
of these is registered with the government; lack of registration is a major bottle-neck 
for achieving goals; without it societies cannot interact with outside funding groups 
such as other NGOs which come onto the reserve.  It appeared the main activity 
undertaken by the female co-operatives was to advance credit to individuals wishing 
to start up or maintain business, however the impact of this remains unclear.  Other 
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activities undertaken include making goods to sell at the market such as soap and 
creams, and using gifts of flour to make “chinchin” (cakes). There also appeared to 
be a significant contribution of the women society groups towards promoting 
education on the reserve; the women place high importance on their childrens’ 
education, playing a dominant role to ensure this is achieved; 
“This school that we are in now, it’s the society that built it and most of the 
teachers of this school are paid for with our own money from this society. 
Our men here they don’t pay for their school fees. If you want your children 
to go to school then you have to get money for their school fees” 
 
Contributions to women or child health however, seemed to be less organised, for 
example gathering of money to take to the sick took precedence over any formal 
liaison with external organisations for the delivery of health campaigns.  Again, the 
lack of registration of the majority of women’s groups was blamed for this; “they 
(the NGOs) came with their message but they didn’t collaborate with us because we 
were not registered”. A final activity mentioned by some women was the ubiquitous 
NGO “development” strategy that continues across great swathes of the African 
continent with little evidence of success (personal observation); free provision of 
small livestock to women with little consideration for ongoing veterinary and 
husbandry costs. Predictably, this activity also failed in KGR; as one woman 
confessed “all the goats died”.      
 
Interestingly, the women do not have a milk society group. I found this surprising; 
possibly because of the extensive literature surrounding the Fulani women’s role in 
milk production and sale, often portrayed as the single activity allowing them some 
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financial and social independence
241
. The explanation for why there was no female 
milk society appeared to be that they did not see the need, it was not worth pursuing 
as a commodity; “if you are looking for milk in this place, you will get it”. This 
possibly reflects the isolation of the KGR and the resulting barriers to business 
opportunity, also the observation across much of the literature that the decreasing 
requirement for fresh milk products has limited Fulani contribution to wider 
society
242
. On retrospect, there is also the possibility the women may have been “shut 
out” of this activity by the male co-operatives; the second time I was there (March 
2011) the World Bank had donated a brand new milk processing plant; I had a 
feeling that association with milk at this time meant association with those who 
controlled a large sum of money.      
 
5.3.4.2 Male Co-operative Groups 
Like the female co-operative groups, the male co-operatives consisted of around 
fifteen societies which all fell under the “Nbela” (umbrella).  In contrast to the 
women’s groups however, all male co-operative societies on the reserve were 
registered with the Nigerian government; thus allowing them to liaise with outside 
funding groups. This appears to have given the male co-operative societies a distinct 
political advantage; it was by far the only homogenous group interviewed in the FGD 
series which indicated an understanding of, and participation in, government policy 
processes and politics; “now we are in politics, and we have our ward councillor 
here. He represents us”. Another participant implied a strong co-operative is the only 
way to gain political voice and standing in local government: “If you are looking for 
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a councillor in this community, if you don’t have a society you will not win.”  There 
were also indications that the male co-operative leaders had a very good 
understanding of (and confidence in) the communication process between the KGR 
Fulani and government should it be required;  
“if something happens within this our community we report to the district 
head. If it concerns the local government, we report to the chairman (of 
Kachia local government). If it concerns the state (Kaduna), we report to the 
governor. If it concerns the federal government, we look for a representative 
that will go and tell the federal government. This is how our societies carry 
out their projects” 
 
Activities of the male society groups included campaigning for development of the 
Kachia access road, digging of wells, and a number of agricultural initiatives 
including the planting of trees and procurement of livestock drugs and feed. Others 
indicated the relative ease with which the male co-operatives could obtain livestock 
inputs, particularly drugs, through a good relationship with the local government 
veterinarian. Example of the extent of their influence can be seen by the recent 
acquisition of a milk processing plant mentioned in the previous section;  
“We are the ones that fight for (the milk processor) in collaboration with 
KADP
243
. The co-operative tell the KADP that this is what we want in this 
place - if not because of the society, nobody would think of such an initiative” 
(Male co-operative FGD KGR March 2011) 
 
Another important role is to liaise with the local government for provision of 
fertiliser; a commodity with a history of “highly contentious political issues” in 
Nigeria (Aberman et al 2009). Some participants in other FGDs implied that co-
operative groups were not always successful in obtaining it, or could be using the 
situation to the advantage of those closest to them;   
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Participant 1: “The society groups collaborate with the government to get the 
fertiliser for us”  
AO: And if they collaborate with the government, do they get the fertiliser? 
Participant 1: No we don’t get it in time”  
Participant 2: “We don’t get it at all”  
And also,  
“We have problems with fertiliser, we don’t get the fertiliser we want. When 
we get allocations for fertilisers, there are some people that used to hide it, 
and go away with it. Sometimes we pay money for fertilisers and don’t get it 
until after one year. Because of this, we have much problem.” (FGD KGR, 
March 2011) 
 
Overall, it appears the male co-operative groups, at least some of them, are quite 
powerful in terms of their bargaining power with local government. Despite the 
majority of internal power on the reserve being held by village leaders, I feel the 
male co-operatives; given their external contacts and knowledge of local and state 
government policy processes, potentially have a large influence on the 
implementation and enforcement of government policies on the reserve, and, politics 
aside, could be a key stakeholder group through which strengthen government-Fulani 
relations, particularly in the livestock and public health sectors in future.  
 
5.3.5 The Role of NGOs and Other External Organisations 
NGOs were mentioned mainly in the area of health services and messaging, 
including PARE and a number which deliver HIV/AIDS awareness. One respondent 
indicated that an NGO was responsible for the building of classrooms on the reserve, 
however this was disputed by another who claimed it was a Chinese company.  
Generally, I felt that the NGO sector did not play a prominent role on the reserve; 
many admitted they did not know the names of the various organisations that came in 
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and out, possibly a defence mechanism against long-standing expectations they will 
just move on; 
“There was a time some people came to this place and they are with some 
drugs, sometimes (we) just hear the people came, but at the end of the day we 
will not see them again”(FGD KGR, March 2011). 
 
Health messages given recently include mostly sanitation such as boiling and sieving 
the water and washing hands after using the toilet, and the omnipresent HIV/AIDS 
advocacy:  
“There was a time we got orientated from other people about HIV/AIDS and 
the NGO spent over ₦70 000 because of this enlightenment....and there are 
other NGOs similar....but we can’t differentiate between them” (FGD KGR 
March 2011) 
  
One attempt to promote the welfare of Fulani pastoralists and increase their socio-
political power was the establishment of “Miyetti Allah” (Thanks be to God), a 
religious organisation formed in 1972 to represent the interests of Fulani in official 
government circles, with a major objective being to improve Fulani access to grazing 
land.  Several respondents on the Kachia grazing reserve indicated their knowledge 
and participation in what is now called the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association 
of Nigeria (MACBAN); which has extensive branches across northern Nigeria 
(Kaufmann et al 1986). I found two extensive references to this organisation in the 
literature from the early 1980’s; one account seemed quite positive of Miyetti Allah’s 
achievements in its first decade, with references to its recognition at both the federal 
and state levels of government (Ezeomah, 1985). The other however stated that 
Miyetti Allah had “no authority in the domains of most concern to pastoralists, 
namely disease control and land rights”, and implied organisation was weak and 
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achievements relied “more on individual initiative and sponsorship” rather than any 
collective action by the Fulani (Kaufmann et al 1986). 
  
5.3.6 The Role of the Private (Veterinary) Sector 
The Fulani on KGR do not have regular access to a veterinarian; drugs including 
oxytetracycline and antihelmintics are bought at the Friday market, with some 
indicating they travel to Kachia, Zankwa (Kaduna State) and as far as Jos (Plateau 
State) to collect drugs and vaccines. Drugs were also acquired on the rare occasion 
someone from the government veterinary department came out to the reserve; “the 
doctors used to come and give our animals injection sometimes individually, 
sometimes a lot of them”. For some things, such as internal parasites, it appeared the 
drugs worked well. There were however indications that the quality of drugs varied, 
or the wrong drug was being used 
“Sometimes we used to vaccinate our animals on several occasions by giving 
them injections and drugs. But we have not seen any response so we spend 
much of our money. So this thing disturbs us seriously”. (FGD KGR March 
2011) 
 
Others indicated ethnoveterinary medicine was also practised; “the native doctor will 
come with the medicine and put it in the water, sometimes we just try and give it to 
the animals, but we don’t know the actual names of the medicine”.  
 
Lack of access to veterinary services is common throughout much of Africa since 
structural adjustment, particularly in remote rural areas. Several attempts to 
strengthen veterinary services have largely failed, for example the widespread 
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Community Based Animal Healthworker (CBAHW) programmes initiated by 
numerous NGOs in the 1990’s. Although proposed in Nigeria under the food security 
programme due to their “success in east Africa”
244
, it failed in large areas of Nigeria. 
The Nigerian Veterinary Council argued that instead of introducing yet another tier 
to the veterinary profession, the Animal Health Technicians (AHT
245
), if trained in 
communication and supported by both government and communities, would be able 
to improve veterinary services through large, particularly rural, areas of the country:;  
“There exists a requirement to open eyes of AHTs and show them they can 
make a living in rural areas, especially if their animal health knowledge is 
combined with husbandry services. For example the vets had a good response 
from Newcastle disease vaccination in conjunction with the HPAI vaccination 
programme, as it sensitised the public about holistic poultry care and disease 
control. If the same can be done by AHTs I am confident they will gain public 
confidence.”(Interview MoA March 2011). 
 
Another interesting conflict I discovered was the overriding assumption of Nigerian 
colleagues and some government officials that the Fulani only wanted free veterinary 
services,  
“Mistrust of Fulani is a big problem. They prefer to observe vets then self 
treat. They are aware of the vet facilities but don’t use. Their knowledge is 
more of a barrier than otherwise. Training them may make it worse” 
(Interview MoA June 2010)  
 
Despite professional frustration towards certain actions by the Fulani, for example 
under-dosing of cattle therapeutics to “try to ration it for their whole herd”, I 
couldn’t help but feel economics was not always the main reason for this (unlike 
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others as demonstrated in the above statement). Conversations on the reserve indicate 
that accessibility to private services could be the major barrier to seeking 
professional advice; “if you see your animals are in emergency condition, you go and 
buy it yourself, you cannot wait for anybody to come and do it for you”. Another 
Fulani farmer explained: 
“You are supposed to know which type of drug to give the animal even if you 
don’t know what the animal is suffering from, so we are facing this problem”.  
 
Whilst professionals may interpret under-dosing of cattle as a sign of unwillingness 
to pay for professional advice, it must be realised that in the absence of choice, 
people will do the best they can. Despite common assumptions that the Fulani do not 
want to invest in their cattle, experiences from Kachia grazing reserve indicate 
disease control is rated as a very high priority by the Fulani, if not for the economic 
benefit, but the social repercussions of sick animals; “cattle disease causes fights 
between people because most of the disease is contagious and we like vaccination 
more than cure.” This is potentially an extremely powerful motivator to improve 
control of zoonotic disease within Fulani herds and stem the level of disease 
circulating within the food chain in Nigeria.  
 
My overriding impression that the Fulani were happy to pay for veterinary services, 
but, like farmers the world over, the quality of service mattered, was reinforced after 
speaking with higher-tier government officials experienced with Fulani communities:  
“I think they’ve gone beyond (expecting free veterinary services)…the only 
thing that keeps the Fulani man, or anybody, is a quality service, I think it’s 
very easy to establish that. For example if before the Fulani man has even 
showed you his animals you are getting out drugs, calculating money - that is 
the wrong approach. Instead, if you take your blood, right there you do a 
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smear, and you tell him “come and see the trypanosomes”
246
, that Fulani 
man cannot go to sleep! He will ask “you mean this thing is in the blood of 
this my cow, destroying the blood?” and he will ask you to give him the 
solution to kill the parasite. It’s all about communication
247
” (Interview MoA 
March 2011). 
 
Certainly the Fulani valued the free preventative vaccination programmes delivered 
to them by the previous government “because vaccination is better than medicine”. 
In this era of veterinary privatisation, it appears the Fulani are certainly willing to 
invest in animal health, if a quality service is available.  Until those working within 
the veterinary sector across Africa strive to ensure their services are affordable, 
accessible and of good quality, there is little chance disease control, particularly of 
the zoonoses, will occur. As one informant knowledgeable on Fulani culture 
explained;  
The Fulani people they are the easiest (to work with) if you know the 
instrument to hold them. You cannot come and give him the same dewormer 
he can buy (at the market) for N1000, and stand there asking him for N10 
000....I think the way we are approaching it is a little bit…not 
professional.”(Interview MoA March 2011) 
 
5.4 Livestock Matters: Interaction between Governance 
Actors for Livestock Disease Control 
 
Whilst comments around lack of trust of Fulani and difficulty in engaging them 
within the current veterinary system may seem fairly innocuous, in terms of public 
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some countries that I suspect it has to be a contributing factor to the dramatic failure of veterinary 




health, they could have dire consequences. For without effective communication 
between the veterinary profession (whether public or private) and the Fulani, there 
will be ongoing problems with disease control, including zoonoses;  
“(if) we are talking about zoonoses you have to look generally, broadly at 
disease control. That is you can’t say you are looking at zoonoses. If you 
have a policy for good disease control then it will practically solve the 
problems of zoonoses”. (Interview MoA March 2011).   
 
 
5.4.1 KAP Study Livestock Disease and Management 
An understanding of Fulani knowledge, attitudes and practices to livestock disease 
control is important, given the potential implications on human health in terms of 
control of zoonoses and minimising risks in the animal food chain. Throughout my 
time on the reserve, lengthy discussions were held with the Fulani about their 
livestock and disease management practices. The most commonly cited disease, 
particularly prevalent in the wet season, was “Hanta” (liver fluke). While accounts 
exist in the literature of deaths associated with acute fascioliasis in northern Nigeria 
(Ogurinade and Ogurinade, 1980), I question whether the parasite itself is really the 
cause of the wide variety of symptoms associated with “hanta”.  Haemorrhagic 
septicaemia
248
and also “harbin darji” (Blackleg due to Clostridium chauvei) have 
been diagnosed on the reserve; descriptions of “sudden death” in cattle would better 
fit with a septic co-infection of fasciola, and account for the wide variety of signs the 
Fulani associated with the parasite.   
 
Other commonly cited diseases included “Sammore” (trypanosomiasis), “Bakkale” 
(brucellosis) identified as swollen joints and the “cow will be having continuous 
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abortion”, “Bauru” (FMD) of which “the symptoms is limping, the cow will be silent 
and stay in one place - there will be no milk at all” and “Kuda” (flies).  “Taki” was 
mentioned; it translates as “manure” although it was unclear as to whether this may 
be diarrhoea or constipation, both a common sign of tick borne disease. Less 
commonly cited diseases included references to “Huhu” (literally meaning lungs – 
most likely CBPP or Pasteurellosis), “Lahoji”(rabies) and “Dauda” which translates 
as “dirtiness” so possibly a referral to diarrhoea or perhaps abortion
249
. One 
respondent replied “there is also one where the cattle develops big rashes all over its 
body and it kills when the animal gets infected and that one is called “Gurda”; 
differential diagnoses include secondary infection with Lumpy Skin Disease or 
Dermatophilosis.   
 
When asked how their animals contract diseases such as FMD, CBPP and 
brucellosis, all respondents showed a good understanding of communicable disease 
transmission, indicating their animals became sick when taken away for grazing and 
mixed with other cows; “sometimes they go for grazing they meet other animals that 
are sick and they bring (the diseases) back”. The cause of FMD was clear “most of 
the time they used to come back with Bauru because they mostly carry it during 
grazing, we want vaccination here”. A similar reasoning was given for liver fluke; 
“when a cow is residing on a place for one year and they left and another cattle 
come to stay at that place they get hanta”. Similarly, the logic given for the cause of 
brucellosis fits with the sexually transmissible nature of the disease; “for the female 
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cow, if the male cow is following her too much she will be affected with the bakkale”. 
Other responses indicated the cause of diseases was often unknown; “sometimes we 
don’t know how it occurs we just see the cows dying”. This could indicate the lack of 
access to (or, as suggested by some, willingness to use) professional veterinary 
services, or could also indicate causes of acute death, such anthrax, is circulating.     
 
The wet season was singled out as a time when animal diseases are most prominent; 
a factor which has also been recorded in the literature (Bolajoko et al 2011, Iro 2001) 
“We have several diseases when it is rainy season - we don’t get much milk from the 
cattles and the cattles are not eating so they are not strong (sic)”. Whilst most Fulani 
assumed cattle diseases were obtained off the reserve during the dry season, there 
was at least one respondent who indicated his cattle became sick when they came 
onto the reserve, suggesting a number of diseases were also circulating within the 
reserve itself;  
“I am a stranger here at Ladduga.  I came here last year during the rainy 
season, I entered here with my cattles, are in very good condition but before I 
leave this place the cattles become somehow (ill) until I carried them to 
where I came from, then they came back into good condition”(FGD KGR 
March 2011). 
 
5.4.2 Local Knowledge and Perception of Zoonotic Disease Risks 
For a society so strongly tuned into the health of their animals, I found the Fulani’s 
limited knowledge of zoonotic diseases surprising; “we have not gotten messages 
about (zoonoses), we have not seen anybody enlighten us about these diseases”. 
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State, which are held in low esteem by the Fulani  
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was the single zoonosis recognised by the majority of participants, possibly as a 
result of cases on the reserve;  
“yes when a mad dog bites somebody, that person will become mad. There 
was a time a mad dog bit somebody and the person start shouting like a dog 
and they took him to the hospital at Kachia and the person died”. 
 
In terms of other animal species capable of transmitting disease, most people replied 
you could not get diseases from cattle, sheep or goats. A minority of respondents – 
all males – indicated their suspicion about the existence of zoonotic disease, for 
instance the similarity between swelling in the legs (which they termed 
“rheumatism”) and “bakkale” (brucellosis);  
“We are doubting about other diseases like when a cattle are infected maybe 
when you drink the milk from that particular infected cow, or you eat the 
meat of that cow, you will get infected, but we are not 100% sure.” (FGD 
KGR March 2011) 
 
Another replied they thought zoonoses existed because “when a man is having a 
particular disease they used to give him drugs that we are giving our animals, so that 
makes us think that there are some diseases common to man and animals”. The 
reserve doctor Idriss Wuro indicated he was suspicious of bovine tuberculosis and 
brucellosis circulating on the reserve
252
 however lack of diagnostics were a barrier to 
definitive diagnosis.  
 
The risk factors for transmission of zoonotic diseases are similar to those found in 
any group of people closely associated with their animals. Although Islam prohibits 
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the consumption of pork, dogs, donkeys, and dead animals
253
, there are still a number 
of practices that undoubtedly expose the Fulani to zoonotic disease. Consumption of 
raw milk, and the handling of aborted foetuses and their associated birth products 
(men only) are two such examples. Reponses about whether milk was boiled before 
consumption were mixed; many replied they preferred boiled milk to the raw product 
because of taste, with the closest referral to disease being “sometimes the flies get 
into the milk”.       
 
A common difficulty of sensitisation for many of the neglected zoonoses
254
 was that 
cause is not linked with effect, as summarised by one of the women; 
“Since we were young, if we took our cattles (sic) for grazing, after the baby 
has finished sucking the milk from its mother, we too go directly to the breast 
and suck milk and nothing is happening to us. But now the world has 
changed, anything you do, people will tell you that you will become infected” 
(FGD KGR March 2011) 
 
The only two zoonoses described as having a treatment were rabies and brucellosis. 
Dr Wuro explained the major problem with rabies post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) 
is keeping stocks on the reserve; an inconsistent electricity supply disrupts the cold 
chain, so they patient must go three times
255
 to Kaduna to get the course which is 
expensive. The communities gave accounts of patients being administered the post-
exposure prophylaxis too late: “He was taken to the hospital and unfortunately the 
doctor is not giving him the injection, for stopping the rabies maybe, so the person 
died”. Suspected brucellosis is treated much the same way as it is in animals; 
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 Potentially decrease the risk of a number of zoonoses prevalent in other populations such as 
porcine cysticercosis, glanders and anthrax 
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 This is according to the WHO’s Abbreviated Multisite Schedule or 2-1-1 protocol used in Nigeria, 
see http://www.who.int/rabies/human/postexp/en/   
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“We have some of the traditional medicine like one “binchchare” – 
something you get close to the dam areas and it will be grinded and mixed 
with potassium before giving it to the animals to drink. But for humans, 
“nboli” – the roots of this nboli together with “eay”, also “dinale” and the 
roots of the “bonge”, these are all traditional methods used to treat bakkale. 
We take the medicine through the mouth with water, and also spread on the 
joints” (FGD KGR March 2011) 
 
5.4.3 Fulani Self Governance for Disease Control on Kachia 
Grazing Reserve  
It has been seen that outside these demarcations of “traditional” (Islamic) and 
“modern” (government) law, there appears to be a third rather strict layer of internal 
governance and rule-making governed by the heads of blocks; if they decide on a 
new rule, everyone follows it seemingly without question
256
. Village heads are 
responsible for the issuance and enforcement of animal quarantine, particularly upon 
their return from grazing off the reserve during the dry season.     
“There is not any law that came to us about how to handle our cattles. Yes 
we make laws on our own, we used to gather ourselves together and tell our 
neighbouring villages there are those with the cattle infected, that they should 
be grazing on their side, they should not come to our side”. (FGD KGR 
March 2011) 
 
One participant implicates FMD as the primary reason for segregation of suspected 
cattle, however the same rules appear to apply for any disease outbreak for which 
they don’t know the cause; 
“Here in Laduga if your cattle are infected with the disease you cannot hide 
it. You will tell people whether you can get help from them, if they have 
something to help you, but if the infection rate is high that’s where you will 
be given a rule to restrict your animal from grazing where the other animals 
are” (FGD KGR March 2011). 
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 See however Riesman (1977) chapter five “Authority relations in the Wuro” which distinguishes 
between Fulani understanding of authority inside and outside the household; it is the latter which is 
referred to here  
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There was also confirmation that vaccination programmes (for example against 
Clostridia infection) were organised and paid for collectively by the Fulani, in the 
absence of any government assistance. External accounts indicate these self-imposed 
rules for disease prevention can be quite strict; one government official told of his 
experiences further south in Oyo state, where the Fulani formed a committee 
preventing other Fulani coming from the north onto their grazing reserve due to fear 
of disease introduction.  
 
The low input Fulani system has been blamed for the perceived lack of incentive for 
Fulani to invest in disease control; commercial operations cannot compete; 
“The nomadic Fulanis are just roaming about looking for grazing land. So at 
the end of the day, no matter what price he is selling his animal, he is still 
making money. If you have your cattle farm, you want to have your pasture, 
you want to have your workers, you want to supplement feed, there’s just so 
much you spend in costs. If you go to the same market as the Fulani herd, you 
discover that there is no need for you to be there.”  (Interview MoA March 
2011).  
 
This point was reiterated at another interview with a member from the private sector;  
“Livestock isn’t market oriented. Herd size is a status symbol. This is the major 
motivation for Fulani. Investors in commercial agriculture shy away from livestock. 
Those who invest in livestock have unclear motives” (Private veterinarian, Jos 
Plateau December 2009).  
Whilst many argue that the Fulani are not interested in marketing their cattle, the fact 
remains that the likelihood of a Nigerian eating beef, mutton or goat that has come 
from a pastoralist herd is extremely high; up to 80% anecdotally, so investment in 
this sector is probably worthwhile.  Ultimately, a large priority is to improve the 
relations between the Fulani and the wider Nigerian “indigene” and government 
communities; which given the history of conflict and feelings of “neglect” will take 
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some time. However, it cannot be ignored; “Because if the Fulani man does not like 
your face, he will not give you any good history. And you need that history.” 
However, there is a long way to go before Fulani-outsider relations are improved to 
the point where livestock disease control, and the subsequent improvements in 
human and animal health, becomes commonplace. One government official felt the 
intermittent nature of communication between Fulani and government authorities is a 
major barrier to building good relations;  
“We have to sustain (communication) - there is so much suspicion, that I’m 
sorry to say - we have communication to a point, and the next thing, no 
contact with them, we don’t see them again. Next time you see another set of 
people coming with a new idea” (FGD KGR March 2011). 
 
Meaningful long-term input into Fulani communities will only arise from multiple 
visits with them, which in turn will allow a deep understanding of the complex 
Fulani psychology, necessary to build sustainable working relationships with them. 
By their own admission, many officials within Nigerian government departments 
acknowledge that continuous contact and understanding of the Fulani is lacking;  
“How you get that confidence (with the Fulani) is through continuous 
contact. Not periodic or haphazard contact. Where the Fulani man is able to 
appreciate that you are coming, that your presence is a help to him - you 
have to establish that even before a Fulani man is going to pay for a service.  
If you don’t develop that confidence, it’s going to be a problem” (interview 
MoA April 2011).  
 
5.5 Understanding of the Local Situation by External Actors: 
Strengthening Advocacy and Political Prioritisation of the 
Endemic Zoonoses 
 
I found informants working within the public health sector across the ministries to be 
largely frustrated at the lack of advocacy and awareness at the policy level for the 
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neglected endemic zoonoses in Nigeria.  One informant explained how “high level” 
advocacy can help; funding in one Plateau State LGA was received after a MoH 
representative gave a presentation on local health issues to the visiting Health 
Commissioner, concluding “high level advocacy helps a lot but needs to be 
consistent, clear and repeated”.  An additional frustration faced by many public 
health practitioners at both the state and federal levels in Nigeria is that states need to 
put money into zoonosis surveillance and control programmes, but this can only 
occur if sufficient data exists in the first place to show it is a problem in that state;  
“Last year (2010) the Director of the Federal Epidemiology Unit presented a 
memo to the NCA on brucellosis
257
, but there was not enough data to 
convince the federal government to put in funds for this disease.  It is an 
emotional issue for some as a professor of animal science at Ahmadu Bello 
University in Zaria died of brucellosis – they cannot make it a national issue 
because of one death, but many feel frustrated that this disease is out there 
and they cannot do a lot about it.”(Interview MoA March 2011) 
 
5.5.1 Passive Surveillance and Underreporting of Zoonoses 
Lack of information from the ground level, leads policy makers to assume many 
zoonoses are not a problem; “It’s difficult to know the true prevalence as it is a rural 
problem, and all rural diseases suffer from underreporting”. One informant 
explained her frustrations that disease diagnosis is not holistic, and many diseases 
have been “forgotten” by the medics; “For example with HAT it took me SO MUCH 
to get people to start looking out for HAT again, everyone had forgotten about it”. 
She blamed the emphasis placed on the “big three”, even at an undergraduate level in 
the medical school, as one of the possible reasons for this;  
“there is not so much emphasis as compared with the emphasis placed on 
malaria, and the common diseases like HIV, TB - but it’s good to really 
revisit such issues again because it took time to get people to (realise) that we 
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still had HAT here. But now I know the suspicion index is increasing because 
previously we never got any report at all of HAT but now doctors will call 
and tell you that they treated patients for malaria and they still present the 
same symptoms, so they would now like them to be tested (for HAT)” 
(Interview MoH March 2011). 
 
Another official deemed the lack of diagnostics as the root cause for poor prevalence 
data from the ground level in Nigeria: 
“I’m sorry to say but we have so many antibiotics, we go to the hospital, even 
as they are taking your blood someone is recommending Ciproxin
258
 and 
those things are going to cloud whatever the problem is.....they give you anti-
malarials, you go back the second time, the antibiotics is given to you....for 
you to come out with a diagnosis is another area again”. (Interview MoA 
March 2011) 
 
Dr. Idriss Wuro on the KGR gave a reason of the realities of why cases are often not 
worked up, particularly at the primary healthcare level, citing cost and lack of 
diagnostics as an issue;  
“What we normally like to do in an investigation is to find out the diagnosis. 
But when you bring in the cost-benefit, you need to treat first – in my 
personal experience I have not made even one diagnosis of brucellosis, I’ve 
been working here almost 10 years. Yes we see orchitis but what we think in 
orchitis is they are moving to TB, we give them antibiotics and it usually 
clears up. At the end of the day you have to make a decision and start to treat, 
rather than wait for test results – if they spend all their money on tests the 
will not be able to afford the treatment.” 
The problems with diagnostics appear to be logistical as well as financial. The simple 
presence of a strong light could require a generator, which needs petrol to run it; the 
costs of diagnosis can therefore easily escalate to more than what people can afford 
to pay.  However, without diagnosis, records are not accurate, and the “field” data 
misrepresents the true picture, given “very few people actually come out to the 
ground level to see what the story is”.  Despite indications from both ministries that 
the professionals are starting to recognise the extent of zoonotic diseases, many fear 
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it will take some time to obtain evidence for their prioritisation within the policy 
arena. Some feel that the “vague” picture on the ground is one of the largest 
bottlenecks in sensitising policy makers, particularly at the federal level where many 
feel interest is only generated by the money, rather than the issue:  
“The HPAI programme created awareness but the big politicians think it’s 
just more money from the World Bank and don’t want to understand the 
project” (Interview MoA March 2011) 
 
As described in section 5.1.5, Nigeria appears to have a thorough disease 
surveillance and reporting system, however the reality reflects the major issues found 
across many developing countries; the quality of the content is failing. Reliance on 
passive surveillance is futile; distances are far and even if there were the human and 
financial resources available to carry out the work, the difficulties of diagnosis lead 
to under-reporting. Interestingly, passive reporting was very successful during the 
2006 HPAI outbreak, most likely reflecting public fear and strong financial backing 
from international donors. In the absence of these factors, for example in the case of 
most neglected zoonotic diseases, reliance on passive reporting is questionable, 
particularly as this is largely what drives policy in the form of memo submissions 
and acceptance to the NCA.  
 
5.5.2 Efficacy of Abattoir Surveillance 
Currently, prevalence data for some food borne zoonoses is obtained through abattoir 
surveillance. By all accounts, mismanagement of abattoirs means using these for 
disease surveillance is futile; abattoirs are run by civil servants who collect revenues 
based on the number of animals going through. The figures for animals tested are 
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“made up” according to the targets required by the government, resulting in a lot 
more being “recorded as tested” than actually get tested; as one informant 
complained “meat inspectors fear butchers, therefore no animals are condemned”. 
Recent, attempts to reform the abattoir system across the country were largely 
unsuccessful as the local level stakeholders were not engaged in the process; I was 
told how butchers refused to do business with a new abattoir in Lagos as the 
improved standards meant abattoir slaughter took longer; animals slaughtered after 8 
am would not get to the market and sold that day so a lot of meat was getting wasted. 
Even if the abattoir system in Nigeria was more transparent, many government 
officials think it would be better to approach zoonotic disease control from the farm 
level: “An abattoir is just an end point. An abattoir shows you the mess of what is 
happening at the farm level” (Interview MoA March 2011). 
 
5.5.3 Improving Prevalence Data for the Zoonotic Diseases: 
Nigeria’s Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training 
Programme (FELTP) 
Nigeria’s FELTP programme began in 2008 with a mission to “assist Nigerian 
Federal Ministry of Health and Federal Ministry of Agriculture in building 
sustainable network of field epidemiologists, vets and laboratory managers in 
measurably improving the PH services” (Interview CDC March 2011). FELTP is a 
worldwide capacity building programme modelled on CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence 
Service (EIS) in the United States. The objective is to improve skills within the 
public service, so when students graduate they are better equipped to support 
government surveillance and reporting systems, particularly during outbreaks. The 
two year Masters in Public Health (MPH) programme is attended by students 
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seconded from the ministries of health and agriculture and funded by CDC, with 
“funding in kind” from government ministries through the continuation of salaries 
and guaranteed post-programme employment. The MPH course is conducted through 
the Universities of Ibaden and Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, with further support 
from the African Field Epidemiology network (AFENET). Studies are linked to an 
identified need for information from the ground, and many centre around the 
neglected zoonoses such as rabies, brucellosis and bovine tuberculosis
259
.   
 
To date, the majority of informants from both the ministries of health and agriculture 
had only praise for the FELTP programme, and all indicated that such a programme 
will be instrumental to instil a One Health attitude to intersectoral disease 
surveillance and response within the ministries; “FELTP doesn’t matter whether 
you’re a vet or a medic - something is growing now”. Other respondents however, 
including a past student of FELTP, indicated some of the short-comings of capacity 
building in the absence of strong national health systems. 
“Administrative and systemic issues  are much harder to resolve through a 
capacity building programme alone, however the training aspects of 
surveillance, laboratory strengthening, public engagement has been 
instrumental and we’re already seeing impact on the ground” (Interview 
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5.6 Conclusion - The Future of One Health in Nigeria 
 
The discovery of HPAI in Nigeria in early 2006 catalysed a number of emergency 
actions by both the Nigerian government and the international community in an 
attempt to stem the loss of human lives and livelihoods from the disease.  By all 
accounts, government support and the promotion of One Health approaches for 
disease control were unprecedented, resulting in focused interdisciplinary 
collaboration for possibly the first time in the country. Events since external funding 
finished in 2009, and questions of the sustainability of One Health in Nigeria’s 
current health and livestock sectors, has been one of the interests of this case study, 
attempting to explore the second proposition of this thesis that: 
 
“The evolution of One Health from the ‘emergency to the everyday’ necessitates 
integration of local perspectives”. 
 
Nigeria’s Fulani people, through their long standing and well entrenched role in the 
livestock sector, have a potentially large stake in the country’s public health status. 
However social exclusion, tradition and physical isolation lead to questions 
surrounding the relevance of government policy to their lives; understanding the 
Fulani internal governance systems may provide the key to improvements in the 
level of disease entering the food chain.  
 
 Insights into Fulani knowledge, attitudes and practices obtained at the Kachia 
Grazing Reserve between June 2010 and April 2011 helped gain a wider 
252 
 
understanding of Fulani governance mechanisms in the context of livestock disease 
control on the reserve. This in turn was related back to activities at the Federal level 
with regards to One Health and general disease control in Nigeria. It appears that 
despite advances at the higher government levels for the promotion of One Health, 
“official” government policy is irrelevant to Nigeria’s Fulani pastoralists, which are 
isolated from mainstream society. For successful control of disease in rural societies, 
of which the neglected zoonoses play a potentially large component, there is a need 
to look from the “bottom up” and further explore community-led decision-making 
processes, such as the localised enforcement of quarantine which is already occurring 
to some degree on Kachia Grazing Reserve. I conclude that harnessing the existing 
“political hierarchy” within Fulani social structure may promote disease control in 
the absence of government policy or veterinary services. Evidence gathered from the 
grazing reserve suggests that mobilising this existing internal Fulani governance 
structure is a potentially powerful way to prevent disease transmission.  
  
At the national level, One Health shows “very good possibilities” in Nigeria, largely 
as a result of the HPAI procedures, however it appears maintaining the momentum 
will be difficult despite the best interests of individuals. By all accounts the approach 
is clear and widely accepted within the veterinary sector; however the medics are 
lagging behind. Despite this, many feel as a result of increased awareness from 
HPAI, and ongoing internal government programmes such as FELTP, the medics 
“have no choice now” but to get on board. As one Ministry of Health informant 
explained from her experiences with neglected tropical disease programmes; 
“Previously the medics were not able to work with anybody, as far as they 
were concerned they thought they knew it all. I want to use as an example the 
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Guinea Worm programme; they were like “if it’s not a doctor or medical 
programme we’re not sure it’s going to work”. They thought they were so 
good. So this time around, with the One World One Health thing, it doesn’t 
have to be particularly a sector, or a particular group within the health 
sector, or people that provide health services. Most of all it’s supposed to be 
a holistic approach, people have to learn to work together and achieve 
common goals as far as I’m concerned”. (Interview MoH March 2011).  
 
Despite the optimism, and the large amount of advocacy and funding for HPAI, One 
Health is far from institutionalised in Nigeria. Several recent publications have 
reflected this, for example a recent study in Kaduna State found less than 50% 
compatibility with the Integrated Disease Surveillance policy passed in the country in 
2002 (Abubaker et al 2011). Perhaps though exploring alternative, community 
centred approaches to disease control, the relevance of a One Health approach – 
particularly in remote rural communities who lie outside the sphere of traditional 
government control whilst practises place them at potentially high risk of zoonotic 













CHAPTER SIX:  
 
THESIS CONCLUSION   
 
6.1 Revisiting the Four Research Objectives in light of the 
Hypothesis   
 
Although the role played by animals in human health and wellbeing has been 
acknowledged for centuries, a resurrection of “One Medicine” philosophies has 
occurred in recent history.  The emergence and rapid spread of diseases such as 
HPAI and SARS during the first decade of the 21
st
 century acted as “trigger 
events”
260
 for dominant international policy narratives surrounding securitisation and 
pandemic preparedness. Messages of fear circulated in both the scientific and 
mainstream media, reinforcing the seriousness of the situation and providing the 
veterinary sector with their “moment in the limelight”
261
 to showcase abilities and 
gain access to resources and funding historically out of its reach, in a movement now 
termed “One Health”.  
 
Central to the One Health movement are calls for the adoption of an intersectoral 
approach encouraging the veterinary, health and environmental sectors to work 
together, particularly at the national ministerial level, for the prevention and control 
of zoonotic disease. The justification of integrated disease control programmes is 
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undisputed, given the multidisciplinarity required for their control. However, the 
realities of combining even just veterinary and human health disciplines is more 
complicated, and despite calls for “commonsense to prevail” (Van der Zeijst 2008) 
the progress to date has been slow, particularly in developing countries, where 
experiences in Africa and central Asia show that collaboration has often been “totally 
lacking” (Zinsstag et al 2005). Empirical evidence within this thesis from the various 
veterinary, health and academic sectors imply that despite the “excitement” 
surrounding One Health in recent times, intersectoral collaboration has been slow to 
take effect, particularly in the absence of external funding; fundamental changes to 
ministerial bottle-necks are required if One Health is to feature permanently in future 
public health and environmental policies.  
 
Using a comparative “extended” case study methodology
262
, this thesis examines 
three One Health propositions, each aimed to explore a different aspect of One 
Health in the African context, with a specific focus at the international, national and 
local levels of policy development.  These three propositions were developed as a 
means to anchor the broader arguments around interdisciplinary collaboration within 
each empirical chapter that support the overall objectives, ultimately acting as a 
mechanism through which to prove or disprove my hypothesis.  The research 
contributes to the growing focus on not whether, but how One Health could be 
operationalised, particularly in developing countries dominated by the “big three” of 
the Millennium Development Goals, and a poorly functioning livestock sector 
largely concerned with diseases of trade rather than its role as a reservoir of zoonotic 
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disease. Zoonoses therefore tend to “fall between the gaps” of health and livestock 
sector responsibility, particularly for the endemic neglected zoonoses which do not 
enjoy the high profile taskforces afforded to their more dramatic cousins including 
Ebola, HPAI and Rift Valley Fever. This conclusion starts by revisiting the original 
objectives outlined in section 2.1 of this thesis, with a discussion as to how they have 
been addressed in light of my original hypothesis. This is followed by a discussion 
around the contribution of the research to the literature, and how its content relates to 
current thinking around One Health and health policy, particularly in the African 
context.    
 
As stated in section 2.1, the overlying hypothesis I wanted to explore was: 
 
The practical realisation of One Health as a  framework for global health is 
inherently complicated, given its dependence on the mutual agreement and co-
operation of a wide range of nations, sectors and actors whose mandates and 
priorities greatly differ. 
 
Avian Influenza gave  a unique opportunity to those agencies, governments and 
academic networks involved with public health and security to “meet” each other, 
forge alliances and work together under the “One Health” banner.  The highly 
politicised nature of the response to avian influenza, coupled with its “Global Public 
Good” image and unprecedented financial commitment, created a policy space that 
facilitated stakeholder collaboration and co-operation. In recent years there has been 
a drive to maintain the momentum of the HPAI response, with advocates arguing for 
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the need to apply the good practice it to other aspects of international and regional 
health governance. However as time goes by it is becoming more difficult to find 
practical examples of One Health operationalisation, and governments that show true 
commitment to the approach within national health frameworks. My initial 
suspicions as to why this may be the case, particularly in developing countries, 
revolves around competition for resources in the absence of an “emergency” 
situation which ultimately, I suspect, discourages collaboration. The following 
section addresses my original objectives more specifically, highlighting to added 
understanding to One Health in the developing country context and subsequent 
recommendations arising from this thesis.   
 
Objective 1: Identify the current processes by which animal and human disease 
control policies are developed; that is the how of policy, rather than the what.  
 
For both the Ugandan and Nigerian case studies, extensive interviews were 
conducted with officials in the Ministries of Health and Agriculture in an attempt to 
address this objective. Engaging in discussion with these representatives revealed 
some major assumptions from the respondents, whether intended or not, about the 
way policy is developed in these two countries. Despite the initial descriptions of the 
policy process resembling the “rational, linear” approach
263
 with a strong emphasis 
on participation from the lower levels of governance
264
, further accounts of the 
process as interviews progressed eventually revealed the influence of various actor-
networks and the “politics” behind policy making that excluded the opinions of 
several stakeholder groups. One informant referred to the “erosion of technical 
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authority”, whereby health and agricultural policy decisions in the two countries are 
made “behind closed doors” at the highest echelons of government with little, if any, 
technocratic consultation.  This was openly discussed by a number of informants and 
examples given including Uganda’s disputed Plan for the Modernisation of 
Agriculture being largely the result of a World Bank initiative. More seriously, a lack 
of technical input is attributed to one of Uganda’s biggest public health crises in 
recent history. The northwards spread of HAT from endemic areas during the 1990’s 
was largely caused by a government re-stocking policy; the result of an agreement 
between the Office of the Prime Minister and international donors and NGOs. Had 
prior consultation from MAAIF officials occurred, Uganda’s Animal Disease Act 
and the requirement for pre-movement treatment of cattle from HAT endemic areas 
would more than likely have been flagged up, and the crisis possibly averted, or at 
the very least lessened in its severity. However as one informant explained, the “deal 
was done” in the office of the Prime Minister before MAAIF officials were even 
aware of its existence.  If One Health or indeed any policy framework to address the 
previously discussed international health and food security concerns of the 21
st
 
century is to be effective, there must be an overriding change of attitude by those 
responsible for policy development and implementation. This involves institutional 
shifts at all levels; both vertically between donors and recipient governments, and 
horizontally within national government offices. There is an urgent need to restore 
the technocratic consultation process, and once again respect the capacity and inputs 
of the technical ministries, particularly as the balance between resources, food 
production systems and health becomes ever-more complex.   
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Triangulation of ministerial views on policy processes with the community realities 
revealed a void between policy and practice at the ground level in both Nigeria and 
Uganda, particularly in the livestock sector where the dominant “safe trade” policy 
narrative
265
 is largely unimplementable on the ground
266
. There was little evidence 
that communities showed an understanding of the policy process which occurred at 
the government levels; of all the FGDs conducted (n=29) only the male co-operative 
group in Nigeria were able to demonstrate some understanding of how policy could 
be influenced, and this was only at the local government level. In this way, my 
empirical evidence very much supported the view of policy making as “the mystique 
of elites, separated from [local] people (which) place policy-making processes in 
rural and agricultural development into a privileged position” (Clay and Schaffer 
1984, quoted in Sutton 1999). It appears that despite the rhetoric common to 
international development discourse surrounding “participatory” processes, pro-poor 
policy development and community empowerment, little of this actually occurs. The 
following example from Uganda is a classic case-in-point, highlighting the void that 
still exists between development policy rhetoric, and the on-ground reality of its 
practice:  
“The women used to walk long distances to collect the water. So the policy makers 
thought that by drilling them a borehole next to their village it would prevent them 
walking such long distances. But when the borehole was drilled, the women 
continued moving long distances collecting water from other villages. So eventually 
they were asked “we have drilled you a borehole here but you are not using it, you 
are still walking long distances”. They said “the water is not our problem. We want 
to interact with other women, because when I walk far I see so and so, and we catch 
up, and discuss issues”…policy has to be in line with the people, and their problems 
- Policy is all about what affects people.” (Interview Serere District August 2010) 
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Objective 2.  Attempt to understand the requirements for the realisation of One 
Health in high risk rural communities, particularly pertaining to advocacy and 
control of endemic zoonotic diseases in areas with limited animal and human 
health resources.   
 
Empirical evidence from Nigeria and Uganda focused on community perception of 
zoonotic disease risks, and how national policy plays out in often isolated, rural areas 
with poor access to health and veterinary services. Through the course of the 
research I wanted to examine the relevance of national policy processes to everyday 
life of the pastoralist Fulani and Ugandan agro-pastoralists, and whether a national 
One Health framework in developing countries would really change the way 
decisions were made, communicated and implemented in such environments, where 
the effect of government policy appears to be rarely felt. One of my main 
conclusions was the importance of understanding risk perception within affected 
communities on zoonotic diseases
267
. I found that for endemic zoonoses with vague 
symptoms, particularly those with a febrile component imitating malaria
268
, 
interventions require advocacy and communication strategies above and beyond that 
for high profile diseases such as Ebola, rabies, and even HIV/AIDS and malaria. 
Convincing people they can contract a disease through everyday actions such as 
drinking milk, eating meat, being bitten by a fly or helping livestock to give birth is a 
difficult undertaking which should not be underestimated, nor neglected in favour of 
the quest to achieve “good science”. Post-SOS II intervention evidence collected in 
Uganda indicated that despite a large investment into the science, community 
understanding of HAT transmission, and as such the likely continuation of 
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preventative spray measures, remained weak. Sound advocacy and communication 
strategies based on a combined understanding of national policy processes and 
community perception of disease should be an inherent component of any zoonotic 
disease control programme in rural areas of Africa. A recommended wider 
consideration for those national and international agencies involved in disease 
control at the local level is how to effectively harness the local knowledge and 
governance mechanisms for disease control which is already naturally occurring, for 
example the enforced quarantine of Fulani cattle herds described in Chapter Five. 
 
The elephant in the room in any discussion surrounding public health policy in 
Africa, particularly for those that advocate for the control of endemic zoonotic and 
food-borne disease within the livestock reservoir, remains the poor performance of 
the veterinary sector across Africa. This results not just from a lack of ministerial 
resources, but what I consider to be a lack of professional confidence and united 
front.  Excuses by veterinarians for poor sectoral performance can be heard 
regardless of the region; farmers are “too poor”, they “prefer to use quacks” or they 
“don’t care about their animals”. Veterinary problems existing across Africa appear 
to be two fold and self-perpetuating: discouragement and disillusion by veterinarians 
at the lack of private sector opportunity is consistently compounded by the lack of 
access to, or faith, in veterinary services by rural communities - a never-ending 
“chicken and egg” scenario. Whilst communities in both Nigeria and Uganda 
overwhelmingly indicated they would prefer to pay for a professional veterinary 
service over a non-professional one, the services needed to be both accessible and 
affordable in conjunction with providing value for money. Additionally, livestock 
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markets in Africa demonstrate a low level of veterinary professionalism, which does 
not encourage clientelism from the rural poor; they in fact demonstrate the polar 
opposite to what should be happening in a healthy trade environment
269
. Currently, 
markets across Africa are treated as a “dumping ground” for sick livestock and a 
haven for poor professional conduct.  Whilst the veterinary profession, in 
conjunction with academia, can certainly address some aspects of this (particularly 
regarding professionalism within the sector
270
), larger political commitment is 
required to encourage veterinarians to rural areas, acknowledge their technical 
capacity and improve their traction within decision making processes. Without a 
vibrant, dynamic, well functioning and well funded veterinary sector, Ministries of 
Health will continue to commit large amounts of money to “fire fighting” diseases 
such as HAT, rabies or tuberculosis in the human population, all the time neglecting 
the role of the animal reservoirs and having little impact on transmission. 
 
Objective 3. Examine the motivation for developing countries to contribute to 
the growing international drive for One Health; particularly given its focus on 
emerging infectious diseases
271
, and their potentially limited relevance to 
Africa’s extensive rural systems where the majority of health funding is 
required.  
 
Possibly as an attempt to garner wider international support, or in the very least 
“mask the political under the cloak of neutrality”
272
, a recent shift from narratives of 
fear and securitisation towards “One Health as a Global Public Good” has recently 
occurred. Despite the obvious investments into collective action associated with this 
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narrative, the fact that not all diseases are found in all countries means that the 
dominant public health or environmental problems of many developing regions may 
continue to be neglected through framing One Health in this way. Specifically, GPGs 
have been suggested as a logical classification for fast-moving or trade-related 
diseases such as HPAI; also the most likely to occur as a pandemic and as such 
override state control
273
. Either way, classification of One Health activities as a GPG 
are probably quite restrictive, and may not be appropriate long term if global health 





Whilst some encouraging examples of the application of One Health can be seen in 
Asia, Africa in particular appears in danger of getting left behind in the global 
movement. This is despite a strong case for One Health on the continent, where the 
fragile interaction between ecosystems, wildlife, domestic livestock and society 
occurs amidst rapidly rising human populations and increasing urbanisation. 
Pertinent to the case studies is that from a developing country (specifically African) 
perspective, the current global health agenda has been criticised for its “narrow 
definition”, with claims that Africa-specific threats are being excluded in favour of 
the “the interests of high-income countries” (Hwenda et al 2011). As such, through 
examining the motivation for developing countries to contribute to the growing 
international drive for One Health, I recommend that calls within the literature for 
“greater sensitivity”
274
 towards developing countries during bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations be supported. It is only through restoring the confidence of developing 
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countries in terms of their equal role in a global vision that One Health can be 
promoted.  
 
Finally, international stakeholders and proponents of One Health need to be mindful 
of how their actions and recommendations appear to those responsible for policy 
implementation at the national and local levels. This is particularly true for 
developing countries, where narrowly focused “top down” policies often neglect the 
wider systems responsible for their implementation. Donor funds for a single health 
challenge have been shown to eclipse entire ministerial budgets in some cases
275
.  
More importantly, those driving One Health at the international level cannot 
advocate for the adoption of approaches which they themselves do not practice; 
intersectoral collaboration being a prime example. The following quotation captures 
beautifully that which I have witnessed on a number of occasions during high profile 
One Health advocacy gatherings: 
“At the big meetings.....what inevitably happens is that WHO makes a little 
speech, David Nabarro makes a little speech, and the OIE too, who maintain 
their vigilant independence from the UN system....This sends the wrong 
message. The whole effort, the whole ethos of this has been to o-ordinate, to 
integrate. Yet when we get to tell the world how well we work together, we do it 
individually” (Scoones 2010:57)    
 
Objective 4. Examine the types of evidence and advocacy necessary for the 





The actor-networks which mould health governance in the 21
st
 century are 
complicated, hence my referral to the “precariousness” of the One Health approach 
in the first proposition.  . WHO is still perceived as central to the current 
                                                          
275
 For example the aforementioned case of HIV/AIDS funding in the Ugandan Ministry of Health  
265 
 
international health policy process; however the explosion of public private 
partnerships, philanthropic organisations and non-governmental bodies into 
international health policy has challenged traditional models of health delivery in 
recent years. 
 
Amidst the flurry of international stakeholders and networks participating in One 
Health meetings, programmes and academic courses across the globe, a growing 
acknowledgment for “One Health governance” has arisen. A working group formed 
at the 2010 Stone Mountain meeting outlined the formation of a One Health Global 
Network to promote the approach and garner international support, whilst 
maintaining One Health could not be “owned” or dominated by any one organisation 
or institute. It cannot be denied that the One Health movement has to date been 
largely driven by western powers, in particular north America and Europe, with 
technical endorsement from the OIE-WHO-FAO agency tripartite. Whilst high 
profile International Ministerial Conferences on pandemic influenza viruses have 
been held in Beijing, Hanoi and Egypt amongst others, specific events aimed at 
garnering political and financial support for One Health have been hosted largely by 
the west; for example the WCS Global Symposium, Winnipeg, Stone Mountain, 




For One Health to progress into the desired international collective action however, 
international agencies and associated stakeholders need to show a united front; in the 
absence of a global government, policy makers are more likely to heed the 
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recommendations of an epistemic community if they “represent a consensus of 
opinion” (Sutton 1999). This is undoubtedly where the strength of the OHGN lies, 
however the current anonymity surrounding its leadership contrasts much of the 
current governance theory. Discussions around endorsement of the OHGN in order 
to increase its credibility, particularly in the eyes of the policy makers, are yet to 
result in a clear way forwards; however a strong platform is needed to enable the 
epistemic community to communicate united options to policy makers in future.     
 
Regarding advocacy for One Health at the national level, the first important 
observation is that One Health has long been deemed the domain of the veterinary 
sector, which has repercussions for issue prioritisation. It could be that zoonotic 
diseases are largely seen to be the responsibility of animal health specialists as a 
result of the “herd population” versus “individual patient” rhetoric surrounding 
veterinary and human medicine respectively. Other theories may be that human 
health policy is dominated by the “big three” in most developing countries, whilst 
livestock sector policies are influenced by OIE discourse surrounding disease 
eradication, often described as the “safe trading in livestock” narrative (IDS 2006, 
Turner 2005)
277
. This lack of crossover ultimately leaves little room for the 
prioiritisation of nationally relevant diseases or environmental issues which would be 
of prime interest to all sectors.  
 
The creation of permanent One Health structures for zoonoses control, whilst 
desirable as a politically endorsed “glue” to hold everything together, will ultimately 
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need to weather the inter-ministerial “turf wars”
278
 which will likely emerge as a 
result of ministries attempting to maintain control over resources and policy arenas. 
In Nigeria, a “stakeholders’ zoonosis committee” has been set up with 
representatives from both ministries to discuss the control and management of 
neglected zoonotic disease.  However when further probed, the official responsible 
for its implementation showed frustration due to lack of formal endorsement by the 
federal government; 
“I set it up so well, but then again, you know, when you plan activities and 
you can’t carry them out because you don’t have the funds it becomes so 
frustrating, so I decided to step aside as we had no encouragement per se, to 
move further”. (Interview NMoH March 2011) 
 
This final example serves to pertinently illustrate how One Health will not “just 
happen”, as is the current expectation by many advocates of the concept. The 
research in this thesis has highlighted some of the broad institutional changes 
required for One Health to become a permanent approach, and as such individual 
country needs cannot be underestimated, dismissed or prescribed in a “top down” 
manner by the international community. What is required instead is national 
assessment of countries’ individual One Health priorities, and the space and time for 
them to develop in order that regional and international health priorities can 
ultimately benefit from the Global Public Good that is One Health.     
 
6.2 The Contribution of this Research 
Understanding the approach towards the control of zoonotic disease in developing 
countries is particularly important given the fragmented human and animal health 
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systems in these countries, and the potential effect of this on their ability to deal with 
high profile outbreaks such as that which occurred in Nigeria in 2006. Moreover, the 
high amount of financial and human resources afforded to various One Health 
approaches since the emergence of H5N1 HPAI suggests this to be a timely analysis 
of the events of the last decade. This section therefore serves to underline the 
intellectual contribution of my research to the existing body of work undertaken on 
policy and practice in the developing country context. To my knowledge, the detailed 
multi-country, multi-level case study used to obtain my empirical data is a unique 
approach to public health research in developing countries, and the only study thus 
far to examine the rhetoric behind the currently high profile One Health movement.  
 
The penultimate aim of this thesis was to provide a critical reflection of One Health 
based on my experiences being both “active implementer”
279
, and “observer” of the 
higher political and institutional processes occurring at the global level
280
. This 
“doubling up” of perspective, coupled with the fact that I lived and worked in Africa 
for a number of years prior to undertaking this research
281
 maintains a unique 
perspective and justifies my contribution to the “social anthropology of 
development”
 282
. A thorough literature review failed to reveal any recent work 
regarding a critical analysis of public health policy in developing countries; while 
research into the logistics of intersectoral collaboration for zoonotic disease control 
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in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be nonexistent.   Based on the experiences of Mosse 
(2005), whose similarly critical approach was cited by some as “unfair and 
disrespectful….too negative”, I am reassured, as Mosse was, by Latour’s view that 
successful objectivity “maximises the capacity for actors to object”
283
.  Ultimately, 
understanding the policy process in order to accurately describe One Health’s current 
position and future potential necessitated the adoption of critical distance; compared  
to simply advocating for One Health which would have justified a more normative 
view.  
 
In terms of theoretical framework, the large body of research around environmental 
policy processes undertaken by Sussex University’s Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS)
284
 is particularly relevant to this thesis. Highlighted by Young (2005) as one of 
the few attempts to understand policy process theory outside the OECD context, the 
IDS approach to examining policy in the context of its narratives, actor-networks and 
external politics and interests
285
 helped focus my analysis of the empirical data. It 
also enabled me to contribute an alternative perspective to previous health policy 
research, which appears driven by an instrumental perspective, as found in the influx 




Of particular relevance to the broader implications of my research to policy and 
practice is the evidence contained within this thesis which largely aligns with 
Mosse’s observation that “relationships, interests and cultures of specific 
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organisational settings” shape development practice, rather than policy per se (Mosse 
2005:230). Mosse infers that whilst donors understand “how their own institutional 
relations and practices are concealed within the coherent policy papers they 
produce”, other stakeholder groups use policy to simply provide “authoritative 
interpretation” of what is happening on the ground (Mosse 2005:230).  As was 
pertinent in the evidence within this thesis, what occurs on the ground in many 
developing countries largely reflects wider social, political and economic pressures, 
rather than what the policy states, and in the case of public health, often with 
dramatic consequences
287
.  I maintain the difficulty of defining and describing policy 
discussed in section 2.3.1 (page 45) still holds, however in a way that I found 
surprising. At one end of the continuum, the perspective of ministerial informants 
that policy is a “rational, linear process” was subsequently shown to be largely 
inaccurate in practice, both at the ministerial level and from the community 
perspective. However the sentiment that “policy is a chaos of purposes and 
accidents” 
288
, whilst I feel to be valid to some extent in a general context, does not 
describe the total picture in many developing countries, given the  major stake of 
international donors in the policies of countries such as Nigeria and Uganda
289
.   
 
In summary, the major contribution of this thesis to the literature therefore occurs on 
a number of levels. Firstly, the evidence helps develop a greater understanding of 
public health policy process in developing countries, particularly in light of 
intersectoral collaboration for zoonotic disease control. Secondly, the research 
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highlights certain aspects important to the implementation of One Health, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa but potentially for any setting experiencing similar 
challenges to those described within the human and animal health systems in Nigeria 
and Uganda.  Finally, I feel a fair assumption could be made that top down, donor-
driven policies such as that which occurs across the health sectors (and to a lesser 
degree in the agricultural sectors of developing countries) may not ensure long term 
participation in the One Health movement in these countries. Good personal 
relationships, rather than policy, appear to drive the type of intersectoral 
collaboration necessary for control in an outbreak situation. Whilst the international 
response to HPAI can certainly be accredited with strengthening these relationships, 
collaboration and co-operation has been shown to all but cease in the absence of 
external funding. The exception to this can be found in Uganda, where despite the 
management difficulties, COCTU has demonstrated that a formal, politically 
endorsed platform could aid the long term commitment to adoption of a One Health 
approach for control of the endemic zoonoses, and thus help implement a local 
perspective. In this way, the research within this thesis ultimately goes some way to 
providing support to the “alternative” One Health narratives in order to address 
endemicity and other aspects of Scoones’ (2010:209) “ten challenges for the way 








6.3 Conclusion  
 
The crux of One Health success lies in the continued and growing recognition of the 
role played by animals in human lives, acknowledged by the “modern advocate of 
One Medicine”
290
 Calvin Schwabe;  
"The final objective of veterinary medicine does not lie in the animal species 
that the veterinarian commonly treats. It lies very definitely in man, and 
above all in humanity.” (Schwabe 1984) 
 
Whilst spending on human health attracts “strong moral and empathetic support, 
leading to significant funding being directly funnelled to health ministries”, the case 
of ‘who pays’ for zoonotic disease control is not as clear (Okello et al 2011). 
Informal alliances outside official policy processes such as personal working 
relationships between individuals from the health and agricultural ministries, and 
short term technical platforms during outbreaks may work on a small scale in the 
short term. However, if One health is to become the “new health paradigm” for 
addressing long term the health problems of the 21
st
 century, it is anticipated a degree 
of formal endorsement, governance and financial backing will be necessary.  
 
Ultimately, the “ecosystems” perspective is still limited or absent from the majority 
of One Health policy discourse. Despite further competition for finite resources with 
greater numbers of stakeholders or networks involved in the approach, the issues 
touched upon at the beginning of this thesis such as habitat destruction, unsafe 
trading of animals, unsustainable use of natural resources and climate change are all 
valid to One Health. Arguments over which disease and where the next pandemic 




will emerge from will continue to grow in urgency unless such upstream causes of 
disease emergence are ultimately addressed. In future, One Health would benefit 
from increased association with programmes and research into ecosystem services 
and the wider environmental impacts of anthropogenic
291
 actions. The “One Health 
as a Global Public Good” policy narrative would also make more sense in a holistic 
environmental context rather than one limited to the GPG of infectious disease.       
 
In conclusion, the words of Dr. S.K Lam pertinently summarise the challenges ahead 
for the sustained adoption of a One Health approach into the future, particularly from 
the perspective of developing countries towards which this thesis contributes:    
“While the One Health Initiative is to be lauded, the solutions may not lie in 
the implementation of methods found suitable for the developed world. One 
size does not fit all here. What is to replace deforestation, open burning or 
free range poultry farming? A more pragmatic and innovative approach as 
well as a paradigm shift needs to be implemented to enable any hope that this 





















Abbass, I (2010) “No retreat no surrender: Conflict for survival between fulani 
pastoralists and farmers in northern Nigeria”, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 8 
No. 1 pp 331-346 available at http://www.abu.edu.ng/publications/2012-06-07-
133920_5712.pdf (last accessed 3rd July 2012) 
 
Aberman, N, Schiffer, E, Johnson, M and Oboh V (2009) “Mapping the Policy 
Process in Nigeria: Examining Linkages between Research and Policy”, Nigeria 
Strategy Support Programme (NSSP) Background Paper 12, November 2009, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
 
Abubaker, A.A, Idris, S.H, Sabitu, K., Shehu A.M., Sambo, M.N (2010) “Emergency 
preparedness and the Capability to Identify Outbreaks: A Case Study of Sabon Gari 
Local Government Area, Kaduna State”, Annals of Nigerian Medicine, Vol. 4, Issue 
1, pp 21-27 
 
Adebayo, O.O, Olaniyi, O.A (2008) “Factors Associated with Pastoral and Crop 
Farmers Conflict in Derived Savannah Zone of Oyo State, Nigeria”, Journal of 
Human Ecology, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 71-74 
 
Allen, T, Parker, M (2011) “The ‘Other Diseases’ of the Millennium Development 
Goals: rhetoric and reality of free drug distribution to cure the poor's parasites”, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32, Issue 1, pp 91-117 
 
American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) (2008), “One Health: A new 
Professional Imperative”, One Health Initiative Task Force: Final Report 
http://www.avma.org/onehealth/ (Accessed online 7
th
 May 2010) 
 
Anon. (2011) “Stamping Out Sleeping Sickness (SOS) in Soroti and Serere District 
(August 2010 – December 2010)” Phase II Field Report, Research Into Use Project 
Documents, January 2011  
 
Anon. (2011b) “SOS RIU Project Notes – March 8
th
 2011”, Research Into Use 
Project Documents, March 2011  
 
Beijing Declaration (2006), Made at the International Pledging Conference on Avian 





 July 2012) 
 
Bell, R, Taylor, S and Marmot, M (2010) “Global Health Governance: Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health and the Imperative for Change” Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics 470-485 
 
Blaikie, N (2010) Designing Social Research (2nd Edition), Polity Press USA, 
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4337-3  
275 
 
Blench, R, Chapman, R., Slaymaker T (2003) “A Study of the Role of Livestock in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” PPLPI Working Paper No.1, FAO Pro-poor 
Livestock Policy Initiative, available at 
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/pplpi/workingpapers.html (last 
accessed 15th June 2012) 
Blench, R (2010) “Conflict between Pastoralists and Croppers in Nigeria”, Review 
Paper prepared for DfID Nigeria, Cambridge, 9th August 2010 
http://www.rogerblench.info/Development/Nigeria/Pastoralism/Fadama%20II%20pa
per.pdf (last accessed 15
th
 June 2012) 
 
Bolajoko M. B, Moses G. D., Gambari-Bolajoko K. O., Ifende V. I, Emenna P., Bala, 
A (2011) “Participatory rural appraisal of livestock diseases among the Fulani 
community of the Barkin Ladi Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria”, 
Journal of Veterinary Medicine and Animal Health, Vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 11-13  
 
Brown, T, M, Cueto, M, Fee, E (2006) “The World Health Organization and the 
Transition From International to Global Public Health”, American Journal of Public 
Health, Vol 96, No. 1, pp 62-72 
 
Brundtland, G.H (2001), speech given at the United Nations Association’s Global 
Leadership Awards 
www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/2001/english/20010419_UNAawardsdinnern
ewyork.en.html (last accessed July 7th 2012) 
 
Burawoy, M (1998) “The Extended Case Method”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, pp 4-33  
 
Butcher, C (2009) “From research into use: Monitoring and Evaluation of a Public 
Private Partnership”, Synthesis Report, Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness Case Study, 
Research into Use Project Documents 
 
Butcher, C (2009b) “Sleeping Sickness Communication Evaluation Baseline Survey, 
2006 and Intervention Survey for Animal Treatment and Sleeping Sickness 2007”, 
Summary of Steadmans / Wren Media Report / University of Edinburgh, Working 
Paper No.: 32, 19
th
 August 2009 
 
Canning, D (2006) “Priority setting and the ‘neglected’ tropical diseases”, 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, No.100, pp 
499-504 
 
Cardiff, R.D., Ward, J.M., Barthold, S.W (2008) “‘One Medicine-One Pathology’: 
Are veterinary and human pathology prepared? Laboratory Investigation, Vol. 88, 
pp18-26 
 
Cattand, P, Simarro, P, Jannin, J, Ly, C, Shaw, A and Mattioli, R (2010), Linking 
sustainable human and animal African trypanosomiasis control with rural 
276 
 
development strategies, No. 10 PAAT Technical and Scientific Series, FAO ISBN 
978-92-5-106670-6  
 
Cavalli A, Bamba SI, Traore MN, Boelaert M, Coulibaly Y (2010) “Interactions 
between Global Health Initiatives and Country Health Systems: The Case of a 
Neglected Tropical Diseases Control Program in Mali”, PLoS Neglected Tropical 
Diseases, Vol 4, No. 8: e798. doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000798  
 
CGIAR (2012) History of the CGIAR available at 
http://www.cgiar.org/who/history/index.html (last accessed 24
th
 May 2012) 
 
Chambers, R (1983) Rural Development: putting the last first. Harlow: Longman 
 
Chambers, R, Pacey, A, Thrupp, L-A (1989) Farmer first: farmer innovation and 
agricultural research. Intermediate Technology Publications, London 
 
Chandler, C (2009) ACT Consortium Manual for Qualitative Data Analysis, ACT 





 July 2012  
 
Clark, W.C., Szlezak, N.A, Moon, S., Bloom, B.R., Keusch G.T., Michaud C.M., 
Dean T. Jamison, D.T., Frenk, J., Kilama, W.L (2010) “The Global Health System: 
Institutions in a Time of Transition.” CID Working Paper No. 193. Center for 
International Development, Harvard University 
 
Collins, A (ed.) 2007, Contemporary Security Studies, 2
nd 
Edition. Oxford University 
Press, New York; Oxford. Available at 
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199548859/01student/cases/collins2e_disease.p
df (last accessed 15th June 2012) 
 
DANIDA (2005) Uganda’s Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture – Evaluation 
Summary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Evaluation Department, 
www.evaluation.dk 
 
de Bruijn, M. (1997) “Hearth hold in Pastoral Fulbe Society, Central Mali: Social Relations, 
Milk and Drought”, Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 625-
651 
  
Delgado, C., Rosegrant, M., Steinfeld, H., Ehui, S. K. & Courbois, 
C. (1999) Livestock to 2020: the next food revolution. Food, Agriculture, and the 
Environment Discussion paper 28. International Food Policy Research Institute 
 




 February 2011, Rambo Reigns, available at 
www.economist.com/node/18236940 (last accessed 15th June 2012)  
277 
 
Ekboir, J (2009) “The CGIAR at a Crossroads: Assessing the role of international 
agricultural research in poverty alleviation from an innovation systems perspective”, 
CGIAR Institutional Learning and Change (ILAC) Initiative Working Paper 9, 
available at www.cgiar-ilac.org (last accessed 15
th
 June 2012) 
 
EMPRES (2006) HPAI Nigeria Situation Update, available at 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload//199578/EMPRES-Watch.HPAI.Nigeria.pdf 
(last accessed 28/02/2012) 
 
England (2007) “Are we spending too much on HIV?” British Medical Journal, Vol. 
334, p344  
 
Enwezor F. N, Umoh J. U, Esievo K. A, Halid I, Zaria L. T, Anere J.I (2009) 
“Survey of Bovine Trypanosomiasis in the Kachia Grazing Reserve, Kaduna State, 
Nigeria”, Veterinary Parasitology, Vol 159, Issue 2, pp 121-125 
 
Ezeomah, C (1985) “Land Tenure Constraints Associated With Some Recent 
Experiments to Bring Formal Education to Nomadic Fulani in Nigeria”, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) Agricultural Administration Unit, Paper 20D August 
1985 
 
Fabusoro, E (2007) “Key issues in livelihoods security of migrant Fulani pastoralists: 
Empirical evidence from southwest Nigeria”, Paper presented at “African 
Alternatives: Initiative and Creativity beyond Current Constraints” AEGIS 
European Conference on African Studies, 11 - 14 July 2007, African Studies Centre, 
Leiden, The Netherlands 
 
FAO (2003) “Veterinary Public Health and control of zoonoses in developing 
countries”, Summary of comments and discussion from the FAO/WHO/OIE 
Electronic Conference, FAO Corporate Document Repository 
 
FAO (2008) in collaboration with the OIE/WHO/UNICEF/World Bank and UN 
system Influenza Coordination (2008) “Contributing to One World, One Health: A 
strategic Framework for Reducing the Risks of Infectious Diseases at the Human-
Animal-Ecosystems Interface”, Presented as a Consultation Document at the 
International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza at Sharm El-
Sheikh, Egypt 
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) Avian Influenza Control And Human Pandemic 
Preparedness And Response Project, Implementation Plan 
 
Fèvre, E.M, Coleman, P.G, Odiit, M, Magona, J.W, Welburn, S.C, Woolhouse, 
M.E.J (2001) “The origins of a new Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense sleeping 
sickness outbreak in eastern Uganda”, Lancet; Vol. 358, pp 625–628 
 
Fèvre, E.M., Picozzi, K., Fyfe, J., Waiswa, C., Odiit, M., Coleman, P.G., & Welburn, 
S.C. (2005) “A burgeoning epidemic of sleeping sickness in Uganda”, The Lancet, 
Vol. 366, pp 745-747   
278 
 
Fèvre, E.M., Odiit, M., Coleman, P.G., Woolhouse, M.E.J. & Welburn, S.C. (2008) 
“Estimating the burden of rhodesiense sleeping sickness during an outbreak in 
Serere, eastern Uganda”, BMC Public Health, Vol. 8, p96  
 
Fidler, D (2001) “The globalisation of public health: the first 100 years of 
international health diplomacy”, Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, Vol.79, 
pp 842-849 
 
Fidler, D 9(2003) “SARS: political pathology of the first post-Westphalian 
pathogen”,  Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 31, pp 485–505 
 
Fidler, D (2004) “Germs, governance and global public health in the wake of 
SARS”, Journal of Clinical Investigation, Vol. 113, No.6, p799-804 
 
Garrett, L, Alavian, E (2010) “Global health governance in a G20 world” Global 
Health Governance, Volume IV, No. 1 (FALL 2010) available at 
http://www.ghgj.org (last accessed 15
th
 June 2012) 
 
Gibbs, P (2003) “The Foot-and-Mouth Disease Epidemic of 2001 in the UK: 
Implications for the USA and the “War on Terror”” Journal of Veterinary and 
Medical Education, Vol. 30, No. 2 pp121-132 
 
Gibbs, E.P.J (2005), “Emerging zoonotic epidemics in the interconnected global 
community”, The Veterinary Record, Vol 157, pp 673-679 
Gilson, L., Mills, A (1995) “Health sector reforms in sub-Saharan Africa: lessons of 
the last 10 years” Health Policy, Vol.32, Issue 1 , pp 215-243 
Godlee, F (1994) “WHO in retreat; is it losing its influence?” British Medical 
Journal Vol. 309 pp 1491–1495 
 
Government of Nigeria Vision 2020 http://www.npc.gov.ng/vault/files/NV2020-
NIP-Volume-II-Original-document_edited__versioin3_10_06_2010.pdf  (last 
accessed 2
nd
 July 2012) 
 
Government of Uganda Animal Diseases Act, available at 
http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Uganda/UG_Animal_Diseases
_Act_1918.pdf (last accessed 3rd July 2012)  
 
Government of Uganda (2001) Uganda’s National Policy for the Delivery of 
Veterinary Services 
 
Government of Uganda (2003) National Agricultural Advisory Services Soroti 
Baseline Report 
 
Government of Uganda (2004) Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 2004/5-




 Government of Uganda (2010) Ugandan National Development Plan 2010-2015 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Uganda_PRSP.pdf 
 
Grépin, K.A, Reich, M.R (2008) “Conceptualizing Integration: A framework for 
analysis applied to neglected tropical disease control partnerships”, PLoS Neglected 
Tropical Diseases, Vol 2, Is 4, p 174-8 
 
Hanoi Declaration http://un-influenza.org/node/4040 (last accessed 3rd July 2012) 
 
Hide G, Tait A, Maudlin I, Welburn SC (1996) “The origins, dynamics and 
generation of Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense epidemics in East Africa” 
Parasitology Today Vol. 12, pp 50–55 
 
Hotez, P.J, Fenwick, A., Saviolo, L., Molyneux, D.H (2009) “Rescuing the bottom 
billion through control of neglected tropical diseases”, Lancet, 373, pp 1570-75 
  
Hotez PJ, Fenwick A (2009b) “Schistosomiasis in Africa: An Emerging Tragedy in 
Our New Global Health Decade”. PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, Vol 3, No. 9: 
e485. doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000485 
HRW (2001) “Jos: A city Torn Apart”, Human Rights Watch Reports, Vol.13, No.9 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/12/18/jos-0 (last accessed 15th June 2012)  
 
HRW (2006) “They do not own this place”: Government Discrimination against 
“non-indigenes” in Nigeria” Human Rights Watch Report, Vol.18, No.3, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/04/25/they-do-not-own-place (last accessed 15th 
June 2012)   
HRW (2009) “Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces”, Human Rights Watch Reports, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/07/20/arbitrary-killings-security-forces-0 (last 
accessed 15th June 2012) 
 
HRW (2011) Human Rights Watch World Report, Uganda: 2011, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/uganda (last accessed 15th June 2012) 
 
Hwenda, L, Mahlathi, P and Maphanga, T (2011) “Why African Countries Need to 
Participate in Global Health Security Discourse”, Global Health Governance, 
Volume IV, No. 2 (SPRING 2011) available at http://www.ghgj.org (last accessed 
15
th
 June 2012) 
  
ICONZ (2011), Kachia Grazing Reserve March 2011 Review of Fieldwork, ICONZ 




 June 2012) 
 
IDS (2006) Understanding Policy Processes: A Review of IDS Research on the 





(last accessed 3rd July 2012)  
 
ILO (2009) International Labour Office/African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights “Nigeria: constitutional, legislative and administrative provisions 
concerning indigenous peoples” ILO Publications, Geneva 
 
Ingawa, S.A, Tarawali, G and von Kaufmann, R (1989) “Grazing Reserves in 
Nigeria: Problems, Prospects and Policy Implications”, African Livestock Policy 
Analysis Network, Network Paper no. 22, December 1989  
 
Iro, I. “From nomadism to sedentarism: An analysis of development constraints and 
public policy issues in the socioeconomic transformation of the pastoral Fulani of 
Nigeria” http://www.gamji.com/fulani1.htm (accessed 6th June 2010) 
 
Jones, B, Grace, D et al (2011), Zoonoses: Wildlife/domestic Livestock Interactions, 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Final Report for the Department of 
International Development, UK available at  
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/livestock/60877-dfid_final25-9-2011.pdf 
(last accessed 15th June 2012) 
 
Kapiriri, L., Norheim, O.F, Heggenhougen,K. (2003) “Public participation in health 
planning and priority setting at the district level in Uganda”, Health Policy And 
Planning; Vol. 18, No.2 pp205–213 doi: 10.1093/heapol/czg025   
 
Kaplan, B (2006) “More on the need for comparative medicine”, Journal of the 
American Veterinary Medical Association, Vol. 229, No. 4, p 498 
 
Kaufman, J.R, and Feldbaum, H. (2009) “Diplomacy and the Polio Immunization 
Boycott in Northern Nigeria”, Health Affairs, Vol 28, No.4 pp 1091-1101 [doi: 
10.1377/hlthaff.28.4.1091] 
 
Kaufmann, R, Chater, S, Blench, R (1986) Livestock Systems Research in Nigeria's 
Subhumid Zone: Proceedings of the second ILCA/NAPRI Symposium held in 
Kaduna/ Nigeria, 29 October - 2 November 1984, International Livestock Centre For 
Africa (ILCA) Available At: 
http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ilri/x5463e/x5463e00.htm#contents (last accessed 3
rd
 
July 2012)  
 
Kaw, B.C (2003), “Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia”, Journal of Clinical Virology, 
Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp 265-75 
 
Keeley, J. E. (2001) Influencing Policy Processes for Sustainable Livelihoods: 
strategies for change Lessons for Change in Policy & Organisations, No. 2. 




Keeley, J and Scoones, I (1999) “Understanding Environmental Policy Processes: A 
Review”, IDS Working Paper 89, Environment Group, Institute Of Development 
Studies, University Of Sussex 
 
Kickbusch, I (2000) “The Development of International Health Priorities -
Accountability Intact?” Social Science &Medicine Vol.51, pp 979–989 
  
King, L.J, Marano, N., Hughes, J.M (2004), “New partnerships between animal 
health services and public health agencies”, Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., Vol 23, 
No.2, pp 717-26 
 
Kitzinger, J (1995) “Introducing Focus Groups”, Qualitative Research Series, British 
Medical Journal, Vol. 311, pp 299-302 
 
Kristjanson, P.M., Swallow, B.M., Rowlands, G.J., Kruska, R.L. & de Leeuw, P.N. 
(1999) “Measuring the costs of African animal trypanosomiasis, the potential 
benefits of control and returns to research” Agricultural Systems, Vol.59, pp 79–98. 
 
Lam, S.K (2010) “One World, One Health – An utopian dream or a Reality?” Article 




 April 2010) 
 
Leboeuf, A, Broughton, E (2008) “Securitization of Health and Environmental 
Issues: Process and Effects. A research outline”, Health and Environment Working 
Document, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri), ISBN: 978-2-86592-
305-2 
 
Lee, K, Collinson, S, Walt, G, Gilson, L (1996) “Who Should be doing what in 
International Health: A Confusion of Mandates in the United Nations?” British 
Medical Journal, Vol. 312, pp 302-7 
 
Litsios, S (1997) “Malaria control, the cold war, and the postwar reorganization of 
international assistance”, Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies in Health 
and Illness, Vol. 17, No.3, pp255-278  
 




 June 2010) 
 
Manhattan Principles (2004), Annex II: Extracted from FAO (2008), Annex 1, p51 
 
Marchal B, Cavalli A, Kegels G (2009) “Global Health Actors Claim To Support 
Health System Strengthening—Is This Reality or Rhetoric?” PLoS Med Vol. 6, No. 
4: e1000059. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000059 
282 
 
Marietu, T, Olarewaju, I.O (2009) “Resource conflict among farmers and Fulani 
herdsmen: Implications for resource sustainability” African Journal of Political 
Science and International Relations Vol. 3, Issue 9, pp. 360-364 
 
Martin, V, Forman, A, Lubroth, J (2006) Preparing for highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza: A Manual for countries at risk, FAO, available at 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/200354/HPAI_PreparednessManual.pdf (last 
accessed 3rd July 2012)  
 
Maudlin, I, Eisler, M.C, Welburn, S.C (2009) “Neglected and endemic zoonoses”, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, No. 364, pp 2777-87 
 
McMichael, A.J, Beaglehole, R (2000) “The changing global context of public 
health”, Lancet Vol. 356, pp 495–99 
 
Molyneux, D.H, Malecela, M.N (2011) “Neglected Tropical Diseases and the 
Millennium Development Goals-why the “other diseases” matter: reality versus 
rhetoric”, Parasites & Vectors, Vol. 4:234 
 
Molyneux D, Ndung’u, J., Maudlin I (2010) “Controlling Sleeping Sickness – When 
Will They Ever Learn?’’ PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, Vol. 4, Issue 5, e609 
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000609 
 
Molyneux, D.H (2008) “Combating the “other diseases” of MDG 6: changing the 
paradigm to achieve equity and poverty reduction?” Transactions of the Royal 
Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, Vol 102, pp509-19 
 
Morton, J (2010) “The Innovation Trajectory of Sleeping Sickness Control in 
Uganda: Research Knowledge in its Context, Research Into Use Discussion Paper 
08 available at http://www.researchintouse.com/resources/riu10discuss08ssickcntrl-
ug.pdf  (last accessed 14
th
 June 2011) 
 
Mosse, D. (2005) Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and 
Practice. London: Pluto Press  
 
Ng, N, Ruger, J.P (2011) “Global Health Governance at a Crossroads”, Global 
Health Governance, Volume III, No.2 (Spring 2011) available at 
http://www.ghgj.org (last accessed 15
th
 June 2012)  
 
Nori, M, Kenyanjui, M.B, Mohammed Ahmed Yusuf, M.A, Mohammed, F.H (2006) 
“Milking drylands: the marketing of camel milk in North East Somalia” Nomadic 
Peoples Vol. 10, No. 1 
 
Normandeau (2011) Atlanta Report 2011: Expert Meeting on One Health 
Governance and Global Network, October 31-November 1
st
 2011, Atlanta, USA 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/health/docs/2011_report-experts-atlanta_en.pdf 




Odiit M, Coleman PG, Liu WC, McDermott JJ, Fevre EM, et al. (2005) “Quantifying 
the level of under-detection of Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense sleeping sickness 
cases”, Tropical Medicine International Health, Vol 10, pp840–849 
 
Ogurinade, A, Ogurinade, B (1980) “Economic Importance of Bovine Fascioliasis in 
Nigeria”, Tropical Animal Health and Production, Vol.12, p55-60 
 
Okello (2011) Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness: An Innovative Public-Private 
Partnership for the Control of Neglected Zoonotic Disease in Uganda, Presentation 
at the First International One Health Congress, Melbourne, Australia February 2011 
 
Okello, AL, Gibbs, EPJ, Vandersmissen, A, Welburn SC (2011), “One Health and 
the Neglected Zoonoses: Turning Rhetoric into Reality”, Veterinary Record, Vol. 




 J (1995) “Whose policy is it anyway? International and 
national influences on health policy development in Uganda”, Health Policy and 
Planning, Vol. 10, Issue 2, pp 122-132 
 
Ollila, E (2005) “Global Health Priorities – Priorities of the Wealthy?” Global 
Health Vol.1, No. 6 
 
Omamo, S.W. (2003) “Policy Research on African Agriculture: Trends, Gaps, and 
Challenges”, ISNAR Research Report 21. The Hague: International Service for 
National Agricultural Research 
 
Omamo, S.W, Farrington, J (2004) “Policy research and African agriculture: Time 
for a dose of reality?” Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Natural Resource 
perspectives, No. 90 
 
Osburn, B., Scott, C., Gibbs, P (2009) “One World - One Medicine – One Health: 
emerging veterinary challenges and opportunities” Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz. Vol. 
28, No. 2, pp481-6 
 
Oxby, C (1984) “Settlement Schemes for Herders in the Subhumid Tropics of West 
Africa: Issues of Land Rights and Ethnicity” Development Policy Review, Vol. 2, pp 
217-33 
 
Packard, R.M (1997) “Malaria dreams: Postwar visions of health and development in 
the third world”, Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies in Health and 
Illness, Vol.17, No.3, pp279-296  
 
Picozzi, K., Fevre, E.M., Odiit, M., Carrington, M., Eisler, M.C., Maudlin, I., 
Welburn, S.C., (2005). “Sleeping sickness in Uganda: a thin line between two fatal 




Reid, A.H, Fanning, T.G, Hultin, J.V., Taubenberger, J.K (1999), “Origin and 
evolution of the 1918 “Spanish” influenza virus haemagglutinin gene”, Proceedings 
of the Natural Academy of Sciences, Vol. 96, pp 1651-56 
 
Riesman, P (1977) Freedom in Fulani social life – An Introspective Ethnography, 
University of Chicago, ISBN 0-226-71743-7 
Rist, R.C (1994) “Influencing the Policy Process with Qualitative Research”, In N. 
Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research pp. 545-557, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc  
http://www.edstudies.net/files/active/0/resources-influencing.html (last accessed 15th 
June 2012) 
 
Schofield, C, Kabayo, J.P (2008) “Trypanosomiasis vector control in Africa and 
Latin America”, Parasites & Vectors, Vol 1, no.  24 doi: 10.1186/1756-3305-1-24 
  
Schwabe CW (1984) Veterinary medicine and human health. Baltimore (USA): 
Williams & Wilkins; 1984. 
 
Scoones, I (2010) Avian Influenza: Science, Policy and Politics, Earthscan UK, 
ISBN 978-1-84971-096-1  
 
Scoones, I, Forster, P (2007) “International policy processes and HPAI (highly 
pathogenic avian influenza) A scoping study” First Phase Report for FAP PPLPI, 
STEPS Centre, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, 
UK 
 
Sharrer, G.T (1995) “The great glanders epizootic, 1861-1866: A civil war legacy”, 
Agricultural History, Vol 69, No 1, pp79-97 
 
Shaw, A (2009) “The socio-economic impact of the SOS programme on Human 
African Trypanosomiasis”, Research Into Use Project Documents, September 2009 
 
Shinyekwa, I, Hickey, S (2007) PRS Review: Uganda Case Study, Background 
Paper for the Chronic Poverty Report 2008-2009, Publication of the Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre, available at 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/publications/details/prs-review-uganda-case-study/ss 
(last accessed 3rd July 2012) 
 
Shuchman, M.D (2007) “Improving Global Health — Margaret Chan at the WHO”, 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol 356, pp 653-656 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp068299  
 
Sierra, K (2009) CGIAR joint declaration , 8
th








Simarro PP, Jannin J, Cattand P (2008) “Eliminating human African 
trypanosomiasis: Where do we stand and what comes next?” PLoS Medicine, Vol. 5, 
no. 2: e55, doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050055   
 
Silver, G.A (1998) “Editorial: International Health Services need an 
Interorganizational Policy”, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 88, No. 5, pp 
727-729 
 
Singer, P.A, Benatar, S.R, Bernstein, M, Daar, A. S et.al (2003) “Ethics and SARS: 
lessons from Toronto”, British Medical Journal, Vol 327, pp 1342-44  
 
Slovic, P (1987) “Perception of Risk”, Science, New Series, Vol. 236, Issue 4799, 
pp280-285 
 
Smith, R, Woodward, D, Acharya, A, Beaglehole, R, Drager, N (2004) 
“Communicable disease control: a ‘Global Public Good’ perspective”, Health Policy 
and Planning, Vol. 19, No. 5, p271-278 doi: 10.1093/heapol/czh032  
 
Smith, R.D, MacKellar, L (2007) “Global public goods and the global health agenda: 
problems, priorities and potential” Globalization and Health, Vol. 3 No. 9 
doi:10.1186/1744-8603-3-9 
 
Smith, R (2003) “Global public goods and health”, Bulletin of the World Health 
Organisation, Vol. 81, No. 7, p 475 
 
Sridhar, D (2010) “Seven Challenges in International Development Assistance for 
Health and Ways Forward”, Global Health Governance Volume II, No.2 (Fall 2010) 
available at http://www.ghgj.org (last accessed 15
th
 June 2012)  
 
Sridhar, D (2009) “Global Health - Who can lead?” Chatham House Publications, 
February 2009, pp 25-26, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt 
(last accessed 15th June 2012) 
 
Stark, J (2011) “Climate change and conflict in Uganda: the cattle corridor and 




 July 2012) 
 
Steele, J.H (1964) “The socioeconomic responsibilities of veterinary medicine”, 
Public Health Reports, Vol 79, No. 7, pp 613-18 
 
Stevens, P (2004) “Diseases of Poverty and the 10/90 Gap”, International Policy 
Network Paper, available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/InternationalPolicyNetwork.pdf 
(last accessed 3rd July 2012)  
 
Stoker, G (1998) “Governance as Theory: five propositions”, UNESCO 1998, 
Blackwell Publishers UK, ISSJ 155/1998 
286 
 
Stone Mountain Meting Overview (2010) Operationalising One Health: A Policy 
Perspective – Taking Stock and Shaping an Implementation Roadmap, available at 
http://www.influenzaresources.org/files/Stone_Mountain_Report_2010.pdf  (last 
accessed 3
rd
 July 2012)  
 
Sutton, R (1999) “The Policy Process: An Overview”, Working Paper 118, Overseas 
Development Institute, Chameleon Press Ltd, London SW18 4SG 
ISBN 0 85003 417 5 
 
Sze, S. (1998) “WHO: From small beginnings”, WHO Forum Interview, World 
Health Forum, Vol 9, pp 29-34 
 
Taylor, A.L (2002) “Global governance, international health law and WHO: Looking 
towards the future”, Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, Vol. 80, pp 975-980   
 
Taubenberger, J. K., Reid , A. H., Lourens, R. M., Wang, R., Jin, G. and Fanning, T. 
G. (2005) Characterisation of the 1918 influenza virus polymerase genes, Nature, 
Vol. 437, pp 889-893 
 
Taylor L.H, Latham S.M, Woolhouse M.E (2001) “Risk factors for human disease 
emergence”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 356 pp 983–989 
 
Tripp, A.M (2004) “The changing face of authoritarianism in Africa: The case of 
Uganda”, Africa Today, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 3-26 
 
Torr, S.J., Maudlin, I. & Vale, G.A. (2007) “Less is more: restricted application of 
insecticide to improve the cost and efficacy of tsetse control”. Medical and 
Veterinary Entomology Vol 21, pp 53-64 
 
Turner, R.L (2005) “Livestock, Liberalisation and Democracy: Constraints and 
Opportunities for Rural Livestock Producers in a Reforming Uganda”, PPLPI 
Working Paper No.29, FAO Pro-poor Livestock Policy Initiative, available at 
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/pplpi/workingpapers.html (last 
accessed 15th June 2012) 
 
Tynan, A. C., Drayton, J.L (1988) “Conducting Focus Groups – A guide for first –
time users”, Managing Intellectual Property, Vol 6, No.1, pp 5-9 
 
UMoF (2010) Uganda’s Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture, available at 
http://api.ning.com/files/ffRLhO7x-
pp8FfrnIEFfaTgGP5wzeKG2UAhWQzkkYkM_/PMAMaindocument.pdf (last 
accessed 3rd July 2012) 
 
USAID (2007) United States Agency for International Development, Nigeria Dairy 
Enterprise Initiative, 2004-2006, Final Report, Land O’Lakes Inc, St. Paul, USA 
 
US Department of State: Background Note Nigeria 




U.S Department of State: Background Note Uganda 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm (last accessed 2nd July 2012)  
Van der Zeijst, B.A.M (2008) “Infectious Diseases know no borders: A plea for more 
collaboration between researchers in human and veterinary vaccines”, Guest 
Editorial, The Veterinary Journal, No 178, pp 1-2 
Vandersmissen, A (2011) Test Phase: Developing the One Health Global Network, 
Synthesis of replies to a test phase questionnaire, European External Action Service, 
August 2011 
 
Vaughan, J.P, Mogedalb, S, Kruseb, S, Kelley, L, Walt, G, Wilde, K (1996) 
“Financing the World Health Organisation: global importance of extrabudgetary 
funds”, Health Policy Vol. 35, pp229-245  
 
Waiswa C, and Kabasa, J.D (2009) “Historical Mapping of Events in the SOS 
Districts”, RIU Project Documents, 2009  
 
Waiswa, C and Kabasa, J.D (2010) “Experiences with an In-Training Community 
Service Model in the Control of Zoonotic Sleeping Sickness in Uganda”, Journal of 
Veterinary and Medical Education, Vol 37, Issue 3, pp 276-281  
 
Walt, G (1993) “WHO under Stress: Implications for Health Policy,” Health Policy 
Vol. 24 pp125–144 
Walt, G., Gilson, L (1994) “Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the 
central role of policy analysis”, Health Policy and Planning, Vol. 9, Issue 4. pp 353-
370 
Waters-Bayer, A, Bayer, W (1994) “Coming to Terms: Interactions between 
immigrant Fulani cattle keepers and indigenous farmers in Nigeria’s subhumid 
zone”, Cahiers d’études africaines, Vol. 34, No. 133-135, pp 213-229 
 
Welburn, S.C., Picozzi, K., Fèvre, E.M., Coleman, P.G., Odiit, M., Carrington M. & 
Maudlin, I. (2001) “Identification of human-infective trypanosomes in animal 
reservoir of sleeping sickness in Uganda by means of serum-resistance-associated 
(SRA) gene” Lancet, Vol 358, pp 2017–2019. 
 
Welburn, S.C., Fèvre, E.M., Coleman, P.G. & Maudlin, I. (2004) “Epidemiology of 
Human African trypanosomiases” In I. Maudlin, P. Holmes & M. Miles, (eds.) The 
trypanosomiases, pp. 219–232, Wallingford, UK, CABI Publishing. 
 
Welburn, S.C., Coleman, P.G., Maudlin, I., Fèvre, E.M., Odiit, M. & Eisler, M.C. 
(2006) “Crisis, what crisis? Control of Rhodesian sleeping sickness” Trends in 
Parasitology, Vol 22, pp 123–128 
 
WHO International Health Regulations 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf (last accessed 




WHO (2006) The control of neglected zoonotic diseases: A route to poverty 
alleviation. Report of a joint WHO/DFID-AHP Meeting, 20–21 September 2005, 
WHO Headquarters Geneva, Switzerland 
 




WHO (2008) “Zoonotic Diseases: A guide to establishing collaboration between 
animal and human health sectors at the country level”, Published in collaboration 
with the FAO and OIE, WHO Press 
 
WHO (2009) Integrated Control of Neglected Zoonoses in Africa: Adapting the 
“One Health” concept. Report of a joint WHO/EU/ILRI/DBL/FAO/OIE/AU 
Meeting, 13-15 November 2007, ILRI Headquarters, Nairobi, Kenya  
  
WHO (2011) The control of neglected zoonotic diseases: community based 
interventions for NZDs prevention and control: report of the third conference 
organized with ICONZ, DFID-RiU, SOS , EU,TDR and FAO with the participation 
of ILRI and OIE. 23-24 November 2010, WHO Headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland. 
ISBN 978 92 4 150252 8 
 
Williams O.D, Rushton, S (2011) “Are the ‘Good Times’ Over? Looking to the 
Future of Global Health Governance”, Global Health Governance, Volume V, No. 1 
(Fall 2011) available at http://www.ghgj.org (last accessed 15
th
 June 2012) 
 
Wolmer, W. and Scoones, I. (2005) An introduction to policy processes IDS: 
Brighton 
 
World Bank Indicators: Percentage arable land Nigeria 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/arable-land-percent-of-land-area-wb-
data.html (last accessed 2nd July 2012)  
 
World Bank Indicators: percentage arable land Uganda 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/uganda/agricultural-land-percent-of-land-area-
wb-data.html (last accessed 2nd July 2012) 
 
World Bank Data Profile: Nigeria   
http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID=9147&
REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED (last accessed 2
nd
 July 2012) 
 
World Bank Data and Statistics: Nigeria  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGE
RIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:368922~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:368896,0




Yach, D, Bettcher (1998) “The Globalisation of Public Health, I: Threats and 
Opportunities” American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 88, No. 5, pp 735-738 
 
Yach, D, Bettcher (1998) “The Globalisation of Public Health, II: The Convergence 
of Self-Interest and Altruism”, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 88, No. 5, 
pp 738-741 
 
Yakubu, Y, Junaidu A.U, Magaji, A.A, Salihu, M.D, Mahmuda, A and Shehu, S 
(2011) “One Health – The Fate of Public Health in Nigeria”, Asian Journal of 
Medical Sciences, Vol 3, Issue 1, pp 47-49 
 
Yin, R. (1994) Case Study Research: design and methods. 2
nd
 Edition, Thousand 
Oaks, California, Sage Publications, USA 
 
Young, J (2005) “Research, Policy And Practice: Why Developing Countries Are 
Different” Journal of International Development, Vol. 17, pp 727–734 DOI: 
10.1002/jid.1235 
 
Zinsstag, J and Tanner, M (2008) “One health: The potential of closer cooperation 
between human and animal health in Africa”, Ethiopian Journal of Health 
Development, Vol.22 (special issue) 
 
Zinsstag, J., Schelling, E., Wyss, K., Mahamat, M.B (2005) “Potential of cooperation 
between human and animal health to strengthen health systems” The Lancet, Vol 
366, pp 2142-45 
 
Zinsstag, J, Schelling, E, Bonfoh, B, Fooks, A et al (2009) “Towards a ‘One Health’ 











APPENDIX I: TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT ONE HEALTH 
EVENTS SINCE THE 1990’S 
2004 New York 
USA  
Wildlife Conservation 
Society Global Symposium 
One World, One Health™ concept coined, along with 
the twelve “Manhattan Principles” (Appendix 2) 
aimed at “a more holistic approach...maintaining 
ecosystem integrity for the benefit of humans, their 
domesticated animals, and the foundational 
biodiversity that supports us all” (FAO 2008) 
 
2004 – 2007 Thailand, 
China & Brazil  
Wildlife Conservation 
Society “One World One 
Health”™ Symposium Series 
 
“Beyond Zoonoses: The threat of Emerging Diseases 
to Human Security and Conservation, and the 
Implications for Public Policy” (WCS 2010). The 
series explored the role conservation biologists can 
play in global public health, and the conservation 
implications for disease control 
 
2005 Geneva, Switzerland 
International Meeting on 
Avian Influenza and Human 
Pandemic Preparedness 
First in the series of high profile HPAI collaboration 





Conference on Avian and 
Human Pandemic Influenza 
 
USD $1.8 billion pledged to promote global human 
and financial co-operation for control of HPAI, 








OHITF officially established by the AMVA Executive 
Board to “study the feasibility of an initiative that 
would facilitate collaboration and cooperation....to 
help with the assessment, treatment, and prevention of 
cross-species disease transmission” (AMVA 2008). 
The OHITF has helped improve the political profile of 
One Health in the USA. 
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2007 New Delhi 
India 
International Ministerial 




Discussions stated “Promoting One Health could be 
the natural extension of the Global Response to Avian 






“Strengthening a Coordinated Response to Avian and 
Pandemic Influenza”: a five-year joint programme 
aimed to strengthen cooperation between the WHO, 
the FAO and the OIE for the management of avian 
influenza and other zoonotic diseases, advocating for 
the adoption of a “comprehensive approach in terms of 
surveillance, risk assessment and communication 




The International Ministerial 




One Health becomes a “political reality and a broadly 
recommended approach” (Vandersmissen, 2011) 
2008 FAO-OIE-WHO-UNSIC-UNICEF-WB global 
framework Contributing to One Health: A Strategic 
Framework for Reducing Risks of Infectious Diseases 
at the Animal-Human-Ecosystems Interface,  
developed to address the approach to control and risk 
management of a range of emerging diseases with the 
potential for “significant transboundary or 
socioeconomic impacts” at the animal-human-






Canadian government initiative to boost One Health 
implementation; “consistency is important in the 
definition, and that “animal-human-ecosystem health” 
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From Ideas to Action should be hereafter used rather than simply “animal-
human health” (Anon, 2009). Consensus was achieved 
on eight key recommendations largely centred around 
policy, advocacy and  communication of One Health 
to various stakeholders 
 
2009 CDC Atlanta 
USA 
Creation of the National 
Centre for Zoonotic, Vector-
Borne and Enteric Diseases 
(NCZVED)   
Published 2009-2014 strategic framework entitled 
“Confronting Infectious Diseases in an Interconnected 
World: People, Animals, and the Environment”, 
emphasising the “strong commitment to the One 
Health approach to disease prevention and control” 
(CDC, 2009).  
 
2010 Hanoi, Vietnam 
International Ministerial 
Conference on Animal and 
Pandemic Influenza 
(IMCAPI) 
Unanimous adoption of the Hanoi Declaration 
(Appendix 4), recommending a broad implementation 




2010 Stone Mountain, USA 
Stone Mountain Meeting 
Operationalizing One 
Health: a Policy Perspective 




Establishment of six One Health working groups with 




Publications Office of the European Union: Outcome 
and Impact Assessment of the Global Response to the 
Avian Influenza Crisis, 2005-2010 -  “The European 
Union has already taken initiatives under the One 
Health umbrella and will continue to do so in the 




Fifth Global Progress Report: Animal and Pandemic 
Influenza; A framework for Sustaining Momentum – 
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“The adoption of One Health approaches  as one of the 
three suggested mainstreams of the framework 
contributes to political and policy basis for further 
action” 
 
2010 Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia 
ASEAN Meeting 
ASEAN ministers of Agriculture agreed on a 
statement on “ASEAN Cooperation on Animal Health 
and Zoonoses: Avian Influenza and Beyond”. A 
regional HPAI/OH working group has been 
established, and ASEAN member-states have 
multiplied high-level declarations on the need to 
support the approach  
 
2010-2011  Various One Health meetings worldwide e.g. Brussels 
June 2010, Sapporo/Japan December 2010, 
Minneapolis May 2011, London June 2011, 
Johannesburg July 2011, Bangkok August 2011, Addis 
Ababa September 2011 
 
2011 Melbourne, Australia 
The first International One 
Health Congress 
"The scientific world -and the private sector- are on 
board. One Health case studies, from all continents, 
are being shared. There is clearly a “One Health 
movement” starting out there.” 
 
2011 Atlanta, USA Expert Meeting on One Health Governance and Global 
Network (OHGN), Atlanta 
 
2012 Davos, Switzerland 
Global Risk Forum One Health Summit “One Health - 
One Planet - One future”. Preliminary launch of the 
One Health Global Network (OHGN) web portal 





APPENDIX II: MANHATTAN PRINCIPLES 
 
We urge the world's leaders, civil society, the global health community and 
institutions of science to: 
 
1. Recognize the essential link between human, domestic animal and wildlife health 
and the threat disease poses to people, their food supplies and economies, and the 
biodiversity essential to maintaining the healthy environments and functioning 
ecosystems we all require. 
 
2. Recognize that decisions regarding land and water use have real implications for 
health. Alterations in the resilience of ecosystems and shifts in patterns of disease 
emergence and spread manifest themselves when we fail to recognize this 
relationship. 
 
3. Include wildlife health science as an essential component of global disease 
prevention, surveillance, monitoring, control and mitigation. 
 
4. Recognize that public health programs can greatly contribute to conservation 
efforts. 
 
5. Devise adaptive, holistic and forward-looking approaches to the prevention, 
surveillance, monitoring, control and mitigation of emerging and resurging diseases 
that take the complex interconnections among species into full account. 
 
6. Seek opportunities to fully integrate biodiversity conservation perspectives and 
human needs (including those related to domestic animal health) when developing 
solutions to infectious disease threats. 
 
7. Reduce the demand for and better regulate the international live wildlife and bush 
meat trade not only to protect wildlife populations but also to lessen the risks of 
disease movement, cross-species transmission, and the development of novel 
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pathogen-host relationships. The costs of this worldwide trade in terms of impacts on 
public health, agriculture and conservation are enormous, and the global community 
must address this trade as the real threat it is to global socio-economic security. 
 
8. Restrict the mass culling of free-ranging wildlife species for disease control to 
situations where there is a multidisciplinary, international scientific consensus that a 
wildlife population poses an urgent, significant threat to public health, food security, 
or wildlife health more broadly. 
 
9. Increase investment in the global human and animal health infrastructure 
commensurate with the serious nature of emerging and resurging disease threats to 
people, domestic animals and wildlife. Enhanced capacity for global human and 
animal health surveillance and for clear, timely information-sharing (that takes 
language barriers into account) can only help improve coordination of responses 
among governmental and non-governmental agencies, public and animal health 
institutions, vaccine or pharmaceutical manufacturers, and other stakeholders. 
 
10. Form collaborative relationships among governments, local people, and the 
private and public (i.e. non-profit) sectors to meet the challenges of global health and 
biodiversity conservation. 
 
11. Provide adequate resources and support for global wildlife health surveillance 
networks that exchange disease information with the public health and agricultural 
animal health communities as part of early warning systems for the emergence and 
resurgence of disease threats. 
 
12. Invest in educating and raising awareness among the world's people and in 
influencing the policy process to increase recognition that we must better understand 
the relationships between health and ecosystem integrity to succeed in improving 




APPENDIX III: BEIJING DECLARATION 18TH JANUARY 2006 
WE, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE: 
 
1. Commit ourselves to ensuring effective development and implementation of 
integrated national action plans within the framework of WHO/FAO/OIE global 
strategies guided by political leadership at the highest level, to mobilizing resources 
in our countries and to drawing upon government, civil society and the private sector 
to effect a coordinated response. In the context of our respective national plans, we 
agree to take vigorous prevention, mitigation, emergency preparedness, and rapid 
response measures in the short term together with actions over the longer term to 
prevent and control the spread of HPAI in the poultry and related industries and 
prevent human exposure to the infected birds. 
 
2. Note with particular satisfaction the World Health Assembly’s adoption of the 
International Health Regulations in May, 2005; emphasize that the implementation of 
the Regulations must reflect the real threats to international public health in the 21
st
 
century, including a possible influenza-related pandemic; and call for the earliest 
possible voluntary compliance with applicable articles in advance of the June 2007 
entry into force of the new Regulations. 
 
3. Subscribe to a long-term strategic partnership between the international 
community and the countries currently affected or at risk in which adequate and 
prompt financial and technical support is mobilized to complement the efforts by 
countries and regions, particularly developing countries. Areas of emphasis will 
include both immediate and longer-term measures. In the short term, priority will be 
given to helping countries contain, control and eliminate the virus in affected poultry 
and prepare for a possible pandemic. Priorities will be given to improving 
surveillance and detection capabilities, increasing public awareness and fostering 
community resilience, promoting vaccine research and development, developing 
stockpiles of human anti-viral, assisting with response and containment measures in 
the event of an outbreak and mitigating social, psychological and economic impacts 
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on the population. In the longer-term, priority will be given to developing capacity 
and infrastructure in animal and public health sectors, as well as undertaking 
complementary reforms in related sectors at all times that there is a need. The 
international community should conduct analysis and provide detailed guidance on a 
range of important issues – such as the appropriate structure for compensation 
systems, stockpile, monitoring and evaluation – that respond to individual country 
circumstances. 
 
4. Commit to sharing information and relevant biological materials related to HPAI 
and other novel influenza strains in our countries in a rapid and timely fashion, and 
to ensure the development, dissemination and application of good practices of HPAI 
surveillance, control, and pandemic influenza preparedness in compliance with 
existing OIE standards on veterinary services and the newly adopted WHO 
International Health Regulations. 
 
5. Commit to increasing cooperation on global research and development of safe and 
effective animal and human vaccines and antiviral medicines for humans, and to 
promoting affordable access for all who need them. 
 
6. Commit to evaluating the results and the impact of our national pandemic 
influenza preparedness and action plans periodically, reviewing and updating them as 
necessary and updating the global HPAI control strategy and human pandemic 
preparedness plans by taking advantage of the expertise and the existing technical 
networks established by UN, WHO, FAO, OIE and other relevant organizations and 
groups. 
 
Finally, we welcome the commitments made at the conference for the coordination 
with the participation of recipient countries of the financial contributions and pledges 
from international financial institutions and organizations, private foundations, 
development banks and donor countries. We see this as critical to facilitating the 
routing of pledged funds to priorities in integrated country action plans, as well as to 
regional and global actors that are leading the control and prevention efforts against 
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HPAI and pandemic threat. We believe that these funds should be delivered and 
utilized on a prompt basis in accordance with the principles of aid effectiveness 


















APPENDIX IV: HANOI DECLARATION APRIL 2010 
WE, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE 
1. Take note of the progress that has been achieved in global coordination and 
cooperation since the end of 2005 in the global response to highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (H5N1), and of the positive conclusions presented at this 
conference, and in independent evaluations of the overall H5N1 response.  
 
2. Commend the ongoing consultations at all levels, as exemplified in particular 
by the technical meeting undertaken as part of this conference, to identify, 
inform, and promote efforts to improve global health.  
 
3. Recognize the concerted efforts of the international community, including 
agencies of the United Nations system and other relevant international and 
regional organizations, countries, development and technical agencies, non-
governmental organizations, foundations, communities, the private sector, 
and other partners to prepare for and respond to the threat of pandemic 
influenza; emphasize the need to continue to enhance coordination at the 
international level and encourage countries and international partners to 
further promote information exchange on experiences, policies, guidelines, 
clinical data, and other aspects bilaterally, regionally and globally.  
 
4. Express satisfaction that commitments first made by participants at the 
January 2006 Beijing conference, and reaffirmed at subsequent conferences, 
have had significant results, including: the development and implementation 
of national integrated action plans within the strategic framework of the 
World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the 
World Organization for Animal Health; and the establishment of strategic 
partnerships between the international community and the countries affected 




5. Renew our commitment to continue and reinforce this long-term partnership, 
by working within the United Nations system and through global, regional, 
and inter-country networks to increase our capacity and cooperation on 
surveillance systems, epidemiological research, antiviral and vaccine research 
and development, health and veterinary systems strengthening, as well as safe 
and resilient systems for food production, and to evaluate periodically our 
preparedness and action plans for pandemics.  
 
6. Recognize that despite substantial progress in controlling H5N1 HPAI 
globally, the virus continues to circulate in domestic poultry in a number of 
countries, and to result in human infections and deaths.  
 
7. Encourage countries and international partners, including agencies of the 
United Nations system, to remain vigilant and continue to share information 
with respect to emerging threats such as H5N1 HPAI, pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, and other influenza viruses and to continue their efforts towards the 
control and elimination of H5N1 HPAI, while working to strengthen jointly 
human and animal public health systems and to evaluate such efforts by 
effective metrics.  
 
8. Recognize that global preparations for H5N1 HPAI influenza largely 
contributed to coordination of the response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009.  
 
9. Recognize the critical importance of learning lessons from the responses to 
H5N1 HPAI and pandemic (H1N1) 2009, including lessons from important 
learning events hosted by a number of countries and institutions as well as 
reviews and assessments that were shared at the conference, appreciate the 
risks associated with these viruses, and commit ourselves to considering to 
take further actions to avert H5N1 HPAI and increasing efforts to review 
pandemic preparedness plans using, where relevant, guidance and tools 
provided by the international technical agencies and the multilateral 
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development banks; these country strategies should be aligned nationally and 
regionally to address the global “One Health” challenges.  
 
10. Recognize that there is a need for the international community, led by the 
international technical agencies and development banks, to address the 
fundamental gaps in public health and animal health systems so as to reduce 
the impact of zoonoses, avert potential pandemics of animal origin, and 
mainstream investments and capacity in country health systems.  
 
11. Call for increased efforts to strengthen early detection of, preparedness for, 
and rapid reporting of future events, by understanding the cross-sectoral 
nature of any threat, with particular focus on the health systems’ capacity for 
rapid inter-disciplinary action and coordination in line with the requirements 
outlined in IHR 2005 and the OIE standards on quality of Veterinary 
Services, with special attention devoted to develop and sustain such capacity 
in the least developed countries, to the needs of vulnerable groups, and to 
encourage the role of local communities as part of disease prevention and 
control programmes.  
 
12. Call for the development of national strategies, plans, and interventions to 
stimulate whole-of-society, multi-sector, multi-disciplinary, and community-
based actions when addressing disease threats that arise at the animal-human-
environment interface, stress the importance of business continuity planning 
in critical sectors, encourage all stakeholders to strengthen institutional and 
practical mechanisms to support cooperation and collaboration, and work to 
improve risk communication at all levels, in particular at the community 
level.  
 
13. Underline the importance of implementing science-based public health 
measures and food safety international standards to minimize the potential 
economic and trade implications, and encourage countries to rapidly report 
disease outbreaks.  
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14. Reaffirm the critical role of communication, while reviewing the challenges 
in communications on pandemic (H1N1) 2009; enhance the efforts to better 
communicate with our populations, including the media, health services, and 
specific communities, to promote understanding of the risk, policy direction 
and necessary prevention measures, and to promote behaviour change, where 
necessary, through effective communication.  
 
15. Call for constructive cooperation between governments and the private 
sector, as well as academia, on innovations leading to improved surveillance, 
prevention, and treatment, including on diagnostic reagents, vaccines, and 
medicines, always working within the relevant policy frameworks established 
by competent national authorities and WHO and OIE.  
 
16. Finally, call for concerted worldwide efforts by all countries and relevant 
agencies of the United Nations system, and other international and regional 
partners, to better understand the emergence of disease threats at the animal-
human-environment interface through multi-sectoral actions, and to develop 

















The NLDC held its 41
st
 meeting at Bolingo Hotel, FCT Abuja on the 17
th
 of March, 
2011. 
The Honourable Minister, Federal Capital Territory, Senator Bala Mohammed was 
Special Guest of Honour and ably represented by Mallam Hamza Adamu Buwai, 
Secretary Agriculture and Rural Development, FCT.  In declaring the meeting 
opened he highlighted the numerous achievements of the Ministry in the Livestock 
sub-sector such as Model Grazing Reserves development, Dairy Development, 
equipping of Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories etc.  He appreciated the support of 
the Federal Department of Livestock (FDL) of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (FMOARD) in achieving this level of success.  
 
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
1. Legislation on the Conservation of Donkeys: 
The Committee noted the important roles of donkeys in the rural economy as beasts 
of burden and reiterated its earlier stand on the need to halt the continuous depletion 
of donkeys and other endangered animal species in the country through adequate 
legislation on consumption and trade.  This Committee recommended the expansion 
of the sub-Committee on Legislation on Donkeys to include other relevant 
stakeholders so as to encourage its production and research in the country. 
 
2. Enactment of Veterinary Council Act: 
The Committee observed with dismay the continued delay in the passing of the Act 
by the National Assembly.  The Committee therefore pleads with the National 
Assembly to speed up the enactment of this Act for National Interest. 
 
3. Resuscitation of the National Zoonosis Centre: 
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Report on resuscitation of the National Zoonosis Centre was presented and 
discussed.  The NLDC approved the recommendations on National Zoonosis Centre 
and its location at the University of Ibadan.  The Committee urged Ministry to 
actively collaborate with the relevant stakeholders to ensure the effective take off of 
the Centre.  
 
4. Legislation on Feed Quality Standards 
The Committee urged the Federal Government to accelerate the process of 
developing a legislation to regulate feed quality standards and charged the Nigerian 
Institute of Animal Science and other relevant stakeholders in the Sector to 
spearhead this initiative. 
 
5. Model Grazing Reserve and Stock Routes Development: 
The Committee commends the Federal, States and the NLDP for the achievements so 
far recorded in Grazing Reserve and Stock Routes development nationwide. The 
Committee however noted that the three tiers of Government should honour the 
sharing formula of 50 : 30 : 20 to ensure accelerated development of the remaining 
infrastructural provisions in Grazing Reserve and along resting points on grazing 
corridors nationwide.  The Committee also urged the National Assembly to 
accelerate the process of passing the bill on the National Grazing Reserve 
Commission which will go a long way in addressing the issue of Pastoralists – 
Farmers conflicts. 
 
6. Progress Report on Avian Influenza Control Project (AICP) 
The Committee commended the efforts of the Federal Department of Livestock 
(FDL), the State Governments and other collaborating Agencies in stamping out this 
dreaded disease in Nigeria.  
To sustain this achievement, the Committee recommended that the Federal and State 
Governments should provide adequate funds in their budget to ensure the continued 
implementation of the project.  The Committee also directed the National 




7. Status of Disease Reporting in Nigeria: 
The Committee expressed great concern over the poor performance of the State 
veterinary services and other relevant stakeholders with respect to disease reporting 
in the country. The Committee urged the State Veterinary Services, VTHs and all 
other stakeholders to discharge their responsibility in disease reporting as a matter of 
obligation.  The committee also recommended improvement of funding for disease 
reporting by all tiers of government in the country and greater collaboration between 
the Epidemiology Units of the Federal Department of Livestock (FDL) and Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMoH) for the purpose of exchange of information and control 
of zoonotic diseases in the light of One World one Health initiative. 
 
8. National Programme for the Control of Newcastle Disease (NCD): 
The Committee observed that combating the scourge of NCD in both commercial 
and rural free range poultry is still a national challenge.  The Committee therefore 
recommended he strategic control of Newcastle disease through the use of 
biosecurity measures complemented by mass vaccination of rural poultry nationwide 
using vaccination using NDV I2. 
 
9. National Programme for the Control of African Swine Fever (ASF): 
The Committee approved the implementation of the contingency plan for the control 
of ASF bearing in mind that many rural households’ livelihood depend on pig 
production. The Committee also recommended a baseline survey, biosecurity 
enforcement in the control of ASF and the involvement of the Universities and 
Research Institutes in the control programme.  Committee also recommended that 
compensation of affected pig farmers should be integrated in the control programme 
and urged the Federal and State Governments to make adequate provision for the 
Project. 
 
10. Abattoir Development and Meat Inspection Act: 
The Committee appreciates the efforts of the Federal Government in renovating 
some Abattoirs across the country.  The Committee also noted the positive 
innovations in Abattoir development and Management in some States and 
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recommended the promotion of Public Private Partnership (PPP) initiative to further 
support the development of standard Abattoir/slaughter slabs nationwide.  
 
The Committee also urged the application of global best practices in Meat Inspection 
and the acceleration of the process of enacting the Meat Inspection and Hygiene 
legislation by relevant stakeholders authorities.  Each LGA should have at least, one 
Veterinary Meat Inspector in its employment for effective and efficient provision of 
safe and wholesome meat and meat produce for the populace. 
 
11. Need for a Rabies Surveillance Programme in Nigeria: 
The Committee noted the increasing human casualties due to Rabies and urge for the 
conduct of a National Rabies Surveillance program to determine the actual status of 
Rabies in the country.  The Committee recommended the control of Rabies in 
animals through mass vaccination of dogs and cats and noted that a multisectoral and 
multidisciplinary approach is necessary to ensure all stakeholders are involved in the 
control. 
 
12. Establishment of Federal Veterinary Medical and Primary Veterinary 
Health Care Centres in Nigeria  
The Committee noted the existing poor veterinary facilities at Federal, State and 
local government level for the provision of veterinary care to animals. The 
Committee therefore urges Federal Government to establish Veterinary Medical 
Centres in the six geo-political zones and primary veterinary care centres in each 
local Government to handle major transboundary animal diseases and support the 
States and Local Governments in the implementation of primary veterinary health 
care services.. 
 
13. Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomosis Control in Nigeria: 
The menace of tsetse fly and trypanosomosis is increasing nationwide.  This limits 
livestock development and production as well as endangering humans through the 
transmission of sleeping sickness.   
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While appreciating Government initiatives in this programme, the committee 
recommended that the three tiers of government should provide adequate funding to 
support the Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign 
(PATTEC) in Nigeria.   
 
14. Establishment of National Livestock Resources Centre  
The Committee noted the absence of accurate and reliable livestock statistics 
essential for effective planning and policy development and also that the last 
livestock resource inventory was undertaken in 1992. The Council therefore urge the 
Federal Government to undertake a national livestock census and establish a national 
livestock resource Centre as a repository of all information and statistics relating to 
the livestock sub-sector. 
 
15. Importation of Grand Parent Stock and Parent Stock for Poultry: 
The Committee observed the fall in the quality and scarcity of day old Chicks in 
Nigeria. In other to meet the growing demand of poultry farmers, the Committee 
recommended that  
(i) government should approve limited importation of pureline 
grandparent and parent stocks of poultry through certified firms who 
possess the competence and infrastructure/facilities to bring them into 
the country to stem the collapse of the poultry industry in Nigeria   
(ii) that both these firms and the producers of day old chicks should be 
regulated  
(iii) imports are to be sourced from countries that are free of H5N1 before 
order is made and up to point of delivery. 
 
APPRECIATION: 
The Chairman and members of the National Livestock Development Committee 
appreciate the fruitful contributions of Honourable Minister, FCT, Abuja, Deans and 
Directors of VTHs of Universities, Research Institutes, State Directors of 
Veterinary/Livestock Services, Professional Livestock Associations, the Secretariat, 
the Press and all the good people of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.   
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Your hospitality and open door policy made our stay enjoyable and very memorable. 
Thank you.  
 
Dr. Joseph Nyager 
Chairman NLDC 2011 
 
 
 
